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1. Introduction 1 
“Man is said to be a reasoning animal. I do not know why he has not been defined as an affective or 
feeling animal. Perhaps that which differentiates him from other animals is feeling rather than reason. 
More often I have seen a cat reason than laugh or weep. Perhaps it weeps or laughs inwardly - but then 
perhaps, also inwardly, the crab resolves equations of the second degree.” 
(Miguel de Unamuno y Jugo) 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In a long tradition that even goes back into ancient times (see for example the Greek 
philosopher Plato and the compound soul) emotion (passion) has been separated from 
cognition (reason) and motivation (will or volition). Emotions were the primitive branch of 
personhood, always disturbing and getting in the way of the strived for good qualities like 
thought and rationality. Nowadays it is common knowledge that it is difficult to think calmly 
and clearly while experiencing an extreme emotion. In German legislation it is even 
differentiated between for example murder and murder in the heat of the moment (“Mord im 
Affekt”). Emotions are often said to have an irrational nature and that they disrupt rationality 
and optimal functioning (Ben-Ze´ev, 2000). Expressions like “she was beside herself with 
rage” or “he was out of his mind with grief” are frequently used terms. 
This view can also be recovered in psychological research. For example the cognitive oriented 
psychological disciplines which are interested in action control, attention, inhibition, problem-
solving, decision making, goal pursuit etc. were rarely interested in the modulation of these 
processes through emotion, affect, or feelings. On the contrary, they often considered emotion 
or affect as disturbing influences for their research goals in the field of cognition (Oatley & 
Johnson-Laird, 1987, 1996). 
However, this view changes and the idea of cognition and emotion as highly intertwined 
becomes ever more popular. Nowadays it is more common to examine emotions and 
cognition not separately but their interrelation. Emotions are discovered as being the centre of 
human mental and social life. They are declared to be essential and to serve important 
functions in everyday life. Only emotions and their often evaluative character allow 
appropriate responses and behaviour in many situations. 
One of the most interesting parts of cognition is executive functions. These functions describe 
basic human processes that make it possible to strive for and to achieve certain goals 
(Baddeley, 1992, 2000; Luria, 1973; Norman & Shallice, 1986). They organise the 
coexistence of two contradicting abilities: to guarantee stable and flexible processing within 
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the cognitive system at the same time. As top-down control processes executive functions 
enable a person to strive for once set goals and to create actions, intentions and behaviour that 
allow the realisation of those goals. This requires a certain kind of stability that allows 
maintenance of intentions and goals over a period of time, that shields them against 
distraction of any kind from the inside or outside and inhibits and suppresses behaviour and 
actions that do not serve the current goal. However, at the same time the organism should not 
be too rigid and be able to flexibly respond to significant changes. Opportunities and changes 
have to be noticed in order to adjust goals and adapt behaviour whenever it is necessary. 
Flexibility and stability are controlled in a top-down manner meaning not stimuli in the 
environment trigger actions but intrinsic processes. This can be described as the will to do this 
or that even against all odds. The special interest of the current study is whether executive 
functions can be modulated by affect. It can be imagined that short affective stimuli might be 
able to disturb the flexibility-stability balance. The selection of the appropriate goals, actions, 
and behaviour or the ability to ignore distracting information might be influenced by affect. 
Emmons and Kaiser (1996) state that affect plays an important role in determining one’s 
commitment to goals. These authors think that affect energizes goal directed behaviour and 
that it can, for example as feedback, provide a basis to inform about the status of a goal. 
Affective stimulation might be the switch between flexibility and stability. However, models 
that allow generating concrete hypotheses about modulating influences of affect on executive 
functions are rare. The classic models of executive functions like the working memory model 
by Baddeley (1986, 2007) or Norman and Shallice’s Supervisory Attentional System (SAS) 
(1986) do hardly include elements that allow deducing ideas about affective influences on 
executive functions.  
On the other side there is vast research concerning influences of mood on cognition in 
general. It has been discovered that mood can influence such complex abilities like memory, 
making judgments, processing of information, or creativity (Clore, Wyer, Dienes, Gasper, 
Gohm, & Isbell, 2001; see Isen 1999, 2000, and Levine & Pizarro, 2004 for reviews). Quite 
often it is assumed that positive mood facilitates processing. Further, these mood effects are 
often explained with different processing styles caused by the different moods (Fiedler, 1988; 
Isen, 2000; Kuhl, 1983; Schwarz, 1990), or with the help of associative networks (Bower, 
1981; Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978), or the idea of feelings as information (Schwarz, 
1990; Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 2003). Some of those ideas are quite elaborate and are good 
models to explain various mood effects, but they are hardly useful to generate ideas about 
how short lived affects may influence executive functions like flexibility, stability, planning 
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and organising, inhibition of inappropriate responses and regulation of impulse control and 
maintenance of relevant task elements. 
Nevertheless there are two models with quite different origins that allow generating more 
appropriate hypotheses about the assumed influences. The PSI model (Theory of Personality 
Systems Interaction) by Julius Kuhl (1996, 2000, 2001) is a model that integrates personality, 
emotional, and action control theories. A second relevant model is the dopaminergic theory by 
Ashby, Isen, and Turken (1999) that was adapted to executive functions by Dreisbach and 
Goschke (2004). From both theories assumptions can be deduced concerning influences of 
affect on flexibility, distractibility, inhibition, perseveration, maintenance capability, 
automatic and controlled processing. The dopaminergic theory assumes that already mild 
positive affect increases dopamine release in certain brain areas which influences performance 
on cognitive tasks. This theory predicts higher flexibility with positive affect whereas Kuhl 
predicts something similar, reduced flexibility without positive affect, flexibility is suppressed 
by negative affect. What also results from the dopaminergic theory by Dreisbach and Goschke 
(2004) is that whereas more dopamine enhances flexibility, stability processes in terms of 
maintenance capabilities and perseveration suffer. A further special assumption concerning 
inhibition is made by Kuhl and Kazén (1999) based on PSI theory. They expect that once 
formed inhibition to control intentions can be overcome more easily with positive affect. 
These different influences on different elements of executive functions make clear that a 
common statement like positive affect improves or impairs executive functions cannot be 
made. This is also due to the vast amount of different functions that are subsumed under the 
term executive functions. 
The hypotheses generated from the two models were tested with a popular paradigm, the task 
switching paradigm. Switch costs and backward inhibition effects were calculated and used as 
indicators for executive control functions. Switch costs are a well established measure to 
represent executive control functions (Jersild, 1927; Meiran, 1996; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; 
Spector & Biedermann, 1976). To deal with repeatedly switching tasks requires high 
flexibility and attention, inhibition of inappropriate responses and task sets, maintenance of 
different task sets, and shielding against distracting influences. The backward inhibition effect 
introduced for the first time by Mayr and Keele (2000) with a paradigm that consists of three 
different tasks allows examining separately the ability to use inhibition, especially inhibition 
linked to abandoned task sets. For affective stimulation positive, negative, and neutral pictures 
(from the International Affective Picture System, “IAPS” by Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 
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2005) as well as feedback were embedded into the paradigm. This allowed examining 
whether affective stimulation influences executive functions. 
Before introducing and presenting the two models that allow generating useful hypotheses, 
Kuhl’s PSI theory and the dopaminergic theory, a brief introduction will be made concerning 
executive functions and the two measures that were used in this study, switch costs and the 
backward inhibition effect. Furthermore a short overview is given about how affect is defined 
and distinguished from mood. 
 
 
1.1 Executive Functions 
 
At first, definitions concerning executive functions are presented briefly. The task switching 
paradigm is introduced that allows calculating switch costs and backward inhibition effects 
which both seem to be good indicators for executive control functions. Besides representing 
executive functions switch costs are in particular also often caused partly by exogenous, non 
executive processes. This has to be taken into account when working with task switching and 
switch costs and is therefore discussed in more detail. 
 
 
1.1.1 Definitions and discrimination 
 
Although it seems that the concept of executive functions is not very old but having its origins 
in the modern psychology, parts of the processes connected to it can be tracked down to much 
older ideas. Kuhl (2001) for example emphasised the affinity of modern research concerning 
executive functions and cognitive control to the older concept of volition. He describes 
volition that was already examined at the beginning of the last century by Narziß Ach (1910) 
within the so called famous “Würzburger Schule” as an important part of action control. 
Cognitive control or executive functions are normally described as the regulation and 
organisation of behaviour (Baddeley, 1986; Norman & Shallice, 1986). More precisely these 
are functions that coordinate perceptual, cognitive, and motor processes in a way that allows a 
flexible adaptation to current task demands (Baddeley, 1992, 2000; Luria, 1973; Smith & 
Jonides, 1999). Many different processes have been connected with executive functions 
because these functions are said to be responsible for adjusting an organism into a present 
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environment. Flexible and at the same time stable processing is necessary. Attention has to be 
controlled and when necessary switched to and focused on relevant information and objects 
(Baddeley, 1992; Kuhl, 1984, 2000; Smith & Jonides, 1999). Information has to be organised 
and coordinated to make it possible to plan the appropriate actions (Baddeley, 1986, 2007; 
Bayliss & Roodenrys, 2000; Garner, 2009; Smith & Jonides, 1999; Tranel, Anderson, & 
Benton, 1994). An adequate response to intrinsic and extrinsic demands always has to take 
into account personal goals and plans and environmental constraints. Behaviour in general 
should always be goal directed (Barkley, 1997, 2001; Kuhl; 2000). To allow selected actions 
to take place the organism also has to inhibit inappropriate responses and regulate impulse 
control (Bayliss & Roodenrys, 2000; Bjorklund & Harnishfeger, 1995; Garner, 2009; Gruber 
& Goschke, 2004; Kuhl, 2001). Taken together, all mentioned factors result in action control 
and action selection (Baddeley, 1986, 2007; Kuhl, 1984, 2000; Smith & Jonides, 1999; Tranel 
et al., 1994) which make self-regulation (Bayliss & Roodenrys, 2000; Garner, 2009; Kuhl, 
2000) and motor control (Barkley, 1997) possible and define executive functions as top-down 
controlled processes (Bobrow & Norman, 1975; Kluwe, 1995, 1997). 
To carry out executive functions many processes are working together to allow an appropriate 
task management: focusing and switching attention, coding representations, inhibiting 
irrelevant processes, planning an action sequence to accomplish a goal, monitoring and 
checking ongoing processes etc. External but also internal stimuli serve as input for the 
system. Output losses and abnormal behaviour can be the consequences of a damaged or 
impaired control system. 
 
 
1.1.2 Task switching paradigm 
 
Among the many existing methods to measure executive functions the task switching 
paradigm is picked out and explained further. This paradigm is said to be able to measure 
executive control functions (De Jong, 2000; Logan, 1985; Sohn & Anderson, 2001). The 
purpose of executive functions is the adaptation of human behaviour to external and internal 
demands. However, the core of those functions is that they can work independently from 
external stimulation if necessary. That requires flexibility and stability at the same time to 
make an appropriate and adequate action regulation and self-regulation possible. The 
switching between at least two different tasks requires high flexibility. Both task sets have to 
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be maintained simultaneously, goals have to be adjusted according to the current task and 
activation of the relevant task set has to take place as well as suppressing of the irrelevant one. 
Jersild (1927) introduced the task switching paradigm by comparing reaction times in blocks 
that consisted of only one task (A-A-A… or B-B-B…) with reaction times in blocks with 
alternating task sequences (A-B-A-B-A…). The homogeneous list of tasks in the single 
blocks normally produces faster reaction times compared to the heterogeneous lists of the 
mixed blocks. So called “switch costs” can be calculated, referred to as “shift loss” by Jersild 
in his original work. Those costs are supposed to represent the additional cognitive demand to 
execute two alternating tasks. This additional cognitive demand can be described in terms of 
different executive processes. What is needed in addition to work through the heterogeneous 
lists is maintaining two task sets at the same time, switching task sets, shifting attention, 
inhibiting previously used task sets, and suppressing activation of the abandoned task that 
might be triggered by ambiguous target stimuli. These processes have to be actively used as 
top-down controlled processes to be able to execute the requested task sequence. An adequate 
measure for executive functions is provided in terms of switch costs with the task switching 
paradigm. Gruber and Goschke (2004) explicitly stated that the abilities to maintain task set 
information, execute conflict monitoring, inhibit prepotent responses, and switch task sets are 
part of executive functions. 
Rogers and Monsell (1995) observed two problems with Jersild’s paradigm and his way of 
calculating switch costs. First, the mixed blocks contain two processes that until then were not 
separable with the common method of data collection. To work through the mixed blocks 
participants need to maintain two tasks simultaneously and also to switch between the two 
tasks. Secondly, the authors assumed that the two different block forms, single and mixed 
require different amounts of attention, effort and strategy use. Rogers and Monsell (1995) 
changed the paradigm in a way that switch costs could be calculated within the mixed blocks. 
In heterogeneous lists tasks did not alternate from trial to trial but only every second time (A-
A-B-B-A-A-B…). A difference can be calculated comparing the switch trials A-B (or B-A) 
with the non-switch trials A-A (or B-B). With these changes in task sequences two different 
measures based on reaction times or error rates can be calculated: general switch costs, 
representing the difference between single and mixed blocks and specific switch costs, 
representing the difference between switch and non-switch trials (Kray & Lindenberger, 
2000). The two measures represent slightly different executive processes. The specific switch 
costs show the greater amount of time that is necessary to simply switch between two 
different tasks. That of course includes various processes like shifting attention, switching 
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task sets and retrieving the associated goals, activating task sets, and inhibiting distracting 
information. General switch costs describe how much more time is needed to maintain two 
tasks and switch between them simultaneously compared to maintaining and working on only 
one task. Switch costs have been investigated through the last 80 years and they have proved 
to be a reliable measure that is well established and documented nowadays (Allport, Styles, & 
Hsieh, 1994; Goschke, 2000; Jersild, 1927; Meiran, 1996; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Spector 
& Biederman, 1976; Wong & Leboe, 2009; for a short review about task switching see 
Monsell, 2003). 
Although switch costs are used as a measure for executive functions researchers always knew 
that the costs also include other processes that are not executive control processes (Mayr & 
Kliegl, 2003; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Rubinstein, Meyer, & Evans, 2001; Sohn & 
Anderson, 2001). Some researchers even tried to explain switch costs without any 
involvement of executive control functions like Allport and colleagues (1994) or hardly any 
involvement like Waszak, Hommel, and Allport (2003). Besides the fact that switch costs 
seem to be a fairly good measure to represent executive control functions the question about 
what causes switch costs, what kind of processes are involved and how they interact is still 
controversial and will be covered in the next paragraph. 
 
 
1.1.3 Assumed processes underlying switch costs 
 
Several processes have been named that are involved in producing switch costs. The most 
frequent explanation is that of exogenous and endogenous reconfiguration processes being 
responsible (Mayr & Kliegl, 2003; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Rubinstein et al., 2001). 
Sometimes different and sometimes quite similar reconfiguration processes are listed by 
various researchers: Monsell (2003) specifies shifting attention, retrieval of goals and action 
rules, activating response sets, and inhibiting irrelevant task elements being part of 
reconfiguration processes; De Jong, Berendsen, and Cools (1999) propose configuration of 
relevant processing modules and setting task goals that trigger retrieval of representations of 
the associated task set; and Sohn and Anderson (2001) list encoding, identifying, 
categorisation, and retrieval of information, rule translation and application and response 
selection. Further processes that have been named as being a cause for switch costs are for 
example S-R-event bindings (Waszak et al., 2003; see also Koch & Allport, 2006) and 
interference from previous tasks (Allport et al., 1994). The latter is closely connected to 
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passive dissipating of previous activation (Meiran, Chorev, & Sapir, 2000; Sohn & Anderson 
2001). Of those five processes (exogenous and endogenous reconfiguration, S-R bindings, 
interference, dissipating) only endogenous reconfigurations can be identified as being genuine 
executive control processes. All other processes are stimulus driven bottom-up processes. 
Most frequently a combination of exogenous and endogenous reconfiguration processes are 
used as an explanation for switch costs. Therefore reconfiguration processes are going to be 
discussed together. The three remaining explanations for switch costs, interference, 
dissipating of activation, and S-R bindings are also outlined together further below as 
explanations that have no relation to executive functions. 
 
Exogenous and endogenous reconfiguration processes 
Rogers and Monsell (1995) declared that part of the task set reconfiguration is endogenously 
driven meaning that task sets can be adopted and prepared in advance of a target whereas 
other parts can only be completed by exogenous processes after target onset. The authors link 
both processes to Norman and Shallice’s (1986) model with the endogenous processes being 
represented in the SAS and the exogenous processes in the contention scheduling. Rogers and 
Monsell (1995) showed that preparation effects rely on a genuine executive control process. 
The use of cues within the task switching paradigm, that announce tasks before target onset 
allow control over the cue target interval (CTI) and the response cue interval (RCI) 
independently. Switch costs could not be reduced by increased preparation intervals when 
they were changed randomly. However, presenting the different preparation intervals in a 
blocked form resulted in significantly reduced switch costs with increasing preparation 
intervals. Thus, only when participants can count on long preparation intervals the additional 
time can be used with the help of control processes to prepare a task in advance. The task is 
not prepared in an automatic way whenever long intervals would allow it. A maximal 
reduction of costs emerged with preparation intervals up to 600ms, longer intervals (up to 
1200ms) could not further reduce the costs and residual costs remained (Rogers & 
Monsell,1995). Meiran and colleagues (2000) found the same effects concerning CTIs and 
called it the preparatory component of switch costs that reflects reconfiguration of a stimulus 
task set before target onset. A second component in their model called the residual component 
is caused mainly by the delayed reconfiguration of the response task set (Meiran, 2000). Sohn 
and Anderson (2001) also identify an endogenous process that is goal-directed, intentional, 
and voluntary and which produces switch costs in case of an inadequate preparation for a task 
switch compared to a task repetition. Like Rogers and Monsell (1995), Sohn and Anderson 
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(2001) declare that executive functions are not represented in residual switch costs any more. 
Rogers and Monsell’s describe endogenous components of task set reconfiguration being able 
to be carried out during preparation intervals but completion of the reconfiguration process 
has to await triggering by a task relevant stimulus. Therefore exogenous components can only 
be completed after stimulus onset. The duration of those exogenous processes results in 
residual switch costs. Sohn and Anderson (2001) showed in two experiments that in residual 
costs only the automatic control (= priming of the information of the previous trial) is 
reflected. 
Mayr and Kliegl (2003) put a slightly different focus on reconfiguration processes but 
confirmed Rogers and Monsell’s (1995) fragmentation into exogenous and endogenous 
reconfiguration processes. In their opinion, cue switches that are part of every cued task 
switch are mainly responsible for switch costs. They identified two processing stages. The 
retrieval stage is triggered by internal or external signals and contains cue driven retrieval of 
rules whereas the application stage is closely linked to the stimulus, with task rules being 
applied automatically. As a consequence, ordinary switch costs can be divided into a cue 
switch (= retrieval stage) and a task switch component (= application stage). On application 
stage only one task set can be maintained in working memory at a time. On retrieval stage 
task rules of the upcoming task have to be retrieved from long term memory. With the use of 
two cues per task Mayr and Kliegl (2003) could confirm their model in several experiments. 
A substantial component of switch costs is caused by cue switches. Cue switch costs 
(=retrieval stage) interacted with practice and preparation whereas the assumed automatic 
processes of the application stage in terms of task switch costs are not or hardly influenced by 
preparation and practice. Therefore processes of the application stage might be called 
exogenous and processes of the retrieval stage endogenous. This fragmentation into cue 
switch and task switch costs allows speculating about the generally calculated switch costs as 
being an appropriate measure for executive functions. Mayr and Kliegl’s (2003) findings 
seem to demonstrate, that cue switch costs could be the more pure and exact measure for 
executive control functions. 
Rubinstein and colleagues (2001) also declared that exogenous and endogenous processes are 
responsible for switch costs but they focused on the importance of rule activation for task 
switching. Rules of the previous task need to be disabled whereas the rules of the current task 
need to be enabled. Those authors classified two separable sets of stages, executive control 
processes and task processes. The latter ones are suggested to consist of stimulus 
identification, response selection, and movement production. Tasks performed repetitively 
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allow an immediate response selection after stimulus identification. Between the end of 
stimulus identification and the beginning of response selection processing stops in case of a 
task switch. This delay is used to execute control processes that enable the subsequent 
response selection stage to proceed correctly. Those executive control processes include two 
stages, goal shifting and rule activation. Task cuing allows goal shifting and rule activation to 
take place in advance and reduce switch costs whereas rule complexity affects rule activation 
in a negative way and increases switch costs. Hence, based on Rubinstein and colleagues’ 
model (2001) increased switch costs are caused by an increased use of executive functions. 
A more special form of interplay between exogenous and endogenous processes is presented 
by De Jong (2000). Although this author also sees exogenous processes being involved in task 
set reconfiguration like Rogers and Monsell (1995), his main idea is that occasional failures of 
endogenous processes cause the lion’s share of switch costs. De Jong and colleagues (1999) 
asked whether interference effects like Stroop or switch costs do reflect real limitations in 
inhibitory capabilities or whether they are only due to occasional failures to fully apply such 
capabilities. Instead of assuming that parts of the reconfiguration process can only start with 
stimulus onset, De Jong (2000) presents his “failure-to-engage” (FTE) hypothesis. This 
hypothesis states that advance preparation is useful and optional and takes place but that 
residual costs are due to occasional failures to engage in such a preparation. Hence, the cause 
for residual costs is not the inability to produce a complete reconfiguration in advance but that 
sometimes reconfiguration processes cannot be executed and accomplished beforehand. The 
cause for these failures in adequate preparation is seen in goal neglect that causes interference 
(De Jong, 2000; De Jong et al., 1999). Subjects always attempt task set reconfiguration before 
stimulus onset. When they succeed, a task switch can be performed without any reaction time 
loss but in some trials they fail and therefore switch costs emerge. Task set reconfiguration is 
defined as an all-or-none process, retrieval attempts of task goals and task rules either fail or 
succeed. 
This single, endogenous process assumption by De Jong (2000) is doubted by Meiran and 
Chorev (2005). They claim that not the proportion of prepared trials in general is affected but 
the target related retrieval competition and therefore also residual components of switch costs. 
Stable task goal representations that are achieved to a greater or lesser extent are the key to 
the authors idea. Stable representations help to overcome automatic tendencies more easily 
resulting in better or faster performances and therefore also in reduced switch costs. 
Especially in switch trials a strong goal representation is needed because with the presentation 
of the target also the task features of the abandoned task are retrieved. Hence, poor task goal 
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representation in switch trials increases switch costs. The authors reasoned that alertness 
might improve goal representation and as a consequence reduce switch costs. Experiments 
showed that alertness reduced switch costs which confirms Meiran and Chorev’s (2005) 
assumptions. 
 
Explanations that have no relation to executive functions 
Allport and colleagues (1994; see also Allport, 1987) seriously doubt whether switch costs are 
the result of a stagelike control process that precedes S-R task execution. In several 
experiments the authors showed that expectations derived from that approach were not met. 
That is, different elements like for example switching more than one task feature, executing 
more difficult tasks, or switching to non dominant tasks should increase executive control 
demands, more executive control would be required and therefore also switch costs should 
increase. That was not the case. Furthermore, the still existent switch costs even after long 
preparation intervals and with the exact knowledge about the upcoming task were not 
expected because executive control processes should and could have been carried out in 
advance to the full extent. Hence, Allport and colleagues (1994) declare that not a stimulus-
independent, autonomous control operation is responsible for switch costs but a kind of 
proactive interference caused by features of the previous task. With proactive interference the 
authors mainly mean competing S-R mappings persisting from the preceding instruction set 
and called it task set inertia (TSI). However, also with long reaction stimulus intervals (RSIs) 
switch costs were still present which makes a passive decay of interference over time very 
unlikely. It seems more plausible to assume that active disengagement from the previous task 
set must wait until triggered by the stimulus of the current task. Allport and colleagues (1994) 
state that features from the previously used instruction set remain active during execution of 
the current task set what causes interference and in the end the residual costs. Their 
conclusion is that executive control functions are not responsible for switch costs. Allport and 
colleagues’ (1994) idea clearly supports a stimulus driven explanation for switch costs. In 
their opinion switch costs are a limitation in people’s ability to switch from task to task by 
fully endogenous means. Costs are due to an inability to inhibit recently adopted, but now 
irrelevant task sets. Such task sets interfere with the current task and slow down responding. 
Although Allport and colleagues (1994) deny that endogenous processes in terms of executive 
control functions carried out before task execution are responsible for switch costs, executive 
processes might still be involved. The authors themselves open the door to allow such an 
assumption when they state that costs are due to an inability to inhibit previous task sets. 
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Inhibition might be used as an endogenous control process to deal with the described 
interference. Inhibition and suppression of persisting activation or the abandoned task set can 
reduce interference and be a useful method to facilitate execution of the current task. 
The influence of previous tasks on current ones are not only represented in Allport and 
colleagues’ (1994) TSI but also in ideas about what happens with persisting activation. The 
dissipating of activation has been examined in several studies. Switch costs are reduced with 
long RCIs. Meiran and colleagues (2000) listed a dissipating component as also responsible 
for switch costs in addition to the already mentioned preparation and residual components. 
But compared to reduction by preparation the underlying process for reduction by dissipation 
is passive and non strategic. This can be assumed because switch costs could be reduced even 
when RCIs were changed randomly. No control functions were used because whenever longer 
intervals were present the dissipating took place.  
Persisting activation from the previous task set is also mentioned by Sohn and Anderson 
(2001) as the second source for switch costs besides preparation effects. The authors assume 
that not the upcoming but the previous task is the problem and cause for switch costs. As a 
consequence switch costs represent both, control processes (like in preparation effects) and 
more automatic processes (like in repetition effects). However, as already mentioned Sohn 
and Anderson (2001) showed that in residual costs only automatic control seems to be 
reflected.  
A further factor that seems to be involved in producing switch costs are S-R-event bindings 
(Waszak et al., 2003). The idea of such bindings relies on Hommel’s so called event files 
(1998, 2004) which are representations created when a stimulus is presented and an action 
selected. S-R-event bindings that integrate perceptual and action information and bind for 
example information about stimuli, response, task, the goal of the action, and task specific 
processing can be long lasting and later reactivated from memory. The authors claim that 
stimuli acquire associations with the tasks they occur with. Features of the competing task are 
also triggered by a stimulus when task activation is weak (e.g. switch trials). Hence, the 
common procedure of using the same stimulus in different tasks might be the cause for the 
greatest share in switch costs because especially under switching conditions the retrieval of 
irrelevant task features leads to increased reaction times. Indeed, experiments showed that 
switch costs included a massive item specific effect meaning, that stimuli used previously in 
the other task produced higher reaction times compared to stimuli had not been shown before 
(Waszak et al., 2003). In the authors opinion this cannot be simple task set inertia (Allport et 
al., 1994) because this effect was obtained even over long intervals with several other tasks to 
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execute in between. A stimulus driven priming of higher order task elements is assumed to 
explain the effect (Waszak et al., 2003).  
The assumption that stimulus-based priming affects the task level was later confirmed by 
Koch and Allport (2006). These authors further examined influences of preparation and decay 
of activation on that part of switch costs that is caused by such stimulus-task associations. 
Longer CTIs reduced the effect of stimulus-based priming on switch costs. Hence, Koch and 
Allport (2006) conclude that stimulus-based effects are probably not responsible for residual 
costs that are normally still existent after long preparation intervals. However, longer RSIs did 
not have an impact on stimulus-based effects of switch costs. The authors assume, that 
stimulus-based priming and preparation effects relate to stimulus set whereas effects of decay 
relate to response set, with response and stimulus set being components of the task set 
(Meiran, 2000). 
 
Conclusion 
Small or large switch costs do not allow drawing conclusions about how many executive 
functions were used or how much control was exercised. Normally large switch costs would 
mean that executive functions have been executed poorly. All functions that can be used to 
flexible switch between tasks like shifting attention, activating and retrieving task sets, 
adjusting goals, inhibiting irrelevant elements etc. were applied slowly and not used 
efficiently. Small costs can be understood as a sign of well applied executive functions that 
allowed a quick and accurate execution of switch tasks. However, besides being a measure of 
executive functions also a lot of exogenous, non executive processes are represented within 
switch costs.  
It has further to be considered that a reduction of switch costs not always means that 
executive functions were applied more efficiently. Exogenous and endogenous processes can 
be represented separately (see Mayr & Kliegl, 2003) which could result in reduced switch 
costs. However, this would only mean that normally also measured exogenous processes are 
not included in the costs anymore. Also the effect of smaller switch costs with long CTIs or 
RCIs does not mean that executive functions were used more efficiently. Long CTIs only 
allow completing endogenous processes before reaction time measuring with target onsets 
starts. The still measured costs are caused by exogenous processes and a statement about the 
efficiency of applied executive processes is not possible anymore. In case of the effect with 
longer RCIs this only means that a non executive process, the decay of activation takes place 
and facilitates the execution of the next task. However, this persisting activation from the 
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previous task that causes interference (Allport et al., 1994) might also be influenced by an 
endogenous process. As already mentioned earlier this activation might be handled with the 
help of inhibition. It can be assumed that inhibition plays an important role in task switching 
and for the size of switch costs (see Koch, Gade, Schuch, & Philipp, in press, for a detailed 
review). Thus, inhibition as part of endogenous reconfiguration processes is covered 
separately in the next paragraph. Especially the calculation of backward inhibition effects 
allows a more detailed examination of inhibition concerning abandoned task sets. 
 
 
1.1.4 Backward inhibition effect 
 
It has already been assumed that inhibition is an executive function itself. It is responsible for 
suppression of impulsive reactions, competing motivational tendencies (Baddeley, 1986; 
Smith & Jonides, 1999), or inappropriate responses (Bayliss & Roodenrys, 2000; Garner, 
2009; Gruber & Goschke, 2004; Kuhl, 2001). Bjorklund and Harnishfeger (1995) state that 
inhibition mechanisms play an important role for controlling of social behaviour, attention, 
and cognition and that poor inhibition can cause severe illness like for example obsessive 
compulsive disorders. 
Mayr and Keele (2000) developed a paradigm that allows examining inhibition as a part of 
switching tasks. For flexible switching especially the disengagement from the previous task 
set might be a crucial factor which seems to make the involvement of inhibition processes 
obvious. The inhibition involved is called backward inhibition by Mayr and Keele (2000). To 
avoid conflicts during task execution a still active task set of the previous trial is inhibited and 
suppressed to prevent interference and to facilitate performance of the current task. This was 
examined with three different, comparable tasks. Task sequences like CBA are compared with 
sequences that include an indirect task repetition like ABA. If inhibition of the previous task 
set takes place, it must be harder to reactivate a task set that had recently been inhibited like 
task A (at the first position) in the sequence ABA, producing higher reaction times compared 
to task A in the sequence CBA that had not recently been inhibited. If however the activation 
hypothesis would be true, the last task in ABA sequences should produce a faster reaction 
time than the same one in CBA sequences. That is, because a task set that was recently and 
maybe is still activated, although other tasks have been executed in the meantime must be 
executed faster when it is used again (like task A in the sequence ABA). With quite 
complicated tasks Mayr and Keele (2000) found, that the last tasks in ABA sequences show 
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slower reaction times than in CBA sequences. These results confirmed the backward 
inhibition hypothesis. The authors declare backward inhibition to be a genuine executive 
process being only present and measurable in top-down control situations like when using a 
cue (see also Hübner, Dreisbach, Haider, & Kluwe, 2003) and not in bottom-up control 
situations like when stimulus driven tasks are used. Mayr and Keele (2000) concluded that 
inhibition processes are part of the switching process, that they work on task set level and that 
they are a top-down control process. As a consequence, the cause for residual costs cannot be 
seen in a lack of activation of the upcoming task but in the necessity to overcome earlier 
formed inhibition. It is further assumed that no longer relevant task set representations are 
inhibited and that this inhibition takes place probably once the next task set is known. 
Therefore the main function of the backward inhibition is to prevent interference only as soon 
as the current task set is started. That defines backward inhibition as a purely reactive process.  
Eliminated as an alternative explanation of backward inhibition was negative priming (Mayr 
& Keele, 2000), and later also automatic episodic retrieval (Mayr, 2002). The idea whether 
preventing interference is a cause for using inhibition was later tested by Hübner and 
colleagues (2003). They showed that elements of the previous task interfered less with the 
current one resulting in faster reaction times compared to elements of other abandoned tasks. 
A further finding by Mayr and Keele (2000) was that backward inhibition cannot be reduced 
with longer intervals of preparation which was confirmed by other researchers (Hübner et al., 
2003; Koch, Gade, & Philipp, 2004; Mayr, 2002; Philipp & Koch, 2006). A factor that was 
also already suggested by Mayr and Keele (2000) is the decay of backward inhibition over 
time. This was later covered several times in the literature (Koch et al., 2004; Mayr, 2002) 
and it was examined in detail in an experimental series by Gade and Koch (2005). These 
authors tested with different RCIs whether decay of inhibition influences the size of the 
backward inhibition effect or the amount of task conflict that seems to make inhibition 
necessary in the first place. If decay of inhibition takes place, a long RCI between trial n and 
n-1 should reduce backward inhibition. If decay of activation from the previous task and 
therefore reduced conflict influences backward inhibition, a long RCI between trial n-1 and n-
2 should decrease backward inhibition effects. The authors found a reduction of backward 
inhibition for long RCIs after trial n-2, but no interaction of long RCIs after trial n-1 and 
backward inhibition. The conclusion was that remaining activation causes interference in the 
cognitive system which produces a need for inhibition and that this defines the size of 
backward inhibition whereas decay of inhibition seems hardly to exist. 
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What is inhibited? 
Despite the original and not very exact assumptions of Mayr and Keele (2000) that task set 
representations are inhibited and that inhibition starts with the processing of the next task set, 
some researchers have tried to answer this question more precisely. It was attempted to clarify 
which of the two stages, application or retrieval stage (Mayr & Kliegl, 2003) is affected by 
inhibition to determine whether cue representation and activation are the crucial factors. 
Unfortunately experiments did not reveal very clear results. In the end the authors concluded, 
that inhibition is probably affecting representations associated with task set application, 
because the assumed automatic processes in the application stage are not or hardly influenced 
by preparation and practice and backward inhibition is also not influenced by preparation. 
This was confirmed by Arbuthnott (2005) for verbal cues. Cue factors are supposed to mainly 
influence the retrieval stage what would mean that different cues should not influence 
backward inhibition. However, Arbuthnott (2005) found that spatial cues could eliminate 
backward inhibition effects completely compared to verbal ones. Spatially cued tasks do 
obviously not receive sequential inhibition. Arbuthnott (2005) explained this finding with less 
activation of competing tasks by the spatial cues. This seems to reduce interference to an 
amount that makes inhibition unnecessary. The special processing of spatial cues seems to 
interact less with the semantic digit stimuli of the chosen tasks than the verbal processing of 
semantic verbal cues. The author argues that verbal cues possess strong cue-task associations 
that normally facilitate task retrieval compared to spatial cues. This for example is supposed 
to be the reason for increased switch costs for spatial cues. That would implicate that on 
application stage the verbal cues that also activate competing tasks with their strong cue-task 
associations need lateral inhibition to be able to execute the current task. Contrary to verbal 
cues spatial cues only activate the relevant task thus producing less interference which makes 
lateral inhibition unnecessary. This emphasises that competing activation which produces 
conflict and interference is the relevant factor for inhibition to take place. In line with Schuch 
and Koch (2003), Arbuthnott (2005) further assumed, that inhibition seems to influence 
response selection and not the retrieval stage. 
The study by Schuch and Koch (2003) generated the hypothesis that response selection 
processes are crucial for switch costs and the backward inhibition effect and that the two costs 
are rather caused by competition on the response selection level than on the level of task set 
reconfiguration. Therefore after no go trials when no response selection is required, switch 
costs or backward inhibition effects should not be found. Experiments showed that if there 
was no response selection in trial n-1 switch costs could not be measured (Schuch & Koch, 
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2003). The same applied for backward inhibition effects. In ABA sequences with a no go trial 
as task B no backward inhibition effect could be demonstrated. A similar result was obtained 
by Verbruggen, Liefooghe, Szmalec, and Vandierendonck (2005, 2006). These authors also 
found no difference between switch and no switch trials when the responses of the previous 
tasks were not executed. When there is no interference caused by the previous trial, switch 
costs seem to disappear. Schuch and Koch (2003) additionally showed that the crucial factor 
for their findings is response selection and not response execution. Hence, it was concluded 
that inhibition is triggered by conflicts concerning response selection and that inhibition is not 
happening on task set level but rather on the response selection level (see also Arbuthnott, 
2005). This is specifying Mayr and Keele’s (2000) original assumptions. Even more precisely 
the previous category response mappings are supposed to be inhibited by Schuch and Koch 
(2003). That includes the complete responses of the last executed task. This might happen to 
support recoding of the meaning of responses especially in overlapping S-R tasks. Gade and 
Koch (2005) assume that probably S-R rules or stimulus category response rules are inhibited. 
Additionally Koch and colleagues (2004) also assume a response-related component of task 
inhibition and found that basic response modes (at least different manual response modes) are 
probably inhibited. 
 
Backward inhibition: an executive function? 
In the end of this paragraph one further issue will be discussed briefly, the question whether 
after all backward inhibition is an executive function in terms of a high-level control process 
or not. Already Mayr and Keele (2000) presented some findings that supported and some that 
contradicted the idea of backward inhibition being an executive function. In favour of the idea 
are results demonstrating that the effect emerged also in paradigms that included direct task 
repetitions (experiment 4) and that it is only present in cued paradigms (experiment 3). Two 
different findings reject the idea: knowing the task sequence in advance did not prevent 
backward inhibition (experiment 5) and preparation effects were also not found (experiment 
1). Already in their original paper Mayr and Keele (2000) responded to that problem with the 
assumption of backward inhibition in general subserving selection of high-level control 
settings. However, the authors further suggest that the way backward inhibition is controlled 
and exerts control is characteristic of a low-level process. Contrary for example to activation 
that can be flexibly modulated at all times, once triggered inhibition might be insensitive to 
further changes and modulations. Thus, backward inhibition is seen as a more local control 
process triggered by the next task set and as a kind of lateral inhibition. 
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The finding that backward inhibition effects are even measurable when direct task repetitions 
were included in task sequences (that supported the idea of backward inhibition being an 
executive control process) was challenged by contradicting findings by Philipp and Koch 
(2006). Their experiments revealed that the size of backward inhibition effects is influenced 
by direct task repetitions. A group with direct repetitions showed significantly smaller 
backward inhibition effects than a group without direct task repetitions. The same reduction 
of backward inhibition effects was also found when direct task repetitions varied blockwise 
within participants. On blocks with repetitions backward inhibition effects were significantly 
smaller compared to blocks without repetitions. The experiments further showed that when 
participants once had completed a block with repetitions the backward inhibition effect also 
decreased in following blocks even when they were without repetitions. As an explanation 
Philipp and Koch (2006) assume activation and inhibition to be partly independent processes 
but being heavily influenced by each other. The amount of inhibition and activation is 
supposed to be always adapted to the current situation. For example if activation is more 
helpful in a situation then inhibition is constrained. That gives the whole process the character 
of a strategic option that allows optimal adaptation to situational demands. This finding of 
reduced or eliminated backward inhibition effects in task sequences that include direct task 
repetitions gives reason to doubt that backward inhibition in general is a part of switch costs. 
That is, because backward inhibition does not emerge in the typical sequences (with direct 
repetitions) that are normally used to be able to calculate switch costs. 
 
Summing-up 
Backward inhibition is thought to reduce interference from the recently abandoned task set 
(Arbuthnott, 2005; Hübner et al., 2000) and has been observed in numerous studies 
(Arbuthnott & Frank, 2000; Dreher, Kohn, & Berman, 2001; Gade & Koch, 2005; Mayr, 
2002; Mayr & Keele, 2000; Mayr & Kliegl, 2003; Schuch & Koch, 2003). Backward 
inhibition is not influenced by preparation and its decay over time is questionable. Although 
what exactly is inhibited and what triggers inhibition is still controversial, category response 
mappings and conflicts on response selection level seem to be the most likely answers so far. 
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1.1.5 Summary 
 
Executive function is a frequently used term that describes many different human abilities. It 
is a kind of umbrella term for a set of functions also called “higher cognitive processes” that 
allow an adapted human action regulation resulting in appropriate behaviour. Included are for 
example such processes as planning, organising of information, working memory, set and 
attention shifting, inhibition and suppression of distracting information, error detection and 
correction, selective attention, rule application, inhibitory control of prepotent responses etc. 
The execution of the appropriate processes at the right time guarantees stable and flexible 
processing at the same time.  
The task switching paradigm (Jersild, 1927; Rogers & Monsell, 1995) is a popular method to 
examine executive functions. Switch costs that can be calculated with that paradigm offer the 
opportunity to cover many of the executive functions researchers are interested in. 
Nevertheless, it has to be noted that also non executive and exogenous processes are 
represented. With a variation of the task switching paradigm one special supposedly also 
endogenous executive function, namely inhibition can be examined closer (Mayr & Keele, 
2000). In spite of some difficulties with the two presented measures switch costs and 
backward inhibition effects, they seem fairly good indicators for endogenous executive 
control functions. 
 
 
1.2 Cognition, Mood, and Affect 
 
Models resulting from mood research and classical models of executive functions hardly offer 
any idea or suggestion about how short affective stimuli might influence executive functions. 
The differences between mood and affect and explanations of mood effects make clear that 
findings of mood research are hardly transferable to the micro level of short affective 
stimulation of executive functions. Furthermore, the brief presentation of two classical models 
of executive functions shows that they can also not offer assumptions about the hypothesised 
interactions between affect and executive functions. Hence, after discriminating between 
mood and affect, the presentation of the two models of executive functions and findings, and 
models of mood research, the concept of affect and some of its attributes are explained in 
more detail because of the relevance of affect for the current study. 
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1.2.1 Discrimination 
 
A rough differentiation between mood and affect is useful because they are clearly not the 
same and it clarifies why findings and assumptions regarding mood research are non-
applicable for short affective stimulation. 
Moods are affective states (Clore et al., 2001) and they are felt or sensed by a person (Larsen, 
2000). They are normally of little cognitive content and object-free (Ben-Zeév, 2000; Russel, 
2003), or rather the object has become diffuse and non-specific (Clore et al., 2001). Most of 
the time, a clear starting point, an exact time of duration, or a level of stability cannot be 
identified (Larsen, 2000; Russel, 2003). Moods are of low intensity, floating in the 
background and sometimes lasting for several hours (Ekman, 1992; Forgas, 1994; Larsen, 
2000; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987). Often mood can only be classified very broadly as 
good or bad. Mood and affect do have this aspect in common. Affect is also often only 
classified roughly as good or bad, pleasant or unpleasant (Larsen, 2000). With the term affect 
Clore and colleagues (2001) for example describe representations of value, good or bad, 
positive or negative. When it is used as a term with an own meaning affect is said to be the 
feeling tone associated with emotion, it is usually evaluative.  
The use of the term affect is different in the two languages German and English. In the 
English speaking world affect is often used as a synonym for emotion or as a superordinate 
term applying for everything dealing with emotion, feeling, mood etc. (Forgas, 1994; Meyer, 
Reisenzein, & Schützwohl, 2001; Otto, Euler, & Mandl, 2000). In German emotion is the 
superordinate term and affect is sometimes used as a synonym for emotion (Otto et al., 2000; 
Sokolowski, 2002). However, when affect is used as a discrete term it often describes very 
strong and intensive emotional states (Meyer et al., 2001). These short and intensive 
emotional experiences sometimes also include strong action tendencies.  
An evaluative aspect of affect is described in both languages. Affect is supposed to be a short 
first evaluative classification in terms of good or bad, most of the time the valence of 
information is observed. Those affective evaluations can be described as being of an 
automatic nature (Baddeley, 2007; Ekman, 1992; Koole & Kuhl, 2008) and when they appear 
they are experienced with little awareness or conscious cause (Ekman, 1992; Oatley & 
Johnson-Laired, 1987, 1996). 
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1.2.2 Mood and affect in models of executive functions 
 
Two of the most popular models representing executive functions are Baddeley’s working 
memory model (1986, 2007) and Norman and Shallice’s Supervisory Attentional System 
(SAS) (1986). Those models have been useful over the last years to examine executive 
functions but for the present study they have to be checked regarding their ability to integrate 
affective modulation of executive functions. Baddeley’s original model (1986) for example 
did not include an affective component. In the renewed version (Baddeley, 2007) some 
changes were made and now emotional influences are represented as well. However, 
Baddeley seems only interested in influences of extreme emotions like danger, elation, 
anxiety, depression, or craving. A new element, the hedonic detector is introduced but it 
represents emotional influences on working memory only in connection with extreme 
emotional states like depression or mental disorders. It is hardly capable to help understanding 
the influence of short affective stimuli on executive functions. 
The second extremely popular model of executive functions by Norman and Shallice (1986) is 
based on an earlier model of central control by Bobrow and Norman (1975). Norman and 
Shallice’s (1986) model describes top-down processing executed with the help of schemata 
and bottom-up processing that is triggered by input information. It consists of two 
complementary processes, an automatic one called “contention scheduling”, that is a basic 
mechanism and a controlled one described as the “supervisory system”. This supervisory 
attentional system (SAS) is not controlling every action in detail but it can influence the 
activation of certain schemata with the help of motivation and attention. An explicit affective 
or emotional control or modulation of processes apart from those motivational influences on 
activation is not included in the model. 
The brief presentation of those two models clearly demonstrates that the importance of 
emotions and affect on cognitive processing are often undervalued and disregarded. Oatley 
and Johnson-Laird (1987, 1996) for example declared that although emotions have important 
cognitive functions they appear as accompanying and disturbing elements when multiple 
goals and cognitive representations show inconsistencies. Affective influences are not 
mentioned or of only minor importance for these models. Hence, they cannot give impulses to 
generate hypotheses about how affective modulation might influence executive functions. 
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1.2.3 A brief review of mood-cognition models and influences of mood 
 
Models with a focus on emotion and affect also hardly offer possibilities to deduce ideas 
about how affect might influence executive functions. Models and ideas often only apply to a 
more superordinate, general level. Examples are the controversy between Lazarus (1984) and 
Zajonc (1984) about what comes first, emotion or cognition, Lazarus’ later developed 
“cognitive-motivational-relational theory” (1991), or the action control model by Lanterman 
(1983) that tried to integrate a cognitive and an emotional control system. Also many models 
dealing with influences of mood rather focus on social questions and problems (see review by 
Bless, 1997) than on cognitive functions. 
However, on this more general level influences of affective stimulation mainly in terms of 
mood on cognitive processes have been examined and reported by various researchers. Mood 
is known to influence a wide range of processes and behaviour (see Isen 1999, 2000; Levine 
& Pizarro, 2004 for reviews). In more detail it can influence creative problem solving and 
cognitive organisation (Isen et al., 1978; Isen & Daubman, 1984; Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 
1987), social judgments (Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Süsser, 1994; Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & 
Kramer, 1994), decision-making (Adolphs & Damasio, 2001), retrieval and recall processes 
(Bower, 1981; Bower, Gilligan, & Monteiro,1981; Isen et al., 1978; Lee & Sternthal, 1999; 
Snyder & White, 1982), learning  (Bower, 1981; Isen et al., 1978; Lee & Sternthal, 1999), and 
flexibility (Forgas, 1989; Estrada, Isen, & Young, 1997). 
Explanations for those findings are most of the time adapted to the special attribute of mood 
being a long lasting effect. The ideas of different processing styles activated in different 
moods (Bless, 2001; Fiedler, 1988; Kuhl, 1983; Schwarz, 1990) or of spreading activation in 
associative networks triggered by moods (Bower, 1981; Isen et al., 1978) heavily depend on 
long lasting influences and time-consuming general cognitive changes caused by moods. Also 
the theory by Schwarz and Clore (1983, 2003) and Schwarz (1990) that affective states have 
an informative function themselves and the affect infusion model (Forgas, 1994, 2001) imply 
and require a different processing of the affective stimulation. As already mentioned affect 
and mood differ (see paragraph 1.2.1) which makes it impossible to transfer those 
explanations and adapt them to the assumed influences of short affective stimulation.  
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 23 
1.2.4 Affect 
 
A more detailed definition of affect seems appropriate. As described earlier, affect differs 
from mood but also from emotion. Brief affective stimulations cannot include the same 
complete emotional experience like emotions. What they can activate must be less elaborated 
and can only include rudimental emotional aspects. Hence, the question is what more 
precisely characterises affect and those rudimental emotional aspects.  
A function of affect is appraisal and evaluation of situations, internal states and their 
interaction (Sokolowski, 2002). Affect is assumed to play an important role in determining 
one’s commitment to goals and to energize goal directed behaviour (Emmons & Kaiser, 
1996). This shows that affect also serves motivational purposes. Motivational states can be 
elicited by affect and affect is seen as a necessary element for action (Lang, Bradley, & 
Cuthbert, 1997). Two basic and quite popular dimensions are often used to classify affect: 
pleasure with the extremities positive and negative and arousal with the extremities high and 
low (Lang et al., 2005, Pauli & Bierbaumer, 2000; Russel, 2003; Wundt, 1896). Although this 
seems to allow only a very rough classification, in Davidson’s (1992) understanding the 
translation of positive and negative into approach and withdrawal reflects the motivational 
aspect of affect. This emphasises that the fundamental decisions an organism will make as a 
relation to its environment are also described with this labelling and classification.  
The patterns of involvement concerning emotional states or emotions and short affective 
stimulation differ in intensity. On the one end there are reactions to emotional or affective 
stimuli that only trigger some brain activities in certain areas and on the other end there is full 
involvement meaning an emotion is subjectively experienced and felt, there are activated 
brain areas and bodily responses, cognitive and evaluative processing is started and 
preparation for action takes place etc. In between those extremities are of course different 
levels and shades of involvement. Support for this view comes from research and literature 
concerning embodied emotions (Niedenthal, 2007). Different levels of involvement in 
emotions exist and already only activating concepts and knowledge about emotions which 
means that emotions are not experienced in a complete way on a subjective level can have an 
impact (Barsalou, Niedenthal, Barbey, & Ruppert, 2003, Niedenthal, Winkielman, Mondillon, 
& Vermeulen, 2009; Oosterwijk, Rotteveel, Fischer, & Hess, 2009). Regarding these 
considerations short affective stimulation must be settled on quite a low level of emotional 
involvement.  
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1.2.5 Summary 
 
Affect is a brief, quick and short lived evaluation of internal and external stimuli on the broad 
dimension of good or bad, positive or negative. A full emotional involvement does not take 
place. This point marks one of the main differences between affect and emotion. Affect also 
differs from moods which are weaker, long-lasting and without an object. Due to the fact that 
they are so long-lasting, moods can fundamentally change cognitive structures and processing 
which is often the base for explanations of mood effects. Such fundamental changes are not 
possible with short affective stimulation. Thus, mood models cannot be applied to short 
affective stimulation. Also models of executive functions do not offer useful ideas regarding 
influences of affect on executive functions. 
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2. Two Models and Hypotheses 
 
In the following paragraphs the PSI model by Julius Kuhl (1996, 2000, 2001) and the 
dopaminergic theory (Ashby et al., 1999; Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004) are presented that 
allow deduction of hypotheses concerning affective modulation of executive functions. It is 
assumed that short affective stimuli might influence the flexibility-stability-processes that 
guarantee adapted human behaviour. Each theory is presented separately accompanied by 
some major findings that support the respective theory. In the end, the final hypotheses that 
were tested in the current study are deduced and specified. 
 
 
2.1 Kuhl’s PSI Theory 
 
The PSI model (Theory of Personality Systems Interaction) by Julius Kuhl (1996, 2000, 
2001) is a model that integrates personality, emotional, and action control theories and further 
also assimilates and absorbs motivational aspects. Interactions between emotion and 
cognition, affect and action control are explicitly stated as being part of the theory. It offers a 
functional design perspective instead of the traditional emphasis on the role of beliefs and 
other cognitive contents as explanation for human behaviour especially concerning self-
regulation, action control and motivation. The theory provides four different psychological 
systems. Moods, emotions and affects control the activation of those psychological systems. 
Emotion regulation allows an effectively working overall system because the right emotions 
at the right time or the overcoming of obstructive emotions give way for the necessary 
resources and motivations (see figure 1). The four systems are 1. Intention memory: Includes 
representations and maintenance of intentions, especially when intentions cannot be executed 
immediately. When difficulties and drawbacks are recognised while trying to pursue a goal 
intention memory comes into action to be able to still reach the goal after all problems have 
been solved. It is supported by analytical processing like reasoning and planning and inhibits 
the intuitive behavioural control which is responsible for automatic action control. 2. Intuitive 
behavioural control: It is the antagonist to the intention memory. It controls automated action 
sequences, routines, and programs that do not need much cognition and complex planning. 
This is all done intuitively without any conscious control. 3. Extension memory: It is a huge 
and holistic system that integrates representations of internal states like needs, emotions, 
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somatic feelings, and values. Within this system, emotions and positive and negative 
experiences can be found. Most of the stored information is unconscious and more felt than 
known. It is based upon a network of action options, feelings and experienced situations. Also 
the self is located within the extension memory because all information concerning the self 
like fears, needs, preferences, standards, and values are stored in this memory system. This 
system also has to integrate and conduct different time perspectives and time lines. 4. Object 
recognition system: It is the antagonist to the extension memory. This system allows a 
conscious perception of single sensations. Negative moods can activate the system and then 
mainly novel, and unexpected information is taken into focus as well as errors and 
information that does not seem to fit with the situation at hand. This system supplies the 
extension memory with new learned experiences. 
 
 
 
             
Conscious self-control
Intention memory
Object recognition
system
Implicit self-regulation
Extension memory
Intuitive behaviour
control
a b
a Regulated through presence or absence of positive affect
b Regulated through coping with negative affect
 
 
Figure 1: Simplified schematic illustration of the PSI theory by Kuhl (1996, 2000, 2001). 
 
 
Each of the described systems is an expert in a special sector. The demands of the situation 
and the ability of the individual to regulate those systems decide which system is going to be 
in charge. The most interesting idea about this theory is that factors of modulation are positive 
and negative affects. Those affects are also acting back on the four psychological systems. 
Hence, behavioural control depends mainly on how a person can regulate the affective 
system. In the first assumption of modulation of the theory the intuitive behavioural control is 
activated through positive affect (see figure 1, the pair-headed arrow marked with the letter 
'a'). Positive affect facilitates the access of formed intentions stored in the intention memory 
to executing systems in the intuitive behaviour control. Positive affect provides a connection 
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between the two systems. To get stored intentions in the intention memory to be executed a 
person must be able to motivate him- or herself and generate positive affect whenever this is 
necessary. Losing positive affect activates the intention memory and helps to keep track of 
awkward intentions if somebody is able to bear the absence of positive affect over a certain 
period of time. This high frustration tolerance enables a person to even execute difficult 
intentions and achieve complex goals. The second assumption of modulation (see figure 1, the 
double-headed arrow marked with the letter 'b') deals with the two other antagonistic systems. 
The object recognition system gets activated through negative affect. The holistic view stands 
back and details are focused. This might be useful when error detection is necessary. Only 
down regulation of negative affect allows again a more general view and the reconsidering of 
for example options for actions that are accessible via the extension memory. To function 
properly a healthy person must be able to carry out those regulations and switches between 
different affects. Especially with difficult tasks this skill is needed.  
 
Affect regulation 
This theory denies the traditional hedonic view of affect regulation (Koole & Kuhl, 2008) and 
affect has a more diverse function. It is assumed that instead of feeling good people more 
often want to feel right and this depends of course on social and also on functional constraints. 
PSI theory offers some explanations and definitions for those functional constraints. For 
example people are assumed to use positive affect to regulate between deliberation and action. 
Negative affect on the other hand regulates between cognitive integration and elementary 
perception. In that context moderate intensity levels seem to be more useful than extreme 
affective states (Koole & Kuhl, 2008). 
In general basic affective operations can be performed automatically and without conscious 
reflection. Different strategies like suppression, reappraisal, distraction, projection, denial etc. 
are used to make affect regulation possible that has to be efficient, flexible and context 
sensitive at the same time. The purpose of affect regulation is the modulation of the cognitive 
and behavioural system to allow adequate responses to ongoing task demands. In PSI theory 
so called intuitive affect regulation under the control of extension memory can provide such a 
control system. Intuitive affect regulation is supposed to improve the efficiency of volitional 
action control and can appear in terms of inhibition of positive affect or amplification of 
negative affect. Inhibition for example is especially relevant for the formation and 
implementation of difficult intentions. In general functions and influences of positive affect 
are: to foster execution of actions, to support the intuitive behaviour control (which can be 
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regarded as automatic action control and is therefore very close to Norman and Shallice’s 
(1986) contention scheduling), to help executing once formed intentions that are stored in the 
intention memory, and to facilitate the release of inhibition that controls planned intentions 
until they can be executed. Functions and influences of negative affect are: to disable the use 
of the extension memory with its more holistic processing mode, to activate the object 
recognition system which constricts flexibility, to support detail oriented processing, and to 
deactivate a more integrating view which also allows distracting but maybe necessary 
information to solve a current problem to gain more influence.  
 
 
2.1.1 Supporting findings 
 
Functions of intention memory as a special kind of working memory are maintenance of an 
intended action, inhibition of an action until the time is right for execution, and inhibition of 
the pathway to the output systems. This system is needed when a task is very difficult and 
requires a separate representation in a higher order or symbolic format. Tasks, that are useful 
to test this are such ones that need sequencing of action steps and monitoring from a control 
system. In general intention memory is required for delayed responses and for tasks with 
difficult and complex intentions. Positive affect is supposed to modulate the interaction 
between intention memory and the output system by releasing inhibition existing between the 
two systems. Positive affect presumably serves as an internal signal to start certain actions. 
The idea of positive affect facilitating the execution of already formed intentions was tested 
by Kuhl and Kazén (1999) with the Stroop task. Facilitation is possible because positive affect 
helps to release the inhibition that is blocking intentions which are stored in the intention 
memory. Every trial in the experiment consisted of two consecutive Stroop tasks, 
respectively. The positive affect was presented in terms of words before every trial. It is 
expected that the positive stimuli function as a kind of go signal and release inhibition 
inflicted on certain intentions and responses. Thus, positive affect is expected to reduce 
Stroop costs for the first tasks in the trials only. More specifically, a volitional facilitation and 
not a generally appearing behavioural facilitation is expected. In a first experiment positive, 
negative, and neutral prime words were presented for 250ms, 750ms, or 2250ms. Baseline 
trials (XXXX in different colours) and incongruent trials (different colour words in different 
inks) were presented randomly in a block. Naming the ink colour was always the task that had 
to be executed. As a result Stroop costs (for the first task in every trial) were significantly 
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reduced for positive prime words compared to neutral ones. These reduced costs are caused 
mainly by faster reaction times in incongruent trials. 
According to PSI theory the correct sequencing of the two action steps (task one and two in a 
trial) that require executive control activate a symbolic representation of an intention. With 
the two action steps in a row the positive affect helps to release the inhibition of the pathway 
between intention memory and output systems. In a second experiment it was tested whether 
the two consecutive tasks are really needed to produce the effect. Hence, trials with one and 
with two tasks were presented in blocked form but in a within-subject design. The results 
confirmed the findings of the first experiment. Reduced Stroop costs after a positive prime 
word were found, but only when two tasks had to be executed per trial. When only one task 
had to be worked on per trial intention memory is probably not loaded and reduced Stroop 
costs do not emerge. Kuhl and Kazén (1999) concluded that Stroop interference can be 
reduced under positive affect. It is assumed that the affect releases inhibition that blocks 
execution of certain actions but only under the condition that intention memory is loaded. The 
positive affect allows a kind of shortcut from intention to action. These results were later 
confirmed in a further study by Kazén and Kuhl (2005).  
The assumption that negative affect deactivates the extension memory was confirmed 
indirectly in a study by Baumann and Kuhl (2005). A deactivated extension memory leads to 
impaired holistic processing and flexibility, and the opportunity to use action alternatives is 
suppressed. The idea of the study was that the absence of negative affect causes an increase of 
flexibility in cognitive processes. This was tested with a target detection paradigm. The higher 
flexibility was demonstrated with faster responses to non dominant, local features with 
positive affect whereas at the same time responding to the dominant, global features had to be 
overcome. Flexibility after negative prime words was impaired, the global focus was kept 
active. 
Results from mood research offer the opportunity to confirm a further assumption of the PSI 
model. That is, positive affect increases automatic processing because it activates the intuitive 
behaviour control. Due to the described differences between mood and affect (see paragraph 
1.2.1 Discrimination) these studies can only be considered as weak evidence. Hänze (1997) 
and also Phillips, Bull, Adams, and Fraser (2002) found larger Stroop costs under positive 
mood compared to neutral mood. Hänze (1997; see also Hänze, 1996 and Storbeck & Clore, 
2008) declared that increased use of automatic processing under positive mood causes the 
effect. The forced automatic processing is a handicap when executing the Stroop task (naming 
the ink colour of incongruent colour words) because the more automated process is that of 
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reading the colour words. As a consequence the effect was caused by increased reaction times 
in Stroop task blocks under positive mood in both studies (Hänze, 1997; Phillips, Bull et al., 
2002). These findings are not contradictory to Kuhl and Kazén’s (1999) study who found a 
reduction of Stroop interference under positive affect because intention memory was not 
involved in the studies by Hänze (1997) and Phillips, Bull and colleagues (2002). 
 
 
2.2 The Dopaminergic Theory 
 
The second model going to be presented relies more on neuropsychological and –biological 
ideas and assumptions. The dopaminergic theory of positive affect formulated by Ashby and 
colleagues (1999) assumes that during periods of mild positive affect a concomitant increased 
dopamine release in the mesocorticolimbic system and perhaps also in the nigrostriatal system 
takes place. These elevated dopamine levels influence performance on a variety of cognitive 
tasks like for example episodic memory or creative problem solving (Ashby et al., 1999). A 
mild increase is already sufficient. The impact of the neurotransmitter dopamine on frontal 
brain areas seems to be of special relevance for performance of executive control functions. 
The importance of the frontal lobes and especially the prefrontal cortex for regulation and 
control of human activation is emphasised quite often (Luria, 1973; Nelson, 1976; Tranel et 
al., 1994; Walsh, 1978). Executive control is supposed to be organised in several stages with 
different processing centres in different frontal brain areas (Koechlin, Ody, & Kouneiher, 
2003) and dopaminergic activity in those brain areas seems to modulate cognitive control 
functions. Kimberg, D’Esposito, and Farah (1997) describe a close connection between 
dopamine-mediated prefrontal functions and working memory capacity. And Dreisbach, 
Müller, Goschke, Schulze, Lesch, and Brocke (2005) found that dopaminergic activity, as 
indicated by spontaneous eyeblink rates which are supposed to be a functional marker of 
central dopaminergic function, modulates cognitive control. Dopamine seems to be a possible 
candidate to dynamically regulate cognitive control and therefore to influence stability and 
flexibility processes and to foster the flexible updating of working memory (Dreisbach, 2006). 
Dreisbach and Goschke (2004) state that phasic increases of dopamine in the prefrontal cortex 
serve as gating signal, triggering the updating of working memory and facilitating a switch of 
cognitive sets.  
A connection of these findings with affect exists, because it is supposed that positive affect 
causes mild increases of dopamine in the prefronatal cortex (Ashby et al., 1999; Cohen, 
2. Two Models and Hypotheses 31 
Braver, & Brown, 2002; Dreisbach et al., 2005). Drugs that enhance the dopaminergic activity 
also elevate affect (Beatty, 1995) and a flattened affect emerges with dopamine antagonists 
(Hyman & Nestler, 1993). A further finding of relevance is that pictures with positive or 
negative valence affected the dopaminergic system the same way as positive and negative 
feedback: positive affect increased and negative affect decreased the activity of the 
dopaminergic system (Colzato, van Wouwe, & Hommel, 2007). However, it has to be noted, 
that dopamine is not supposed to also mediate the positive feelings that are associated with 
positive affect (Ashby et al., 1999). 
Hence, it is hypothesised that moderate increases in positive affect, which are associated with 
mild dopamine increases in frontal brain areas enhance cognitive flexibility and reduce 
perseveration. This includes an improvement of the ability to overcome dominant responses 
as well as selective attenuation of perseverating behaviour. The increase of cognitive 
flexibility happens at the cost of increased distractibility and impulsivity. Furthermore, the 
antagonistic processing mode of flexibility, maintenance capability of working memory is 
weakened and impaired with positive affect (Dreisbach, 2006; Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004). 
It has to be noted that dopamine is not supposed to enhance switching of cognitive sets in 
general but higher dopamine levels are assumed to lead to higher cognitive flexibility and at 
the same time reduce perseveration (Owen, Roberts, Hodges, Summers, Polkey, & Robbins, 
1993) what might then also facilitate switching. 
 
 
2.2.1 Supporting findings 
 
Based on the dopaminergic theory Dreisbach and Goschke (2004) tested whether positive 
affect increases flexibility and distractibility and at the same time reduces perseveration. The 
basic idea was that positive affect might modulate the balance between switching and 
maintaining intentions. The authors developed a special task that allowed examining those 
different abilities. It is predicted that positive affect reduces perseveration and therefore 
facilitates set switching and that at the same time positive affect increases distractibility. In a 
decision task with letters (vowel or consonant) and digits (odd or even) participants are 
trained to respond to stimuli in a prespecified target colour and ignore distractor stimuli in a 
different colour. After 40 trials in blocks of 60 trials participants in a first group had to switch 
to a completely new target colour whereas the former target colour became the new distractor 
colour. It is expected that under positive affect increased flexibility facilitates disengagement 
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from the formerly relevant target colour supported by a bias towards novel stimuli and 
reduced perseveration. Therefore it should be easier to switch distractor and target colours in 
the described way compared to neutral affect. In a second group the former distractor colour 
became the new target colour whereas a new colour was chosen as the new distractor colour. 
Predictions for this second group were that increased flexibility and the bias towards novel 
stimuli with positive affect focuses attention on the distractor and therefore more time is 
needed to complete that kind of target and distractor colour switch compared to neutral affect. 
As valent stimuli positive and neutral pictures of the IAPS (Lang et al., 2005) were used. 
Since Dreisbach and Goschke (2004) called those time (and error rate) differences to execute 
those switches of target colours “switch costs” it has to be noted that those “switch costs” are 
different from what is normally understood with that term (see paragraph 1.1.2 Task 
switching paradigm). Dreisbach and Goschke (2004) only switched once per block and not 
the task but only the cue (=colour) that signalled which are the relevant task features. A task 
switch in a traditional task switching paradigm includes a change of cue, task rules, responses, 
response mappings etc. and is executed repeatedly. 
Nonetheless predictions for the two groups were supported and the suspected increase and 
decrease in reaction times were mainly found for the response incompatible trials. This 
allowed the authors to assume that positive affect not simply increases reaction times but 
shows differentiated influences. Positive affect showed its impact only when strategies of 
inhibition and flexibility are really executed. It is further assumed that affect might influence a 
more global parameter like activation threshold which then is responsible for the reported 
effects. Dreisbach and Goschke (2004) concluded that positive affect reduces perseveration 
and at the same time increases flexibility which is supposed to be expressed in a bias towards 
novel stimuli. 
In a second study Dreisbach (2006) concentrated more on the maintenance factor that is also 
important in task switching. It was expected that mild positive affect (again IAPS pictures 
were used) reduces maintenance capability. Reduced maintenance should result in costs when 
a certain goal has to be executed and in benefits when the goal unexpectedly changes. 
Different levels of maintenance of tasks and parts of tasks were represented with a continuous 
performance task. If the letter A (cue) was followed by the letter X (probe) the right response 
button had to be pressed. Was the X preceded by another letter like B (e.g. B-X), the left 
response button was the correct reaction as well as for an A not followed by an X (e.g. A-Y). 
Also the combination of B (not A) as cue and Y (not X) as probe indicated a left button press. 
A further important component of the experiment was the probability of occurrence of the 
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letter pairs. Pairs that required a right button press appeared in 70% of all trials, whereas each 
cue-probe pair with a left button press occurred in 10% of all trials, respectively. That meant 
that participants were forced to expect an X after an A. It was hypothesised that positive affect 
weakens maintenance therefore A-Y tasks are expected to be performed faster and with less 
errors compared to neutral or negative affect. The weak maintenance of the cue A which 
prepares for a right button press facilitates a left button press when the probe Y unexpectedly 
appears. The goal unexpectedly changes and the reduced maintenance capability caused by 
positive affect facilitates the response. B-X tasks were expected to be slower and more 
erroneous under positive compared to neutral and negative affect. The weakened maintenance 
of the cue B should impair reactions for the following probe X that requires different 
responses depending on the cue. Dreisbach (2006) also claimed costs under positive affect for 
B-Y pairs. This is not very plausible because cue and probe indicate the same response button 
and whether the cue is maintained well or not should not make any difference. However, what 
is predicted by Dreisbach (2006) is that under positive affect B-X pairs should produce more 
costs than B-Y pairs because increased response competition occurs with the probe X that 
indicates two opposing responses. Maintenance of the cue is necessary to know which 
response is required. The probe Y does not cause such a response conflict and competition. 
In the first experiment the predictions were not well met and there was reason to believe that 
the obtained results were due to a simple speed-accuracy trade-off. Therefore in a second 
experiment the general maintenance demands were increased by introducing distractors 
between cue and probe. The distractors made the effects clearer. Under weak maintenance 
caused by positive affect A-Y tasks were performed faster whereas B-X tasks were performed 
slower compared to neutral and negative affect, respectively. In general effects were more 
pronounced with error rates. Especially the prediction that B-X pairs will show worse 
performance under positive affect than B-Y pairs was only revealed with error rates. Although 
the effects of those two experiments were generally weak it can be concluded that positive 
affect impairs maintenance capability. It is further assumed that results of weakened 
maintenance capability under positive affect might only be obtained with quite simple tasks. 
The already mentioned study by Baumann and Kuhl (2005) further confirms the prediction of 
the dopaminergic theory that positive affect helps to overcome dominant responses. Short 
affective stimulation with words facilitated to shift the focus from dominant (global) to non 
dominant (local) stimulus features. The tendency to respond to the dominant global shapes 
was interrupted by positive affect. 
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A further interesting result was revealed by Phillips, Bull and colleagues (2002). As already 
mentioned these authors found increased Stroop costs under positive mood but they could also 
obtain higher general switch costs with positive mood. This effect originated in higher 
reaction times in mixed blocks for participants with a positive mood compared to a neutral 
mood. As described earlier (see paragraph 1.1.2 The task switching paradigm) general switch 
costs also include the measuring of maintenance. The costs are calculated by comparing 
single task blocks that do not require maintenance of the other task with mixed blocks that 
rely highly on maintenance capabilities. The result of larger general switch costs under 
positive mood can be considered to reflect weakened maintenance capability and higher 
distractibility, represented in increased reaction times in mixed blocks. 
 
 
2.3 Review of the two Presented Models 
 
The complicated interplay between affect and the four systems of the PSI model reveals that a 
simple answer to the question whether affect influences executive control functions or not and 
if it does how this influence may look like is not possible. Influences of positive and negative 
affect can vary greatly depending on what measures are used and what elements of executive 
functions these measures represent. Nonetheless PSI theory offers opportunities to deduce 
hypotheses regarding interactions of positive affect with switch costs and backward inhibition 
effects (see further below). This is possible because the systems that are mainly modulated by 
positive affect (intuitive behaviour control and in particular intention memory) are connected 
with volition, action control and action planning, factors that are of relevance for task 
switching. Furthermore, based on PSI theory Kuhl and Kazén (1999) and Kazén and Kuhl 
(2005) already examined inhibition, a factor that seems to be of some importance for task 
switching. A clear advantage is that the model focuses on ideas about influences of affect and 
not of moods or emotions. However the part of the model that describes systems that are 
mainly modulated by negative affect (extension memory and object recognition system) 
clearly show, that it is in general a theory about personality and the development of identity. 
Those more global issues are hardly useful to deduce hypotheses for the micro processes 
covered by task switching.  
The dopaminergic theory seems to be much more convenient and applicable to task switching 
and its processes. Dreisbach and Goschke (2004) have to be credited for taking the hypotheses 
about dopamine and its influences on cognitive tasks from Ashby and colleagues (1999) and 
2. Two Models and Hypotheses 35 
applying them to the processes of set and task switching. However, the relevant processes like 
for example maintenance were examined separately and with paradigms that are quite 
different to the task switching paradigm. As described earlier switch costs measure a 
combination of different processes (see paragraph 1.1.3 Assumed processes underlying switch 
costs). The fragmented way in which only certain processes or combinations of processes 
were examined in the studies by Dreisbach (2006) and Dreisbach and Goschke (2004) do not 
reflect the complex combination of processes being responsible for switch costs. However, 
the dopaminergic theory focuses on affect and not on emotions or moods what is most useful 
for the current study. 
In the end PSI theory might be too holistic and the dopaminergic theory too fragmented to be 
adequate models that fit the attempts of the current study to modulate measures of executive 
control functions like backward inhibition effects and switch costs by affect. Nonetheless the 
two models were used to deduce hypotheses about influences of brief affective stimulation on 
switch costs and backward inhibition effects which are presented in the next paragraph. 
 
 
2.4 The Current Experiments, Hypotheses and Expectations 
 
The aim of this study was to measure affective modulation of executive functions. As 
measures of executive control functions task switching costs (Rogers & Monsell, 1995) and 
backward inhibition effects (Mayr & Keele, 2000) were chosen and calculated with the 
dependent variables reaction times and error rates. 
In general results and findings concerning influences of affect on switch costs and backward 
inhibition effects as measures of executive functions are rare. There are studies that examined 
executive functions but they used different tasks and measures like for example the Tower of 
London task (Oaksford, Morris, Grainger, Williams, & Mark, 1996; Phillips, Smith, & 
Gilhooly, 2002), the Stroop task (Hänze, 1997; Kazén & Kuhl, 2005; Kuhl & Kazén, 1999; 
Phillips, Bull et al., 2002), fluency tasks (Baker, Frith, & Dolan, 1997; Mohlman, Mangels, & 
Craske, 2004; Phillips, Bull et al., 2002), the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Mohlman et al., 
2004) or other tasks (Aycicegi-Dinn, Dinn, & Caldwell-Harris, 2009; Dreisbach, 2006; 
Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004; Oaksford et al., 1996; Spies, Hesse, & Hummitzsch, 1996; 
Wang, LaBar, Rosenthal, Dolcos, Lynch, Krishnan, & McCarthy, 2008). Furthermore very 
often not short lived affect but mood was induced (Baker et al., 1997; Hänze, 1997; Oaksford 
et al., 1996; Phillips, Bull et al., 2002; Phillips, Smith et al., 2002; Spies et al., 1996; see 
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Mitchell & Phillips, 2007 for a review), personality traits or even clinical samples with for 
example affective disorders were tested (Aycicegi-Dinn et al., 2009; Fales, Vanek, & 
Knowlton, 2006; Mohlman et al., 2004; Moritz, Hübner, & Kluwe, 2004; Uekermann, 
Channon, Lehmkämper, Abdel-Hamid, Vollmoeller, & Daum, 2008; Wang et al., 2008). 
Studies that worked with task switching often did not use a pure and classical task switching 
paradigm (Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004; Phillips, Bull et al., 2002; Wang & Guo, 2008) or 
affective manipulations were far from being comparable with the brief induction of positive, 
neutral, or negative affect as intended in the current study (Paulitzki, Risko, Oakman, & Stolz, 
2008; Steinhauser, Maier, & Hübner, 2007; Kofman, Meiran, Greenberg, Balas, & Cohen, 
2006). Regarding influences of affect on inhibition different inhibition processes have been 
examined like inhibition of intended actions (Kazén & Kuhl, 2005; Kuhl & Kazén, 1999), 
inhibition of inappropriate responses (Albert, López-Martín, & Carretié, 2009; Yu, Yuan, & 
Luo, 2009), or other kinds of inhibition that are slightly different from backward inhibition 
(Hänze, 1997; Phillips, Bull et al., 2002; Wood, Mathews, & Dalgleish, 2001). It seems as if 
an elaborated examination of affective influences on backward inhibition effects has yet to 
come. Thus, the current study offers examination of executive functions in terms of switch 
costs and backward inhibition effects with different affective stimulation. In order to gain a 
full pattern of affective influences three affective states were used, positive, negative, and 
neutral. The neutral affective state made it possible to have a kind of baseline compared to 
positive and negative affective states. 
There are different methods to activate affect (physiological, hypnosis, personality traits etc.) 
but within an experimental setting in a laboratory with a tight paradigm using situational 
stimuli like films, pictures, sounds, words etc. seems to be the most convenient procedure 
(Sokolowski, 2002). Hence, as affective primes, pictures from the international affective 
picture system, IAPS (Lang et al., 2005) were used. Apart from being an established method 
(Dreisbach, 2006; Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004), it was already shown in combination with the 
startle reflex that pictures evoke affect. The startle reflex which is supposed to be a useful 
measure of human motivation and emotion is modulated by pictures from the IAPS (Bradley, 
Cuthbert, & Lang, 1999). Normally aversive stimuli increase the startle reflex (e.g. eyeblink) 
and pleasant stimuli occasion a relative inhibition of reflex magnitude (Bradley et al., 1999; 
Bradley, Lang, & Cuthbert, 1993; Lang, 1995; Lang et al., 1997). Hence, presenting valent 
pictures before a task should be sufficient to trigger different affective states. 
This study offers a clear combination of short affective stimulation by valent pictures from the 
IAPS (Lang et al., 2005) but also by valent feedback with the well established task switching 
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paradigm to discover modulating effects of affect on executive control functions. The task 
switching paradigm seems to be an appropriate method to cover some of the many processes 
linked with executive control processes. The main task of executive functions is to guarantee 
a balance between stable and flexible processes to allow adapted human behaviour. Executive 
control is described as top-down control processes that enable goal pursuit. Particular 
processes being necessary to execute task switching are focusing and shifting attention, 
maintaining and switching task sets, retrieving associated goals, activating task sets, inhibiting 
distracting information, planning and preparing an action sequence to accomplish a goal, 
monitoring and checking ongoing processes. An explicitly mentioned function of executive 
control, inhibition and suppression of irrelevant information in order to execute a current task 
is covered separately by the backward inhibition effect (Mayr & Keele, 2000). 
Kuhl’s PSI theory (1996, 2000, 2001) and the dopaminergic theory (Ashby et al., 1999; 
Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004) allow generating hypotheses about influences of affect on 
executive control functions represented by switch costs and backward inhibition effects: 
 
1. Influences of affect on switch costs 
a) PSI theory assumes that positive affect facilitates the connection between the loaded 
intention memory and executing systems in the intuitive behaviour control. It can be 
presumed that especially in case of a task switch which is a difficult task the intention 
memory is used and loaded. The simple non-switch tasks can be executed in an 
automatic way and do not need the intention memory. In case of positive affect the 
formed intention regarding a switch trial can be connected more easily to the executing 
system, they can be completed faster compared to switch trials with neutral affect. For 
non-switch trials affect does not make a difference because the intention memory is 
not loaded. Therefore smaller switch costs can be expected with positive compared to 
neutral affect due to reduced reaction times for switch trials.  
 
b) The prediction of the dopaminergic theory is similar. Enhanced cognitive flexibility 
and attenuated perseveration under positive affect are expected to result in benefits 
especially for switch trials. Those trials require the ability to abandon a recently 
executed task set and to flexibly switch to another one. Therefore it is expected that 
high flexibility and less perseveration are beneficiary when switching tasks. This 
should result in reduced reaction times for switch trials under positive affect producing 
smaller switch costs compared to neutral affect. 
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c) Predictions concerning influences of negative affect are more speculative but the 
idea about the facilitated access to the intuitive behaviour control with positive affect 
(see hypothesis 1a) might be extended to negative affect. Negative affect will prevent 
intentions stored in the intention memory to be brought into action, access to executing 
systems will be partly blocked. This is relevant for switch trials when intention 
memory is loaded. Although the prevention will not be a complete one at least reaction 
times will be slowed down compared to neutral affect. Therefore increased reaction 
times for switch trials can be expected with negative affect resulting in larger switch 
costs compared to neutral affect. 
 
2. Influences of affect on backward inhibition effects 
a) PSI theory assumes that positive affect supports overcoming once formed 
inhibition. If dissolving inhibition is facilitated under positive affect this would result 
in smaller backward inhibition effects. The formed inhibition for the first task in ABA 
sequences should be easier to release at the last position in the triplet with a preceding 
positive affect. In the end, faster reaction times for ABA sequences with positive affect 
would cause smaller backward inhibition effects.  
A problem concerning this prediction might be that definitions of inhibition differ. 
Kuhl (1996, 2000, 2001; see also Kuhl & Kazén, 1999) describes an inhibition that is 
used on formed intentions that are going to be executed later. Backward inhibition 
(Mayr & Keele, 2000) however is used to avoid interference and conflict with a 
previously executed task set. Although descriptions and definitions of inhibition are 
different the generated hypothesis might still be valid.  
 
b) To generate hypotheses for inhibition processes and effects from the dopaminergic 
theory is more difficult and therefore also more speculative. There are no explicit 
statements about influences of positive affect and increased dopamine levels on 
inhibition. However, inhibition and assumptions about distractibility can be linked. It 
is predicted that positive affect increases distractibility. That means that inhibition is 
weakened and impaired and as a consequence the amount of inhibition to deal with the 
abandoned task set will be reduced. It might further be possible that the weakened 
maintenance capability and the enhanced ability to overcome dominant responses with 
positive affect have an impact on inhibition during task switching. Both assumptions 
would reduce the necessity to inhibit and suppress the previous task set in order to 
execute a current task. Therefore the formation of inhibition that takes place after the 
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first task in a triplet (e.g. ABA) might be affected. Less inhibition in the first place 
with positive affect (maybe because it cannot be used or maybe it is not necessary to 
use it) reduces the time needed to overcome it later in the sequence resulting in smaller 
backward inhibition effects for positive affect compared to neutral affect. Crucial for 
that effect would be a positive affect between the first and the second task in ABA 
sequences. 
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3. Method 
 
3.1 General Information 
 
The main goal of the current study was to examine influences of affective stimulation on 
executive functioning. The following measures of executive functions were used: 1. switch 
costs generated with the help of the classical task-switching paradigm comparing switches 
between two different tasks with task repetitions; 2. backward inhibition effects which need 
three different tasks in different sequences to be calculated. Both measures were always 
(except for experiments 6.1 and 6.2) collected in parallel within one experimental setting. 
However, blocks with and without direct task repetitions were not varied within but between 
participants because direct task repetitions influence backward inhibition effects (Philipp & 
Koch, 2006). Participants were assigned by chance either to the task switching group 
including direct task repetitions or to the backward inhibition group without any direct task 
repetitions. Switch cost analyses could only be carried out in the group with direct task 
repetitions and backward inhibition effects were only examined in the group without direct 
task repetitions1. 
Affective stimuli were inserted into the paradigm on a trial by trial basis either directly before 
a task as unrelated primes (experiments 1 and 2) or as task-related cues (experiments 3 and 
3.1) or after a task as feedback (experiments 4, 5, 5.1, 6.1, and 6.2). The chosen method was 
to use visual affective stimuli in terms of pictures from the IAPS (Lang et al., 2005) or 
pictorial feedback.  
The paradigm offers different affect positions to be analysed. For backward inhibition effects 
triplets of tasks are analysed and two positions in the triplets are important. Between the first 
and the second task inhibition is supposed to be generated and implemented and before the 
third task this inhibition has to be overcome to be able to execute the last task of an ABA 
sequence (Mayr & Keele, 2000). As a consequence the affective elements between the first 
                                                 
1
 Task sequencing also allowed analysing backward inhibition effects in the group with direct task repetitions. 
These analyses did not reveal any interesting results or a constant pattern of influence. Please note, that due to 
the fact that direct task repetitions had a probability of p = .33 the probability of ABA and CBA sequences was 
only p = .22, respectively. In the end that left only a small amount of triplets to be analysed. This also caused the 
removal of several participants in certain experiments from those additional backward inhibition analyses due to 
missing data. 
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and the second and before the third task in a sequence are of importance2. In case of valent 
pictures presented before a task the positions lag-1 and lag-0 are the relevant ones, for 
feedback the positions lag-1 and lag-2 are of interest (see figure 2). In both cases the positions 
refer to the overcoming and forming of backward inhibition, respectively. All backward 
inhibition analyses were carried out with the mentioned valence positions. 
For exploring switch costs only sequences with two trials, pairs of trials are needed. To 
analyse influences of affective stimuli on switch costs, only the position between those two 
trials is of importance3. Thus, switch cost analyses were carried out with lag-0 valence 
position when pictures were presented before a trial and lag-1 position when feedback was 
used after a trial. 
 
 
  
Figure 2: Schematic display of sequences with feedback and pictures and the notation of positions. 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 It was also tested in all experiments whether the position before the first task in a triplet had an influence. It is 
possible that affect at this position might influence the performance of the first task of a  triplet which then could 
influence all further processes like inhibition or reactivation of that task. No interesting findings or constant 
patterns were observed. The complex design including three affect positions simultaneously also caused missing 
data for a vast number of conditions in nearly all additionally analysed experiments. To keep analyses as simple 
as possible and because assumptions and predictions about the position before the first task were weak, it was 
excluded from the reported analyses.  
3
  Like for backward inhibition effects also for switch costs the position before the first task in a pair might have 
had an influence. Again, this position did not reveal any interesting additional information and therefore it was 
excluded from the reported analyses. 
Positions depending on the analysed trial: 
lag-2     lag-1      lag-0 
C     A     B     C     A … pp 
p p p p 
C     A     B     C     A … f f f f f 
Analysed trial 
lag-2   lag-1     lag-0 
Sequences with 
valent pictures (p) 
before a task: 
Sequences with 
valent feedback (f) 
after a task: 
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The overall effects of the valence factor containing the three conditions positive, neutral, and 
negative affect were not of interest. Instead, two contrasts were defined and reported. Positive 
affect is not supposed to have an impact into the same direction as negative affect (Kuhl, 
2001; Kuhl & Kazén, 1999; Isen, 1999, 2000). Ashby and colleagues (1999) for example state 
that effects of negative mood are more complex and are not merely the opposite of positive 
mood. Furthermore, mood appears not to be a simple dichotomous phenomenon (Mitchell & 
Phillips, 2007). Hence, it seems more appropriate to compare each of the two valences 
(positive and negative) with a kind of baseline, the neutral condition. This resulted in the 
contrasts positive versus neutral and negative versus neutral that were analysed and reported 
in the following experiments whenever it was possible. 
 
 
3.2 Experiments and Results 
 
Nine experiments will be presented. Results of every experiment are discussed directly after 
its result section. Those discussions are only very brief because most of the time significant 
results supporting the main hypotheses were scarce. Hence, these direct discussions are used 
mainly to emphasise the relevant findings and especially to explain changes made for the 
subsequent experiment based on the results of the current one. An elaborated discussion of all 
experiments and results is presented in the general discussion (section 4). 
 
 
3.2.1 Experiment 1 
 
Method 
Participants 76 students of the Friedrich-Schiller-University in Jena (between 19 and 30 years 
old) participated in the single-session experiment (duration approximately 30 minutes). They 
received 1.50 Euros, a bar of chocolate, and a piece of fruit for participating. The experiment 
lasted about 30 minutes. Six participants were excluded from analyses because their error 
rates showed merely correctness by chance.  
Task and stimuli The stimuli were presented on a white screen. The three tasks form 
(Gestalt), line (Linie), and colour (Farbe) were cued with the first letters of the German terms 
G, L, and F, respectively. The presented target was either a square or a circle (form), drawn in 
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a thick or a thin line (line), in blue or in green (colour). Participants’ task was to press the 
letter “D” on the keyboard for responses circle, thick, or green and the letter “L” for square, 
thin, or blue depending on the announced task (see figure 3). Responses had to be given as 
fast and as accurate as possible. Only six targets were used: a blue, thin circle, a blue, thick 
circle, a green, thin circle, a blue, thick square, a green, thin square, and a green, thick square. 
A green, thick circle and a blue, thin square were not included in the target set because in 
those cases the response key mapping allowed responding correctly without knowing the task. 
48 valent pictures4 were chosen from the IAPS (Lang et al., 2005) to serve as affective primes 
in the test blocks (in practice blocks twelve different pictures were used). Pictures were 
chosen concerning their values of valence (9-point scale) and arousal (9-point scale). As can 
be seen in table 1, the values from the IAPS were fairly well met by the evaluation of all 
pictures by the present sample at the end of the experiment. The valence of positive and 
neutral pictures was slightly overestimated whereas the negative ones were underestimated. 
 
 
    
form
circle square
Tasks:
Possible responses:
line colour
thick thin green blue
Stimuli (example):
 
 
Figure 3: Tasks and response options. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 The following pictures were used: 1050, 1440, 1525, 1710, 2038, 2050, 2071, 2091, 2120, 2190, 2209, 2216, 
2276, 2340, 2691, 2880, 2900, 4626, 5510, 5731, 5740, 5833, 5971, 6260, 6312, 7000, 7004, 7006, 7010, 7025, 
7035, 7041, 7053, 7161, 7185, 7200, 7330, 8370, 8420, 8496, 8499, 9340, 9421, 9429, 9470, 9495, 9600, 9902. 
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Table 1: Means of valence and arousal for the 48 prime pictures that were used. Listed are the values 
from the IAPS (Lang et al., 2005) and the present sample’s evaluation. 
 
 IAPS 
valence (range)                  arousal (range) 
Present sample 
valence (SD)     arousal (SD) 
   
positive  7.8   (7.6 to 8.3)                     5.4   (4.5 to 6.7)  7.4  (1.5)              5.2  (2.3) 
neutral  5.0   (4.6 to 5.4)                     2.6   (1.8 to 3.0)  5.3  (1.2)              3.4  (2.0) 
negative  2.8   (2.2 to 3.5)                     5.8   (4.6 to 6.9)  2.4  (1.5)              6.3  (2.3) 
 
 
Trial Procedure A trial started with the presentation of the prime picture. The prime was 
shown for 500ms on its own in the middle of the screen. It remained on the screen in the 
background during cue and target presentation until a response was given. The task cue was 
shown slightly above the centre of the screen in front of the prime also for 500ms. The cue 
vanished and the target object was presented in front of the prime in the middle of the screen 
until a response button was pressed. The response was followed by a blank screen for 200ms 
before the next prime started (see figure 4). Sizes of prime picture, cue, and target (see 
technical details further below) did not allow a full coverage of the prime picture by the cue or 
the target. 
 
 
     
 
Figure 4: Trial procedure in experiment 1. 
 
 
prime and target 
RT 
prime 
500ms 
prime and cue 
500ms 
blank screen 
200ms 
prime 
500ms 
 
G
3. Method 45 
Procedure Half of the participants worked on a version that contained no direct task 
repetitions. In this group the task distribution led to 50% of ABA and CBA sequences, 
respectively. The other half of the participants had to execute experimental blocks which also 
included direct task repetitions with a probability of p = .33. In both groups tasks were drawn 
randomly but every task was shown with the same frequency throughout the experiment. All 
participants were informed at the beginning to which group they belonged.  
In all experiments direct stimulus repetitions were avoided. This allowed excluding or at least 
minimising explanations based on S-R bindings (Waszak et al., 2003). 
At the very beginning a written instruction was presented on the screen explaining the tasks 
and the experimental procedure. It was pointed out that although the valent pictures are 
irrelevant for task execution they should be attended to carefully, because a recognition test 
would be carried out with them later. 
At first the participants were familiarised with the three tasks with two practice blocks of 
twelve trials each. Afterwards the recognition test with the twelve pictures from the two 
practice blocks and twelve new pictures had to be worked on. The pictures were shown on the 
screen in a random order. Participants had to decide for each of the 24 pictures whether it was 
a new one or an already familiar picture. Participants received immediate feedback about the 
correctness of their responses. Then eight test blocks of 48 trials per block followed. After 
each block a summary was given about errors and average reaction times. For the prime 
pictures in the test blocks there was also a recognition test similar to the first one but this time 
the test included only 25 trials for time saving reasons. All 25 trials were drawn randomly 
from a list containing all 48 prime pictures that were used in the test blocks and 48 unfamiliar 
but similar pictures from the IAPS (Lang et al., 2005). At last the 48 pictures from the test 
blocks had to be evaluated on two nine-point-scales. The scales were designed similar to those 
used by Lang and colleagues (2005). One scale concerned the valence from positive to 
negative and the other dealt with the arousal level from high to low.  
The following technical details were used in all reported experiments. Participants were 
normally seated in a comfortable distance to the 17-inch monitor and the standard German 
keyboard. As response buttons always keys of the computer keyboard were used. Stimuli 
were always presented on a white background. Letter and word cues were presented in 
Courier New 18-points font, bold and in black colour. The size of the IAPS pictures on the 
screen was approximately 11 x 9 centimetres. Words written under the pictures were in black, 
font Terminal with a font size of 16-points. Targets had a size of circa 2 x 2 centimetres on 
the screen. Direct feedback included a picture sized 2 x 2 centimetres and text in bold Courier 
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New, font size 14-points in the colours green (for positive feedback) and red (for negative 
feedback). Feedback for the additional task was given in bold Courier New, font size 24-
points in blue (for the correct execution of an additional task) or in red (for missing to press a 
button or for pressing the wrong button). 
 
Results for backward inhibition effects 
In the backward inhibition group the 34 participants showed an error rate of 7.9% (SD = 
6.0%) and two participants were excluded from further analyses because their error rates were 
higher than 19.8% (mean error rate plus two standard deviations). Erroneous responses (7.0% 
of all trials) and reaction times below 200ms or more than one and a half interquartile ranges 
(552ms) above the 75th percentile (1109ms) were excluded from analyses (upper limit = 
1937ms; 6.3% of all trials) (Tukey, 1977). Further were excluded, like in all other 
experiments’ backward inhibition analyses, the first two trials of each block and the two trials 
following a wrong response. Only triplets without response errors at any position were 
analysed. This was a standardised procedure for all experiments. 
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was carried out that included the variables backward 
inhibition (ABA or CBA), lag-1 valence (positive, neutral, or negative), and lag-0 valence 
(positive, neutral, or negative). The means of all combinations of variables are presented in 
table 2 for reaction times and in table 3 for error rates. Instead of reporting results of the two 
valence variables with three levels each, the valence factors were split up into two contrasts. 
The neutral valence was contrasted with the positive and the negative one,  respectively. 
Reaction times A significant backward inhibition effect was found, F(1,31) = 5.85, p < .03. 
Reaction times for ABA sequences were 20ms slower than for CBA sequences (see table 2). 
Interactions of backward inhibition with the contrasts positive-neutral and negative-neutral at 
position lag-1 or lag-0 were not significant (all F’s < 1.1, p’s > .31) (see figure 5). All three-
way interactions of backward inhibition and contrasts at positions lag-1 and lag-0 were also 
not significant (all F’s < 3.3, p’s > .08). 
The two predefined contrasts at both positions did not reach significance (all F’s < 1). Apart 
from a significant interaction of the contrasts negative-neutral at position lag-1 with positive-
neutral at position lag-0, F(1,31) = 10.50, p < .01, no other interactions between contrasts 
were significant (all F’s < 3.7, p’s > .06). Whereas after a neutral prime at position lag-1 
reaction times were speeded up for positive primes (792ms) compared to neutral ones 
(822ms) at position lag-0, the reaction times show a reversed pattern after a negative prime at 
position lag-1 (lag-0 positive: 812ms; neutral: 794ms). 
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Error rates To rule out an explanation in terms of a speed-accuracy trade-off and to check 
whether valence influences might be on errors, analyses with error rates were carried out 
parallel to those with latencies. Analyses with error rates were always based on percentaged 
errors.  
There was no significant overall backward inhibition effect (F < 1) (see table 3). For position 
lag-0 the interaction of backward inhibition and the contrast negative-neutral reached 
significance, F(1,31) = 5.16, p < .04 (see figure 6). The backward inhibition effect was 
normal for neutral valence (1.3%) compared to a reversed effect for negative valence (-0.9%). 
All other interactions of backward inhibition with the contrasts and the three-way interactions 
of backward inhibition, lag-1 contrasts, and lag-0 contrasts were not significant (all F’s < 1.5, 
p’s > .23). 
None of the predefined contrasts at the two positions or interactions between the contrasts at 
the two positions reached significance (all F’s < 3.6, p’s > .06). 
 
 
Table 2: Reaction times (in milliseconds) for ABA and CBA sequences and their difference (BI = 
backward inhibition effect) for all combinations of the three valences at the two positions, respectively. 
 
Variable      
Position lag-1 Position lag-0 ABA CBA BI (SD) 
      
 positive 826 817 9 (148) 
 neutral 849 813 35 (170) 
  positive 
 negative 795 805 -9 (111) 
 positive 817 767 50 (158) 
 neutral 838 805 32 (112) 
  neutral 
 negative 830 830 0 (128) 
 positive 826 798 28 (111) 
 neutral 793 794 -1 (130) 
  negative 
 negative 838 805 33 (115) 
      
Total  823 804 20 (46) 
 
 
 
 
3. Method 48 
Table 3: Error rates (in percent) for ABA and CBA sequences and their difference (BI = backward 
inhibition effect) for all combinations of the three valences at the two positions, respectively. 
 
Variable      
Position lag-1 Position lag-0 ABA CBA BI (SD) 
      
 positive 6.2 7.6 -1.4 (5.7) 
 neutral 7.8 7.5 0.4 (6.8) 
  positive 
 negative 5.2 5.7 -0.6 (7.5) 
 positive 8.1 6.6 1.6 (9.8) 
 neutral 7.8 6.1 1.6 (8.8) 
  neutral 
 negative 5.8 7.1 -1.3 (7.9) 
 positive 7.7 7.0 0.7 (7.5) 
 neutral 8.4 6.4 2.0 (8.4) 
  negative 
 negative 6.4 7.2 -0.7 (7.3) 
      
Total  7.0 6.8 0.3 (2.9) 
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Figure 5: Backward inhibition effects for reaction times (in milliseconds) with positive, neutral, and 
negative valence at positions lag-1 and lag-0, respectively. Error bars refer to standard errors. 
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Figure 6: Backward inhibition effects for error rates (in percent) with positive, neutral, and negative 
valence at positions lag-1 and lag-0, respectively. Error bars refer to standard errors. 
 
 
Results for switch costs 
The switch cost group with 36 participants showed an average error rate of 8.6% (SD = 
8.7%). Three participants’ error rates were higher than 26.1% (mean error rate plus two 
standard deviations) and they were excluded from all further analyses. Afterwards, the sample 
showed an error rate of 6.6%. Those trials and reaction times faster than 200ms or more than 
one and a half interquartile ranges (524ms) above the 75th percentile (1026ms) were excluded 
from analyses (upper limit = 1812ms; 7.9% of all trials) (Tukey, 1977). Also the first trial in 
each block and the trial following an error were excluded from analyses. Only complete and 
correct pairs were analysed. This was standard for all experiments. 
For the analysis of variance (ANOVA) the variables switch costs (AA or AB) and valence at 
position lag-0 (positive, neutral, or negative) were used. The means of all combinations of 
variables are presented in table 4 for reaction times and in table 5 for error rates. As before, 
instead of the overall effects of the three-level variable valence results of the defined contrasts 
positive versus neutral and negative versus neutral were reported. 
Reaction times Significant switch costs were found, F(1,32) = 110.36, p < .01. Switch trials 
were executed more than 180ms slower than non-switch trials (see table 4). Interactions of 
switch costs with the contrasts positive-neutral or negative-neutral were not found (all F’s < 
1.2, p’s > .29) (see figure 7).  
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The contrasts positive-neutral and negative-neutral were also not significant (all F’s < 1). 
Error rates For error rates there were also significant switch costs with 2.7% more errors in 
the switch condition than in the non-switch condition, F(1,32) = 32.58, p < .01 (see table 5). 
No interactions of switch costs with the contrasts were found (all F’s < 3.7, p’s > .06).  
None of the predefined contrasts did reach significance (all F’s < 1). 
 
 
Table 4: Reaction times (in milliseconds) for task switches (AB) and task repetitions (AA) and their 
difference (SC = switch costs) for all three valences, respectively. 
 
Variable     
Position lag-0 AB AA SC (SD) 
     
  positive 807 627 180 (106) 
  neutral 815 626 189 (115) 
  negative 806 635 171 (110) 
     
Total 809 629 180 (99) 
 
 
Table 5: Error rates (in percent) for task switches (AB) and task repetitions (AA) and their difference 
(SC = switch costs) for all three valences, respectively. 
 
Variable     
Position lag-0 AB AA SC (SD) 
     
  positive 7.6 4.7 2.9 (5.0) 
  neutral 8.1 4.4 3.8 (4.9) 
  negative 6.6 5.1 1.5 (5.1) 
     
Total 7.4 4.7 2.7 (2.7) 
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Figure 7: Reaction times (in milliseconds) for non-switch and switch trials after a positive, neutral, or 
negative picture at position lag-0, respectively. Error bars refer to standard errors.  
 
 
Discussion 
For reaction times an influence of valence on cognitive measures like backward inhibition 
effects or switch costs was not found, significant interactions of the two contrasts positive-
neutral and negative-neutral with the two measures did not emerge.  
For latencies a significant backward inhibition effect was found. The paradigm with the 
chosen tasks and stimuli seems to be an efficient method to measure backward inhibition 
effects. What would have been expected following the dopaminergic theory for valence 
position lag-1 was a reduction of the backward inhibition effect under positive compared to 
neutral affect. On a descriptive level this prediction looks like being fulfilled (see figure 5). 
The cause for the smaller effect with positive affect was predicted to be increased reaction 
times for ABA sequences but the found pattern appears to be more complex. The main cause 
for the smaller effect with positive affect are increased reaction times for CBA sequences 
(neutral: 801ms; positive: 812ms) but also a reduction of reaction times for ABA sequences 
(neutral: 828ms; positive: 823ms) contributed to the difference (see table 2). 
Following PSI theory at position lag-0 smaller backward inhibition effects were predicted 
under positive affect compared to neutral affect caused by a reduction of reaction times for 
ABA sequences. However, data show a decreasing linear pattern for backward inhibition 
effects from positive to neutral to negative (see figure 5). This pattern is mainly caused by 
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increasing reaction times for CBA sequences from positive (794ms) to neutral (804ms) to 
negative (813ms) (see table 2). 
Contrary to reaction times, for error rates some significant interactions were obtained. Besides 
latencies error rates are a second possibility to detect influences of affective stimulation on 
executive functions. Valence might not influence reaction times, but error rates in a kind of a 
monitoring function that for example helps to avoid errors in certain conditions. However if 
this is not the case it is important to make clear that no speed-accuracy trade-off exists. Error 
rates should always show patterns of results similar to those for reaction times. For the current 
experiment a speed-accuracy trade-off cannot be assumed. 
For error rates a significant interaction of backward inhibition with the contrast negative-
neutral at position lag-0 was found. With a negative valence at this position the backward 
inhibition effect was reversed (see figure 6). This was mainly caused by a reduction of error 
rates in ABA sequences from neutral (8.0%) to negative (5.8%) whereas for CBA sequences 
error rates with neutral and negative affect were identical (6.7%). It seems as if a negative 
valence at position lag-0 helps to avoid errors in the more difficult ABA sequences. Normally 
it is more difficult to execute the last task in ABA sequences because of the inhibition that is 
inflicted on that task. In general that is expressed in higher reaction times and error rates. In 
the current experiment at least error rates after negative affect showed a different pattern, 
errors in ABA sequences could be reduced to an amount that even allowed a reversed 
backward inhibition effect. The PSI and the dopaminergic theory did not make any specific 
predictions concerning the difference between negative and neutral affect neither for reaction 
times nor for error rates. Before interpreting that effect any further a replication would be 
desirable and useful. 
 
For reaction time analyses significant switch costs were found. As for backward inhibition 
effects interactions with valence were not found. The switch costs for the three valences 
hardly differed (see table 4) and not even a pattern of possible influences of valence on switch 
costs can be described. 
As for reaction times analyses based on error rates also showed significant switch costs but 
contrary to backward inhibition analyses no significant interactions were found.  
 
A reason for having missed significant influences of affect on backward inhibition effects or 
switch costs might have been the presentation of the valent stimuli. Participants could have 
ignored the valent pictures because they were not relevant for executing the tasks. The 
pictures might have flown by as a kind of visual background noise while participants 
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concentrated on the real task. To check this assumption a sensitivity measure d’ was 
calculated. Every participant had to complete a recognition test concerning the valent pictures 
at the end of the experiment. The relative frequency for hits was 0.94 and 0.15 for false 
alarms. This resulted in d’ = 2.6 which is a fairly high value and gives reason to believe that 
the participants at least noticed the pictures in a kind of way that allowed them to remember 
those pictures later in the experiment. However, even with this high recognition rate it is still 
an open question, whether participants also encoded the valence of the pictures. It might not 
be necessary to know the valence of a picture to remember it as a former part of the previous 
test blocks. Hence, for the next experiment an additional task was created to support focusing 
on the valence of the prime pictures. The same experiment was carried out again but this time 
the valence of the pictures was specified in written form directly below the pictures. Also 
attention was drawn to the pictures with an additional task. Participants had to notice when 
the valence content of the picture and the written valence word under the picture did not 
correspond. This will hopefully advance encoding and processing of the valence information 
because with the additional task attention is constantly drawn to it. 
 
 
3.2.2 Experiment 2: Additional task 
 
Method 
Participants 69 students of the Friedrich-Schiller-University in Jena (between 18 and 40 years 
old) participated in the single-session experiment for partial fulfilment of course 
requirements. The experiment lasted about 30-40 minutes.  
Task and Stimuli Task and stimuli were the same as in experiment 1. The same prime 
pictures were used plus two additional neutral pictures5, altogether 50 pictures. This was 
necessary to guarantee that within a block no picture was presented twice, because sometimes 
none, one, or two additional tasks were included. In table 6 the results of the evaluative testing 
of the pictures at the end of the experiment are presented compared to the values from the 
IAPS (Lang et al., 2005). This time the neutral pictures show nearly identical evaluation 
values. As in experiment 1 the negative ones are still slightly underestimated but for the 
positive pictures the understatement increased. 
 
 
                                                 
5
 The two additional pictures were numbers 5520 and 7080 from the IAPS (Lang et al., 2005). 
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Table 6: Means of valence and arousal for the 50 prime pictures that were used. Listed are the values 
from the IAPS (Lang et al., 2005) and the present sample’s evaluation. 
 
 IAPS 
valence (range)                  arousal (range) 
Present sample 
valence (SD)     arousal (SD) 
   
positive  7.8   (7.6 to 8.3)                     5.4   (4.5 to 6.7)  7.2  (1.5)              5.5  (2.0) 
neutral  5.1   (4.6 to 5.4)                     2.6   (1.8 to 3.0)  5.2  (1.0)              3.2  (1.9) 
negative  2.8   (2.2 to 3.5)                     5.8   (4.6 to 6.9)  2.5  (1.5)              6.5  (1.9) 
 
 
Trial Procedure The trial procedure was identical to that in experiment 1. 
Procedure As in experiment 1, half of the participants worked on a version that contained no 
direct task repetitions, the other half had to deal with direct task repetitions. The probabilities 
for ABA, CBA, and repetition sequences were the same as in experiment 1 for the different 
groups.  
The three tasks (form, line, and colour) were explained by means of a written instruction on 
the screen. In this experiment valence of the pictures was also labelled below every picture. 
For example, below a picture with a negative valence the word ‘negative’ was written in 
German. All pictures with the appropriate valence words that were used in the practice blocks 
were presented to the participants before testing started. This was followed by two practice 
blocks with twelve trials each to allow participants to familiarise with the tasks. Then an 
additional task was introduced. Normally, the valence of the picture and the written valence 
word were identical. But sometimes this was not the case and participants were requested to 
register the discrepancy and press the space button immediately. For the additional task the 
trial procedure was slightly changed. The prime was shown for 900ms instead of 500ms to 
leave enough time for identification and a correct response. No cue and no stimuli followed 
but feedback was shown for 1750ms. If no button was pressed within the 900ms feedback 
read “Zu langsam! Bild und Text haben nicht übereingestimmt!” (Too slow! Picture and text 
did not match!). If the space button was pressed within the 900ms positive feedback was 
shown reading “Richtig! Sehr gut erkannt!” (Correct! Well recognised!). If any other button 
was pressed within the 900ms the following feedback was shown: “Leider falsche Taste!” 
(Wrong button press!). Another two practice blocks were presented with twelve trials each 
and two additional tasks, respectively. Again, as in experiment 1 in practice blocks different 
pictures were used as in test blocks. Therefore, before the test blocks started the 50 test 
pictures were all shown to the participants with the appropriate valence word written below it. 
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After that, ten test blocks with 48 trials per block had to be completed. Within these ten 
blocks nine additional tasks were presented. Four blocks had no additional task at all, three 
blocks one and the other three blocks two additional tasks, respectively. Positions of the 
additional tasks in the block sequence and within a block were chosen randomly. After each 
block again a summary about errors and average reaction time was presented. 
At last the 50 pictures from the test blocks had to be evaluated on two nine-point-scales. As in 
experiment 1 the first scale concerned valence from positive to negative and the second one 
dealt with the arousal level from high to low. 
 
Results for backward inhibition effects 
The 35 participants of the backward inhibition group showed an error rate of 7.5% (SD = 
7.4%). Two participants were excluded from further analyses because their error rates were 
higher than 22.4% (mean error rate plus two standard deviations). Erroneous responses (5.9% 
of all trials) and reaction times below 200ms or more than one and a half interquartile ranges 
(764ms) above the 75th percentile (1380ms) were excluded from analyses (upper limit = 
2526ms; 5.7% of all trials) (Tukey, 1977). Additional to wrong responses and reaction times 
slower than 2526ms also additional tasks and the two tasks following such a task were 
excluded. 
The identical analyses as in experiment 1 were carried out. Means of all variables and 
combinations of variables are presented in table 7 (reaction times) and table 8 (error rates). 
Reaction times This time a significant backward inhibition effect was not found (F < 2.7, p > 
.11) (see table 7). All interactions of backward inhibition with the two contrasts at positions 
lag-1 and lag-0, respectively, as well as the three-way interactions were not significant (all F’s 
< 1) (see figure 8). 
For position lag-1 both contrasts and for position lag-0 the contrast negative-neutral did not 
reach significance (all F’s < 1), but the contrast positive-neutral at position lag-0 was 
significant, F(1,32) = 5.53, p < .03. Reaction times after neutral primes at position lag-0 
(994ms) were 20ms slower than after positive primes (974ms). Interactions between contrasts 
were not significant (all F’s < 3.0, p’s > .09). 
Error rates There was no significant backward inhibition effect (F < 1). Also none of the 
interactions with backward inhibition did reach significance (all F’s < 3.0, p’s > .09) (see 
table 8). 
For the contrasts and also the interactions between the contrasts no significant results could be 
observed (all F’s < 3.1, p’s > .08). 
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Table 7: Reaction times (in milliseconds) for ABA and CBA sequences and their difference (BI = 
backward inhibition effect) for all combinations of the three valences at the two positions, respectively. 
 
Variable      
Position lag-1 Position lag-0 ABA CBA BI (SD) 
      
 positive 958 956 3 (165) 
 neutral 996 981 15 (125) 
  positive 
 negative 1002 989 12 (157) 
 positive 985 981 4 (125) 
 neutral 981 979 2 (139) 
  neutral 
 negative 1023 978 45 (160) 
 positive 994 970 24 (146) 
 neutral 1021 1005 16 (137) 
  negative 
 negative 988 980 8 (188) 
      
Total  994 980 14 (51) 
 
 
Table 8: Error rates (in percent) for ABA and CBA sequences and their difference (BI = backward 
inhibition effect) for all combinations of the three valences at the two positions, respectively. 
 
Variable      
Position lag-1 Position lag-0 ABA CBA BI (SD) 
      
 positive 6.1 5.6 0.4 (5.4) 
 neutral 5.8 5.4 0.4 (7.1) 
  positive 
 negative 5.7 6.7 -1.0 (8.3) 
 positive 6.2 6.3 -0.1 (5.3) 
 neutral 6.4 4.9 1.5 (5.4) 
  neutral 
 negative 6.5 5.6 1.0 (6.6) 
 positive 7.1 5.5 1.6 (6.7) 
 neutral 4.7 5.5 -0.8 (6.3) 
  negative 
 negative 5.7 5.4 0.3 (6.6) 
      
Total  6.0 5.7 0.4 (2.2) 
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Figure 8: Backward inhibition effects for reaction times (in milliseconds) with positive, neutral, and 
negative valence at positions lag-1 and lag-0, respectively. Error bars refer to standard errors. 
 
 
Results for switch costs 
The average error rate of the switch cost group (34 participants) was 8.1% (SD = 6.9%). Two 
participants with error rates higher than 21.9% (mean error rate plus two standard deviations) 
were excluded from all further analyses. The remaining sample showed an error rate of 6.8%. 
Erroneous responses and reaction times below 200ms or more than one and a half 
interquartile ranges (704ms) above the 75th percentile (1291ms) were excluded from analyses 
(upper limit = 2347ms; 7.0% of all trials) (Tukey, 1977). As for backward inhibition analyses 
every additional task and the following trial were not included in the analyses. 
The carried out analyses were the same as in experiment 1. In tables 9 (reaction times) and 10 
(error rates) means of all combinations of variables are presented. 
Reaction times Significant switch costs were found, F(1,31) = 89.02, p < .01, switch trials 
were 161ms slower than non-switch trials (see table 9). The interaction of switch costs with 
the contrast negative-neutral reached significance, F(1,31) = 5.14, p < .04. Switch costs after 
neutral primes (143ms) were smaller than after negative primes (182ms) (see figure 9). The 
interaction of switch costs and the contrast positive-neutral was not significant (F < 1). 
For the two predefined contrasts no significant results were obtained (all F’s < 3, p’s > .09). 
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Error rates For error rates also significant switch costs were found, F(1,31) = 25.91, p < .01. 
2.2% more errors were made in switch than in non-switch trials (see table 10). Interactions of 
switch costs with one of the two contrasts did not reach significance (all F’s < 1.4, p’s > .26). 
The contrast positive-neutral was significant, F(1,31) = 5.58, p < .03, with 1% more errors 
after neutral primes (6.6%) than after positive ones (5.6%).The other contrast was not 
significant (F < 1). 
 
 
Table 9: Reaction times (in milliseconds) for task switches (AB) and task repetitions (AA) and their 
difference (SC = switch costs) for all three valences, respectively. 
 
Variable     
Position lag-0 AB AA SC (SD) 
     
  positive 951 789 162 (112) 
  neutral 960 817 143 (125) 
  negative 991 809 182 (109) 
     
Total 967 805 162 (97) 
 
 
Table 10: Error rates (in percent) for task switches (AB) and task repetitions (AA) and their difference 
(SC = switch costs) for all three valences, respectively. 
 
Variable     
Position lag-0 AB AA SC (SD) 
     
  positive 7.0 4.1 2.9 (4.8) 
  neutral 7.3 5.8 1.5 (4.4) 
  negative 7.8 5.6 2.2 (3.3) 
     
Total 7.4 5.2 2.2 (2.4) 
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Figure 9: Reaction times (in milliseconds) for non-switch and switch trials after a positive, neutral, or 
negative picture at position lag-0, respectively. Error bars refer to standard errors.  
 
 
Discussion 
In this second experiment reaction times were generally slower and backward inhibition 
effects and switch costs smaller. The additional task that increased the difficulty of the 
experiment might have slowed down latencies in general.  
Again, an interaction of backward inhibition with valence was not found, this time neither for 
reaction times nor for error rates. Although the general backward inhibition effect based on 
reaction times was only slightly smaller than in experiment 1 (14ms versus 20ms) it did not 
reach significance this time. 
For latencies at position lag-1 the backward inhibition effect after positive primes is again 
smaller than after neutral ones and this time expectations from the dopaminergic theory were 
met. The descriptive difference was mainly due to reduced reaction times for ABA sequences 
with positive affect (positive: 985ms; neutral: 996ms). Reaction times for CBA sequences 
were nearly identical (positive: 975ms; neutral: 979ms). The pattern of backward inhibition 
effects at position lag-0 from experiment 1 could not be replicated. Considering PSI theory 
the expected smaller backward inhibition effect after positive primes was not even reached on 
a descriptive level. Backward inhibition effects for positive and neutral primes hardly differ 
(see figure 8). 
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Error rates did not reveal any significant result. The significant interaction of backward 
inhibition effects and the contrast neutral-negative that was found in experiment 1 was not 
replicated.  
 
For switch costs a significant interaction with the contrast negative-neutral based on reaction 
times was found. Switch costs were larger after a negative prime. This seems mainly due to an 
increase of reaction times for task switches of nearly 30ms with negative primes (see table 9 
and figure 9). This pattern was exactly predicted with PSI theory. If this finding could be 
replicated it would confirm the idea of the PSI theory that with negative affect the connection 
between the intention memory and the executing systems of the intuitive behaviour control is 
disturbed and partly blocked. That slows down execution of the switch trials with negative 
affect compared to positive affect. The pattern of switch costs for the contrast positive-neutral 
is completely contrary to the predicted one by the PSI and the dopaminergic theory. With 
positive affect switch costs are larger than with neutral affect. However, this interaction was 
not significant. 
A speed-accuracy trade-off for the significant interaction cannot be assumed.  
 
In this second experiment it was tried to direct attention to the valence of the prime pictures. 
An additional task was used that asked participants to actively compare the valence 
information of the picture with a given written information below the picture. A recognition 
test with the prime pictures like in experiment 1 was not carried out due to time constraints, 
the experiment should not last longer than 45 minutes. Therefore a sensitivity measure could 
not be calculated. 
In this experiment only an interaction between valence and switch costs was found. The 
additional task seemed not enough to enhance the perception of the valence of the stimuli in a 
way that allowed a substantial impact on switch costs and backward inhibition effects. 
Therefore, for the following experiment the relevance of the valent pictures was again 
intensified. The pictures should gain importance and influence when they are connected more 
tightly to the tasks. Hence, the irrelevant pictures concerning the tasks were turned into cues 
for the three different tasks. In the next experiment every task had three different cue pictures 
because none of the three valences positive, neutral, and negative should be missed out. Thus, 
participants had to deal with nine different pictures and they had to learn, which pictures are 
cueing which tasks in an extensive procedure at the beginning of the experiment. The 
additional task was retained so that attention was still directed towards the valence 
information of the pictures. 
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3.2.3 Experiment 3: Valent cues 
 
Method 
Participants 62 students of the university in Jena (between 18 and 37 years old; three 
participants failed to name their age) participated in the single-session experiment. They 
received a bar of chocolate and a token worth 2 Euros to be honoured in the university 
cafeteria or later during data collection 3 Euros and a bar of chocolate. The experiment lasted 
about 40 minutes. One participant had to be excluded from analyses due to a programming 
error in the executed condition. Further eleven participants were excluded because their error 
rates showed merely correctness by chance.  
Task and Stimuli The tasks and task stimuli were the same as in experiment 1 and 2. The 
purpose of the valent pictures changed. They were not used as elements unrelated to the tasks 
anymore but as cues for the three different tasks. Every task had three different cues, a 
positive, a negative, and a neutral picture. The nine pictures for the three different tasks were 
again chosen from the IAPS (Lang et al., 2005)6, taking into account the results from the 
evaluations in experiments 1 and 2. Valence and arousal values of the pictures are presented 
in table 11. The present sample’s evaluation of the negative pictures was nearly identical to 
the values from the IAPS. Once more the positive pictures were underestimated whereas this 
time the neutral ones were slightly overestimated. 
 
 
Table 11: Means of valence and arousal for the nine pictures used as task cues. Listed are the values 
from the IAPS (Lang et al., 2005) and the present sample’s evaluation. 
 
 IAPS 
valence (range)                  arousal (range) 
Present sample 
valence (SD)     arousal (SD) 
   
positive  7.9   (7.6 to 8.0)                     5.0   (4.9 to 5.1)  7.4  (1.6)              5.4  (2.0) 
neutral  5.2   (5.1 to 5.2)                     2.8   (2.6 to 3.0)  5.8  (1.4)              3.9  (1.8) 
negative  2.4   (2.4 to 2.5)                     5.1   (5.0 to 5.2)  2.4  (1.4)              5.0  (2.4) 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 The following pictures were chosen: numbers 1811, 2150, 2340, 2880, 2038, 5740, 2900, 9340, and 2141. 
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Trial Procedure The trial procedure was slightly modified due to the fact that cue and prime 
were identical in this experiment. A trial started with the presentation of the cue prime picture. 
It remained in the middle of the screen on its own for 500ms and then also during target 
presentation until a response was given. The target was presented in front of the cue prime in 
the middle of the screen until a response button was pressed. The response was followed by a 
blank screen for 200ms before the next cue prime picture was shown. 
As in experiment 2 the additional task was also used in the current experiment. The trial 
procedure was the same as in the previous experiment with one small change. The prime 
picture was not shown for 900ms but for 1000ms. All other features were identical concerning 
the additional task. 
Procedure Two versions, one with the other without direct task repetitions were used as usual 
with the same probabilities as in experiments 1 and 2. 
The introduction to the tasks and the cues was varied depending on their mapping. One 
positive, one negative, and one neutral picture were combined as a cue set, respectively. In 
three different experimental versions the three cue sets were matched differently on the three 
different tasks following the rules of the Latin square. During practice phase the participants 
could be introduced to the tasks in one of three orders: 1. colour, form, and line, 2. form, line, 
and colour, 3. line, colour, and form. With this procedure sequence effects of task introduction 
or effects of task and cue combination were expected to be avoided. A long and extensive 
introduction phase was necessary because the cues were linked to the tasks arbitrarily. The 
combination of cues and tasks had to be learned first. Participants got introduced to the first 
task with a block of eight trials at the beginning of the experiment after the written general 
instruction. Then the second task was explained and also practiced with eight trials. Two 
blocks with 16 trials each followed in which the first and the second task were practiced 
together. After that the third task was introduced, again with eight training trials. Then two 
blocks with 20 trials each were presented with all three tasks. With the completion of those 
two blocks the introduction and training phase of tasks and cues ended. The additional task 
was explained to the participants and practiced at once with two blocks of 18 trials, 
respectively. In each of the two blocks two additional tasks were included at a random 
position. Then the test phase of eight blocks, each with 56 trials began. Three blocks were 
without an additional task, three blocks contained one and two blocks two additional tasks, 
respectively. The position of an additional task in the block sequence and within a block was 
again arbitrary. 
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The first two trials of a test block were drawn randomly. The remaining 54 trials were 18 line, 
colour, and form tasks, respectively. This number of trials allowed the presentation of each 
possible cue target combination (three cues per task and six targets) once in a block. After 
each block participants were informed about their performance concerning speed and 
accuracy. In the end the nine cue prime pictures had to be evaluated on the twnine-point-
scales. 
 
Results for backward inhibition effects 
In the backward inhibition group the 26 participants showed an error rate of 12.1% (SD = 
11.9%) and two participants were excluded from further analyses because their error rates 
were higher than 35.9% (mean error rate plus two standard deviations). Erroneous responses 
(9.8% of all trials) and reaction times below 200ms or more than one and a half interquartile 
ranges (1231ms) above the 75th percentile (1989ms) were excluded from analyses (upper limit 
= 3836ms; 7.6% of all trials) (Tukey, 1977). Again additional tasks and the two trials 
following such a task were excluded from analyses. 
In a first step it was tested whether the three different mappings of cue pictures to the three 
tasks represented with the factor version (version1, version2, version3) influenced any of the 
relevant variables. This was not the case and therefore the variable version was not included 
in the following analyses. 
Identical analyses as in the experiments before were carried out. Means of combinations of 
variables for reaction times and error rates are presented in table 12 and table 13, respectively. 
Reaction times A significant backward inhibition effect was not found (F < 1) (see table 12). 
Also, interactions of one of the two contrasts at positions lag-1 and lag-0 with backward 
inhibition did not reach significance (all F’s < 3.2, p’s > .08) (see table 12 and figure 10). The 
three-way interaction backward inhibition x contrast negative-neutral at position lag-1 x 
contrast positive-neutral at position lag-0 was significant, F(1,23) = 4.30, p < .05. After a 
neutral cue at position lag-1 a reversed backward inhibition effect of -65ms emerged for a 
positive cue at position lag-0 and a normal backward inhibition effect of 14ms for a neutral 
cue at the same position. This pattern changes for a negative cue at position lag-1 especially 
concerning the positive cue at position lag-0. Whereas the combination lag-1 negative plus 
lag-0 neutral revealed a backward inhibition effect of 15ms (which is nearly identical to the 
14ms of the combination lag-1 neutral plus lag-0 neutral) the combination lag-1 negative plus 
lag-0 positive obtained a backward inhibition effect of 144ms. All other three-way 
interactions were not significant (all F’s < 1). 
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Table 12: Reaction times (in milliseconds) for ABA and CBA sequences and their difference (BI = 
backward inhibition effect) for all combinations of the three valences at the two positions, respectively. 
 
Variable      
Position lag-1 Position lag-0 ABA CBA BI (SD) 
      
 positive 1272 1252 20 (248) 
 neutral 1373 1358 15 (286) 
  positive 
 negative 1351 1360 -9 (217) 
 positive 1233 1298 -65 (305) 
 neutral 1376 1362 14 (250) 
  neutral 
 negative 1355 1345 10 (207) 
 positive 1306 1163 144 (233) 
 neutral 1457 1442 15 (271) 
  negative 
 negative 1330 1314 17 (251) 
      
Total  1339 1322 18 (97) 
 
 
Table 13: Error rates (in percent) for ABA and CBA sequences and their difference (BI = backward 
inhibition effect) for all combinations of the three valences at the two positions, respectively. 
 
Variable      
Position lag-1 Position lag-0 ABA CBA BI (SD) 
      
 positive 11.7 10.2 1.5 (6.3) 
 neutral 8.8 8.4 0.5 (8.0) 
  positive 
 negative 8.7 9.7 -1.1 (7.5) 
 positive 10.9 9.4 1.5 (7.9) 
 neutral 9.9 8.0 1.8 (6.9) 
  neutral 
 negative 11.1 9.8 1.3 (8.9) 
 positive 10.6 10.6 0 (8.2) 
 neutral 9.5 8.9 0.5 (8.2) 
  negative 
 negative 12.0 8.2 3.8 (7.9) 
      
Total  10.3 9.2 1.1 (2.9) 
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The contrast positive-neutral at position lag-0 was significant, F(1,23) = 17.64, p < .01. 
Reaction times were faster after a positive cue (1254ms) compared to a neutral cue (1395ms) 
at position lag-0. All other contrasts did not reach significance (all F’s < 4.3, p’s > .05). A 
further significant result can be reported for the interaction of the contrasts negative-neutral at 
positions lag-1 and lag-0, F(1,23) = 6.24, p < .03. For a neutral cue at position lag-1 reaction 
times are only slightly faster after a negative cue (1350ms) compared to a neutral one 
(1369ms) at position lag-0. This pattern is intensified after a negative cue at position lag-1. 
Reaction times after a negative cue at position lag-0 are now faster (1347ms) than after a 
neutral one (1450ms). All other interactions were not significant (all F’s < 2.6, p’s > .12). 
Error rates For error rates no significant backward inhibition effect was found (F < 3.5, p > 
.07) (see table 13). None of the interactions of backward inhibition with the contrasts (all F’s 
< 1) or the three-way interactions (all F’s < 1.2, p’s > .28) were significant.  
All contrasts and all interactions between contrasts failed to reach significance (all F’s < 1). 
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Figure 10: Backward inhibition effects for reaction times (in milliseconds) with positive, neutral, and 
negative valence at positions lag-1 and lag-0, respectively. Error bars refer to standard errors. 
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Results for switch costs 
The switch cost group with 24 participants showed an average error rate of 10.8% (SD = 
8.3%). Two participants showed error rates higher than 27.5% (mean error rate plus two 
standard deviations) and were excluded from all further analyses. Afterwards, the sample 
showed an error rate of 9.0%. Those trials and reaction times faster than 200ms or more than 
one and a half interquartile ranges (1058ms) above the 75th percentile (1755ms) were 
excluded from analyses (upper limit = 3342ms; 7.0% of all trials) (Tukey, 1977). 
It was also tested whether the factor version had an impact on relevant variables. This was not 
the case and therefore the factor was not included in reported analyses. Analyses as in the 
previous experiments were carried out. The means of all combinations of variables are 
presented in table 14 for reaction times and in table 15 for error rates. 
Reaction times Significant switch costs were found, F(1,21) = 122.53, p < .01. Non-switch 
trials were 335ms faster than switch trials (see table 14). Interactions of switch costs with the 
two contrasts were not significant (all F’s < 1.2, p’s > .30) (see figure 11). 
The contrasts positive-neutral, F(1,21) = 23.87, p < .01 and negative-neutral, F(1,21) = 5.94, 
p < .03 reached significance. Reaction times were faster after positive (1090ms) and after 
negative cues (1129ms) compared to neutral ones (1197ms), respectively. 
Error rates For error rates there were also significant switch costs, F(1,21) = 6.11, p < .03, 
with switch trials producing approximately 1.9% more errors than non-switch trials (see table 
15). None of the two contrasts did interact significantly with switch costs (all F’s < 3.1, p’s > 
.09). 
The contrasts positive-neutral and negative-neutral did not reach significance (all F’s < 1). 
 
 
Table 14: Reaction times (in milliseconds) for task switches (AB) and task repetitions (AA) and their 
difference (SC = switch costs) for all three valences, respectively. 
 
Variable     
Position lag-0 AB AA SC (SD) 
     
  positive 1247 932 315 (155) 
  neutral 1370 1023 346 (156) 
  negative 1301 957 344 (188) 
     
Total 1306 971 335 (142) 
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Table 15: Error rates (in percent) for task switches (AB) and task repetitions (AA) and their difference 
(SC = switch costs) for all three valences, respectively. 
 
Variable     
Position lag-0 AB AA SC (SD) 
     
  positive 9.0 6.9 2.1 (4.3) 
  neutral 10.2 7.0 3.2 (5.6) 
  negative 9.6 9.1 0.5 (6.5) 
     
Total 9.6 7.7 1.9 (3.6) 
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Figure 11: Reaction times (in milliseconds) for non-switch and switch trials after a positive, neutral, or 
negative picture at position lag-0, respectively. Error bars refer to standard errors.  
 
 
Discussion 
In the third experiment again no two-way interactions of backward inhibition with the two 
contrasts were found but for the first time a three-way interaction reached significance. Only 
the combination of certain lag-1 and lag-0 valences made a difference. Noticeable are the 
enormous differences between backward inhibition effects that produced that result. That is, 
144ms for the combination negative-positive and -65ms for the combination neutral-positive. 
It is difficult to speculate about that finding because neither PSI theory nor the dopaminergic 
3. Method 68 
theory made any predictions about such an interaction or a prediction about influences of 
negative affect at all. At first, a replication of this finding would be useful.  
On a descriptive level the pattern of backward inhibition effects for affect at position lag-1 
was different compared to experiments 1 and 2 especially for the contrast positive-neutral. 
With neutral cues a reversed backward inhibition effect was observed whereas after a positive 
cue a small normal effect can be described. Reduced reaction times for ABA sequences as 
well as increased latencies for CBA sequences with neutral compared to positive affect caused 
this difference. 
Reinforced was the impression that for lag-0 valence a smaller backward inhibition effect for 
positive compared to neutral affect as predicted seems not to exist. Again the size of the 
backward inhibition effect decreased from positive to neutral to negative like in experiment 1. 
A trend about whether reaction times in ABA or CBA sequences caused the pattern cannot be 
described because the general reaction time level for the three different valences differed 
greatly (average reaction times for ABA and CBA sequences taken together - positive: 
1254ms; neutral: 1395ms; negative: 1343ms). 
Significant results with error rates were not found and a speed-accuracy trade-off for the 
found results based on reaction times cannot be assumed. 
 
The switch costs analyses did not reveal any significant result neither for reaction times nor 
for error rates. The finding of the previous experiment (interaction of switch costs with the 
contrast negative-neutral for latencies) was not replicated. Quite the contrary, the switch costs 
for those two valences are nearly identical in this experiment (see table 14). The pattern for 
switch costs with positive and neutral affect was in accordance with the predictions. Switch 
costs with positive affect were smaller than with neutral affect. This was mainly due to a 
reduction of reaction times for switch trials with positive affect. This can be explained with 
facilitated access of formed intentions to executing systems according to PSI theory as well as 
with enhanced flexibility according to the dopaminergic theory. However, this interaction was 
not significant. 
 
This time participants had to pay attention to the prime pictures because they served as the 
task cues. Although an interaction of valence and measures of executive control could not be 
observed a three-way interaction of backward inhibition, the contrast negative-neutral at 
position lag-1, and the contrast positive-neutral at position lag-0 was found. A replication of 
this interaction was aimed for with the next experiment. The high general error rate, the huge 
variance regarding reaction times as well as the generally high latencies and complaints from 
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participants concerning the difficulty of the tasks made it necessary to simplify the experiment 
before collecting more data. Participants reported that they did not mind the additional task 
which was a rare event. The high error rates as well as the high drop out rate show that the 
difficulty of the experiment was generally high so that participants might not have taken the 
additional task too serious. Thus, the additional task was omitted in the next experiment. Also 
only positive and neutral affect was used for two reasons: first of all that simplified the 
experiment further because only six cues have to be learnt and matched with the three tasks. 
Secondly, this valence combination seems still promising enough to produce a significant 
interaction even though the three-way interaction was obtained with involvement of negative 
affect. An interaction can still be expected because the pattern for negative valence at position 
lag-1 and positive versus neutral affect at position lag-0 is similar although less pronounced to 
that for a positive valence at position lag-1 and positive versus neutral affect at position lag-0 
(see table 12).  
 
 
3.2.4 Experiment 3.1: Valent cues 2 
 
Method 
Participants 36 students of the university in Jena (between 18 and 30 years old) executed 
sequences without direct task repetitions, only backward inhibition effects were calculated. 
Data to measure switch costs was not collected. Participants received 3 Euros for participating 
in the single-session experiment that lasted about 30 minutes. Showing merely correctness by 
chance two participants were excluded from further analyses.  
Task and Stimuli Tasks and task stimuli were the same as in experiment 3. The valent cue 
pictures were partly changed because some pictures were not rated as expected in experiment 
3. Also only positive and neutral cue pictures were used to simplify the experiment. An 
evaluative testing of the three positive and three neutral pictures used in the test blocks at the 
end of the experiment also included three negative pictures to give participants the 
opportunity to exploit the 9-point scale and to avoid a bias7. Again and also with the changed 
pictures the present sample underestimated positive pictures and overestimated neutral ones 
compared to the values from the IAPS (Lang et al., 2005) (see table 16).  
 
                                                 
7
 The following pictures from the IAPS (Lang et al., 2005) were used: 2190, 5534, 7484, 2150, 1440, and 2340. 
The three additional negative ones were: 2900, 9340, and 2141. 
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Table 16: Means of valence and arousal for the three positive and the three neutral pictures used as 
task cues, as well as for the three additionally evaluated negative pictures. Listed are the values from 
the IAPS (Lang et al., 2005) and the present sample’s evaluation. 
 
 IAPS 
valence (range)                  arousal (range) 
Present sample 
valence (SD)     arousal (SD) 
   
positive  8.1   (7.9 to 8.2)                     4.8   (4.6 to 5.0)  7.4  (1.5)              5.4  (2.2) 
neutral  4.9   (4.8 to 4.9)                     3.3   (2.4 to 4.2)  5.2  (1.6)              3.9  (2.0) 
negative  2.4   (2.4 to 2.5)                     5.1   (5.0 to 5.2)  2.4  (1.6)              5.2  (2.5) 
 
 
Trial Procedure The trial procedure was identical to experiment 3 with one difference: the 
additional task was no longer used to further simplify the experiment. 
Procedure Only the version without direct task repetitions was carried out. Probabilities were 
the same as in the preceding experiments. 
The method of introducing tasks and cues was the same as in experiment 3. Only the part with 
explaining and practicing the additional task was of course omitted. 
The test phase consisted of twelve blocks with 38 trials each. The first two trials of a test 
block were drawn randomly from a special list. The remaining 36 trials were 12 line, colour, 
and form tasks, respectively. This block length allowed presenting each possible cue target 
combination (two cues per task and six targets) exactly once in a block. Again a summary 
about errors and average reaction time was presented at the end of each block.  
The experiment ended with the evaluation of the six cue prime pictures plus the additional 
three negative pictures on the two nine-point-scales. 
 
Results for backward inhibition effects 
The remaining group of 34 participants showed an average error rate of 10.5% (SD = 12.5%) 
Data of three participants was not used in the further analyses because their error rates were 
higher than 35.5% (mean error rate plus two standard deviations). Erroneous responses (7.7% 
of all trials) and reaction times below 200ms or more than one and a half interquartile ranges 
(1052ms) above the 75th percentile (1747ms) were excluded from analyses (upper limit = 
3325ms; 7.9% of all trials) (Tukey, 1977).  
As in experiment 3 the factor version was tested, but no influence on relevant variables was 
found and the factor was not included in the reported analyses. 
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The identical analyses as in all previous experiments were carried out with the difference that 
the factor valence at both positions only had two levels, positive and neutral. Therefore no 
results can be reported for the contrast negative-neutral. Means of all variables and 
combinations of variables are presented in table 17 (reaction times) and table 18 (error rates). 
 
 
Table 17: Reaction times (in milliseconds) for ABA and CBA sequences and their difference (BI = 
backward inhibition effect) for all combinations of the two valences at the two positions, respectively. 
 
Variable      
Position lag-1 Position lag-0 ABA CBA BI (SD) 
      
 positive 1174 1127 47 (143)   positive 
 neutral 1270 1195 76 (130) 
 positive 1190 1139 51 (138)   neutral 
 neutral 1220 1172 48 (163) 
      
Total  1214 1158 55 (79) 
 
 
Table 18: Error rates (in percent) for ABA and CBA sequences and their difference (BI = backward 
inhibition effect) for all combinations of the two valences at the two positions, respectively. 
 
Variable      
Position lag-1 Position lag-0 ABA CBA BI (SD) 
      
 positive 7.2 8.5 -1.3 (5.4)   positive 
 neutral 8.6 6.5 2.1 (4.1) 
 positive 8.2 7.4 0.7 (4.5)   neutral 
 neutral 8.2 7.3 0.8 (3.5) 
      
Total  8.0 7.5 0.6 (2.0) 
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Reaction times A significant backward inhibition effect of 55ms was found, F(1,30) = 15.45, 
p < .01 (see table 17). An interaction of backward inhibition with the contrast positive-neutral 
at any position did not emerge (all F’s < 1) (see figure 12). Also the three-way interaction of 
backward inhibition with the contrast at both positions did not reach significance (F < 1). 
The contrast positive-neutral at position lag-0 was significant, F(1,30) = 7.84, p < .01. 
Reaction times were faster after a positive cue (1158ms) at position lag-0 compared to a 
neutral one (1214ms). The contrast at position lag-1 and the interaction between the contrasts 
were not significant (all F’s < 3.2, p’s > .08).  
Error rates There was no significant backward inhibition effect for error rates (F < 2.9, p > 
.10) (see table 18). No interactions of backward inhibition with the contrast positive-neutral at 
positions lag-1 and lag-0 were found (all F’s < 3.5, p’s > .07) but the three-way interaction 
reached significance, F(1,30) = 5.06, p < .04. The difference between a positive (0.7%) and a 
neutral cue (0.8%) at position lag-0 after a neutral one at position lag-1 is not very big but for 
a positive cue at position lag-1 positive and neutral cues at position lag-0 differed greatly. 
There is a reversed backward inhibition effect of -1.3% after a positive cue and a normal one 
of 2.1% after a neutral cue (see table 18). 
The two contrasts and the interaction between them were not significant (all F’s < 1). 
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Figure 12: Backward inhibition effects for reaction times (in milliseconds) with positive and neutral 
valence at positions lag-1 and lag-0, respectively. Error bars refer to standard errors. 
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Discussion 
Simplifying the experiment clearly helped to reduce response errors and drop out rates. But 
reaction times were still quite high and the cut-off limit for reaction times remained above 
3000 milliseconds. 
Again no interactions of backward inhibition effects with the contrast (in this experiment only 
positive-neutral) were found and also the three-way interaction of the preceding experiment 
was not replicated. The descriptive pattern for lag-1 affect was like in experiment 3 and 
contrary to the predictions of the dopaminergic theory. The backward inhibition effect after 
positive affect was larger compared to after neutral affect. This was mainly due to increased 
reaction times for ABA sequences after positive affect (1222ms) compared to neutral affect 
(1205ms). The prediction from PSI theory for lag-0 backward inhibition effects was correct at 
least on a descriptive level. The effect was smaller after a positive cue. A reduction of 
reaction times for ABA sequences after positive affect seems to be the main cause for this 
pattern (positive: 1182ms; neutral: 1245ms). This was predicted by PSI theory because the 
positive affect is assumed to help overcoming once formed inhibition which accelerates 
reaction times for ABA sequences. 
For error rates the interaction of backward inhibition, valence at position lag-1 and valence at 
position lag-0 was significant. Considering the significant three-way interaction for reaction 
times from experiment 3 it would have been expected to find an average backward inhibition 
effect for the lag-1–lag-0 combinations positive-neutral and neutral-neutral, a larger effect for 
positive-positive and a clearly reversed effect for the combination neutral-positive. This 
expectation was not met. The interaction was mainly due to the large difference between 
positive and neutral affect at position lag-0 after a positive cue at position lag-1 (positive-
positive: -1.3%; positive-neutral: 2.1%) (see table 18). 
A speed-accuracy trade-off for the observed effects cannot be assumed. 
 
So far influences of affect on switch costs and backward inhibition effects are rare. A problem 
might be the method of affective manipulation. Although it was discussed already earlier that 
picture stimuli can elicit an affective modulation (see for example Bradley et al., 1999; Lang 
et al., 1997) it can still be doubted whether pictures as they were used in the previous 
experiments trigger affective states in a way that allows them to have an impact on executive 
functions. Thus, feedback is now used as affective element. It is supposed to be a stronger 
affective element because it is relevant for example with regard to goals. Feedback is going to 
be presented in every trial after the response. To allow a differentiation after correct responses 
into positive, neutral and negative feedback response speed was used as criterion. Fast 
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responses guaranteed positive and slow responses lead to negative feedback. No general limits 
were used but subject based ones that always used the preceding six reaction times to compute 
individual limits for the current trial. As a side effect of that procedure it is also expected that 
reaction times are accelerated and variance will be reduced. Taken together, this might 
increase chances to find a modulating effect of affective stimulation on executive functions. 
 
 
3.2.5 Experiment 4: Valent feedback 
 
Method 
Participants In this experiment 60 students of the Friedrich-Schiller-University in Jena, aged 
between 18 and 38 years participated. The experiment lasted about 30 minutes and 
participants received at least 2.50 Euros. They could earn 25 Cents of extra money for every 
block with a positive end result. With eight test blocks participants could earn maximum extra 
money of 2 Euros and therefore maximum payment of 4.50 Euros was possible. 
One participant had to be excluded because the experiment was started a second time for her 
after the first program start crashed after some time. Five participants showed merely 
correctness by chance and were also excluded. 
Task and stimuli The actual task was the same as in experiments 1 and 2: squares and circles 
(task form) in blue and in green (task colour) drawn with a thin or a thick line (task line). 
Cues to the tasks were the letters F (colour), G (form) and L (line). This time the valent 
element was included in the paradigm in terms of different feedback. After every task 
feedback was shown depending on correctness and response speed. Three different kinds of 
feedback were possible after a correct trial depending on response speed. An expected side 
effect of this procedure was a speeding up of reaction times and a reduction of variance. After 
a wrong response a red grumpy (see figure 13) and the text “Falsche Antwort” (“Wrong 
answer!”) were shown. If the answer was correct three different feedbacks were possible 
depending on reaction times. The current reaction time was always compared with the six 
previous reaction times of only correct responses. When the current reaction time was slower 
than the mean of the second and third slowest reaction time out of the six reaction times then 
the grumpy face (see figure 13) and the following text were shown: “Zu langsam!” (“Too 
slow!”). When the current time was faster than the mean of the second and third fastest 
reaction time (out of the six reaction times) then a smiling face (see figure 13) and the words 
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“Sehr schön!” (“Very nice!”) were presented. Was the current time in between those two 
means then the neutral face (see figure 13) without any text was shown. 
 
 
 
 
     
 
Figure 13: Examples of feedback faces that were used in experiments 4, 5, 6.1, and 6.2. 
 
 
Trial Procedure A trial started with the cue presented for 500ms in the middle of the screen. 
Straight afterwards the target was shown until a response button was pressed. Depending on 
correctness and response speed feedback was shown for 1000ms which was followed directly 
by a blank screen for 200ms before the next cue was presented (see figure 14). 
Procedure As usual two different versions were used one with the other without direct task 
repetitions. 
The experiment started with written instructions on the screen. It was emphasised that 
participants could earn some extra money if they were responding correctly and fast enough. 
First, two practice blocks with twelve trials each were presented without feedback to allow 
familiarisation with the tasks. Afterwards participants had to complete eight test blocks with 
56 trials each. In every block the received positive, negative and neutral feedback were 
counted. Positive feedback added 10 points to the block score, negative feedback subtracted 
10 points, with neutral feedback nothing happened. At the end of each test block the block 
score was presented as well as the error rate and average reaction time. Only with a positive 
block score 25 Cents could be earned additionally. 
 
 
Grumpy face Neutral face Smiling face 
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Figure 14: Trial procedure in experiment 4. 
 
 
Results of backward inhibition effects 
The error rate in the group with 28 participants was quite high, 18.2% (SD = 10.7%). Two 
participants were excluded from further analyses due to higher error rates than 39.6% (mean 
error rate plus two standard deviations). Afterwards the error rate was 16.4%. Those trials and 
reaction times below 180ms or more than three interquartile ranges (327ms) above the 75th 
percentile (702ms) were also excluded (upper limit = 1683ms; 5.0% of all trials) (Tukey, 
1977). 
The same analyses were carried out as in the experiments before with two adjustments 
concerning the relevant valence positions. In the previous experiments only valent elements 
preceding a trial were used. Thus lag-0 valence related to the valence shown before the last 
trial in a triplet, lag-1 to the valence before the second trial. In the current experiment valent 
feedback was used which is presented after the response in every trial (see figure 2). The 
corresponding and reported valence positions to lag-0 and lag-1 from the previous 
experiments are lag-1 (valent element before the last trial) and lag-2 (valent element before 
the trial in the middle of a triplet). 
The means of all combinations of variables are presented in tables 19 (reaction times) and 20 
(error rates). 
Reaction times There was no overall backward inhibition effect (F < 1) (see table 19). The 
interaction of backward inhibition with the contrast positive-neutral at position lag-2 was 
significant, F(1,25) = 7.43, p < .02. At position lag-2 positive feedback produced a reversed 
backward inhibition effect (-47ms) compared to neutral feedback that showed a normal effect 
target 
RT cue 
500ms 
blank screen 
200ms 
cue 
500ms 
 
G 
 
L 
feedback 
1000ms 
Sehr schön! 
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(6ms) (see figure 15). The other interactions of backward inhibition with the remaining three 
contrasts were not significant (all F’s < 2.9, p’s > .10). The three-way interaction of backward 
inhibition with the contrast positive-neutral at positions lag-2 and lag-1 was also significant, 
F(1,25) = 4.37, p < .05. After positive feedback at position lag-2 positive feedback at position 
lag-1 caused a reversed backward inhibition effect of -33ms whereas neutral feedback at the 
same position produced an effect of -69ms. For neutral feedback at position lag-2 this pattern 
is reversed. After lag-1 positive feedback the backward inhibition effect is -9ms and after 
neutral feedback a normal backward inhibition effect of 27ms can be measured (see table 19). 
The other three-way interactions did not reach significance (all F’s < 3.7, p’s > .06). 
The contrast positive-neutral at position lag-2 was significant, F(1,25) = 5.12, p < .04, as well 
as the same contrast at position lag-1, F(1,25) = 8.73, p < .01. At position lag-2 reaction times 
are faster after positive feedback (553ms) compared to neutral feedback (571ms). Reaction 
times at position lag-1 are faster after neutral feedback (550ms) compared to positive 
feedback (583ms). The contrasts negative-neutral at both positions did not reach significance 
(all F’s < 1.2, p’s > .28). The interaction of the contrasts negative-neutral at position lag-2 and 
positive-neutral at position lag-1 was also significant, F(1,25) = 4.26, p < .05. There is hardly 
a difference between reaction times for positive (572ms) and neutral (565ms) feedback at 
position lag-1 after negative feedback at position lag-2, but for neutral feedback at position 
lag-2 this small difference increases (lag-1 positive: 601ms; lag-1 neutral: 555ms). All other 
interactions between contrasts were not significant (all F’s < 1). 
Error rates No significant backward inhibition effect was found for error rates (F < 1) (see 
table 20). The interaction of backward inhibition and the contrast negative-neutral at position 
lag-2 reached significance, F(1,25) = 15.27, p < .01. After neutral feedback at position lag-2 a 
reversed backward inhibition effect of -2.8% was found compared to negative feedback at the 
same position with a normal effect of 4.1% (see figure 16). All other interactions of backward 
inhibition with the contrasts were not significant (all F’s < 1.4, p’s > .26). Also none of the 
three-way interactions reached significance (all F’s < 2.4, p’s > .14). 
None of the contrasts or of the interactions between contrasts were significant (all F’s < 2.7, 
p’s > .11). 
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Table 19: Reaction times (in milliseconds) for ABA and CBA sequences and their difference (BI = 
backward inhibition effect) for all combinations of the three valences at the two positions, respectively. 
 
Variable      
Position lag-2 Position lag-1 ABA CBA BI (SD) 
      
 positive 561 594 -33 (90) 
 neutral 497 567 -69 (80) 
  positive 
 negative 530 568 -38 (150) 
 positive 597 605 -9 (65) 
 neutral 568 541 27 (96) 
  neutral 
 negative 555 557 -1 (105) 
 positive 579 564 15 (71) 
 neutral 578 551 27 (106) 
  negative 
 negative 579 525 54 (124) 
      
Total  561 564 -3 (26) 
 
 
Table 20: Error rates (in percent) for ABA and CBA sequences and their difference (BI = backward 
inhibition effect) for all combinations of the three valences at the two positions, respectively. 
 
Variable      
Position lag-2 Position lag-1 ABA CBA BI (SD) 
      
 positive 17.2 17.1 0.2 (13.0) 
 neutral 14.8 15.6 -0.8 (14.6) 
  positive 
 negative 14.4 15.3 -0.9 (8.1) 
 positive 18.3 17.2 1.1 (12.5) 
 neutral 15.5 19.0 -3.5 (14.1) 
  neutral 
 negative 13.4 19.4 -6.0 (8.5) 
 positive 19.0 15.5 3.5 (8.7) 
 neutral 17.2 12.0 5.2 (10.4) 
  negative 
 negative 19.4 15.6 3.8 (6.6) 
      
Total  16.6 16.3 0.3 (3.7) 
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Figure 15: Backward inhibition effects for reaction times (in milliseconds) with positive, neutral, and 
negative feedback at positions lag-2 and lag-1, respectively. Error bars refer to standard errors. 
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Figure 16: Backward inhibition effects for error rates (in percent) with positive, neutral, and negative 
feedback at positions lag-2 and lag-1, respectively. Error bars refer to standard errors. 
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Results for switch costs 
The average error rate of the switch cost group (26 participants) was 20.8% (SD = 10.7%). 
One participant with an error rate higher than 42.3% (mean error rate plus two standard 
deviations) was excluded from all further analyses. Erroneous responses (19.9% of all trials) 
and reaction times below 180ms or more than three interquartile ranges (252ms) above the 
75th percentile (601ms) were excluded from analyses (upper limit = 1357ms; 8.7% of all 
trials) (Tukey, 1977).  
The same analyses were carried out as in previous experiments with one minor adjustment 
concerning the relevant valence position. So far the reported position lag-0 referred to the 
valence shown between a task pair. For the current experiment valent feedback was used 
which means that now position lag-1 is related to the valence that is shown between a pair of 
tasks (see figure 2). The corresponding and reported valence position to lag-0 from the 
previous experiments is lag-1 in the current one. 
In tables 21 (reaction times) and 22 (error rates) means of all combinations of variables are 
presented. 
Reaction times Significant switch costs were found, F(1,24) = 19.49, p < .01. Non-switch 
trials were 64ms faster than switch trials (see table 21). An interaction of switch costs with 
one of the two contrasts was not found (all F’s < 4.3, p’s > .05) (see figure 17). 
The two contrasts were also not significant (all F’s < 2.1, p’s > .16). 
Error rates Also for error rates significant switch costs of 7.5% were found, F(1,24) = 32.62, 
p < .01 (see table 22). The interaction of switch costs with the contrast positive-neutral 
reached significance, F(1,24) = 8.21, p < .01. Switch costs were larger after positive feedback 
(11.6%) than after neutral feedback (6.9%) (see figure 18). The other interaction with the 
contrast negative-neutral was not significant (F < 2.6, p > .12). 
The contrast negative-neutral was significant, F(1,24) = 7.47, p < .02, with higher error rates 
after negative (19.5%) compared to neutral feedback (17.0%). The other contrast was not 
significant (F < 1.2, p > .30).  
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Table 21: Reaction times (in milliseconds) for task switches (AB) and task repetitions (AA) and their 
difference (SC = switch costs) for all three valences, respectively. 
 
Variable     
Position lag-1 AB AA SC (SD) 
     
  positive 512 427 85 (86) 
  neutral 511 443 69 (62) 
  negative 507 468 39 (96) 
     
Total 510 446 64 (73) 
 
 
Table 22: Error rates (in percent) for task switches (AB) and task repetitions (AA) and their difference 
(SC = switch costs) for all three valences, respectively. 
 
Variable     
Position lag-1 AB AA SC (SD) 
     
  positive 24.0 12.3 11.6 (9.8) 
  neutral 20.4 13.5 6.9 (7.9) 
  negative 21.5 17.4 4.0 (7.8) 
     
Total 21.9 14.4 7.5 (6.6) 
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Figure 17: Reaction times (in milliseconds) for non-switch and switch trials after positive, neutral, or 
negative feedback at position lag-1, respectively. Error bars refer to standard errors. 
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Figure 18: Error rates (in percent) for non-switch and switch trials after positive, neutral, or negative 
feedback at position lag-1, respectively. Error bars refer to standard errors. 
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Discussion 
This paradigm with performance-related feedback produced high error rates compared to the 
preceding experiments. However, feedback also allowed considerably accelerated reaction 
times with the cut-off limit below 1700ms in backward inhibition analyses and below 1400ms 
in switch costs analyses.  
The experiment revealed some interesting results and gives the impression that with feedback 
relevant influences of affect on measures of executive functions can be achieved. However, it 
has to be noted that the experiment disclosed confounding variables (Rothermund, 2003). 
Feedback is not only carrying valence information but it is also connected with the 
performance in the preceding trial. Therefore the influence on backward inhibition effects and 
switch costs might not originate in the valence information included in feedback but be an 
artefact connected with the delivered performance. Hence, before interpreting the found 
effects it is necessary to separate valence and performance or at least to examine the influence 
of valence without the underlying performance variable in a further experiment. To make that 
possible the next experiment did not include neutral feedback anymore. Instead of neutral 
feedback also positive and negative feedback was given by chance. That allowed analysing 
influences of real feedback that is performance-related and of random feedback that is based 
on average performances but still provides feedback containing valent information. If effects 
reported in the current experiment are affect-related then interactions of backward inhibition 
effects and switch costs with valence should be observed in analyses with random feedback. 
Are the effects only recovered with real feedback then influences are highly performance-
related. 
 
 
3.2.6 Experiment 5: Valent feedback 2 
 
Method 
Participants 60 students of the Friedrich-Schiller-University in Jena, aged between 18 and 31 
years participated. Duration of the experiment was approximately 30 minutes and participants 
again received at least 2.50 Euros plus 25 Cents of extra money for every block with a 
positive end result. Eight test blocks allowed maximum extra money of 2 Euros and therefore 
maximum payment of 4.50 Euros was possible. 
Two participants showed merely correctness by chance and were excluded from further 
analyses.  
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Task and stimuli Task and stimuli were exactly the same as in experiment 4. Again feedback 
depended on the comparison of a current reaction time with the six preceding times. To be 
able to generate performance independent feedback neutral feedback was dispensed. Instead 
of showing neutral feedback negative or positive feedback was presented by chance. Hence, it 
was possible to analyse real feedback depending on performance and random feedback with 
no strong connection to a previous performance. To increase the probability of occurrence for 
random feedback upper and lower limits to categorise reaction times were slightly changed. 
The second slowest (formerly the mean of the second and third slowest reaction time) and the 
second fastest (formerly the mean of the second and third fastest reaction time) reaction times 
were the new lower and upper limits.  
Trial Procedure The trial procedure was identical to that in experiment 4. 
Procedure All details and conditions were like in experiment 4. 
 
Results for backward inhibition effects 
The 29 participants of the backward inhibition group had an average error rate of 22.4% (SD 
= 10.4%). Two participants were excluded from further analyses due to higher error rates than 
43.2% (mean error rate plus two standard deviations). Erroneous responses (20.9% of all 
trials) and reaction times below 180ms or more than three interquartile ranges (280ms) above 
the 75th percentile (643ms) were excluded from analyses (upper limit = 1483ms; 7.0% of all 
trials) (Tukey, 1977). 
Analyses were separated for real and for random feedback. Of the factor valence only two 
levels, positive and negative remained. Hence, the contrasts positive-neutral and negative-
neutral could not be analysed anymore. Apart from that, analyses for random feedback were 
carried out as in experiment 4. For real feedback separate analyses had to be carried out for 
valence positions lag-2 and lag-1 because of missing data in certain conditions in case of 
combined analyses. Split analyses for random and real feedback and the generally high error 
rate caused data loss in several combinations of variables. 
The means of all variable combinations for reaction times concerning random feedback are 
presented in table 23 and concerning real feedback in table 24. Means of error rates for 
random feedback are presented in table 25 and for real feedback in table 26.  
Reaction times Random feedback No significant backward inhibition effect was found (F < 1) 
(see table 23). Interactions of backward inhibition with valence positions lag-2 or lag-1 did 
not reach significance (all F’s < 1) (see figure 19, left side). Also the three-way interaction 
was not significant (F < 1). 
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Positive and negative feedback at position lag-1 differed significantly, F(1,26) = 7.39, p < .02. 
Reaction times were faster after negative feedback (504ms) compared to positive feedback 
(518ms). An interaction between valences at positions lag-2 and lag-1 was not found (F < 1.9, 
p > .18). 
Real feedback For analyses with lag-2 valence a significant reversed backward inhibition 
effect of -28ms was found, F(1,26) = 5.50, p < .03 (see table 24). Also the interaction of 
backward inhibition and lag-2 valence reached significance, F(1,26) = 14.68, p < .01 (see 
figure 19, right side and table 24). After positive feedback at position lag-2 a reversed 
backward inhibition effect of -73ms was found. After negative feedback a normal effect of 
17ms was observed. A significant difference between reaction times after positive (497ms) 
and negative (518ms) feedback at position lag-2 was observed, F(1,26) = 4.53, p < .05. 
For analyses with lag-1 valence no significant results were found (all F’s < 1) (see table 24). 
Error rates Random feedback A significant reversed backward inhibition effect was found, 
F(1,26) = 4.29, p < .05 (see table 25). CBA sequences produced 3.1% more errors than ABA 
sequences. All other factors and interactions were not significant (all F’s < 3.4, p’s > .07) (see 
figure 20, left side). 
Real feedback For lag-2 valence no significant backward inhibition effect or a main effect for 
lag-2 valence were found (all F’s < 2.7, p’s > .11), but the interaction of backward inhibition 
and lag-2 valence reached significance, F(1,26) = 6.93, p < .02 (see figure 20, right side and 
table 26). The backward inhibition effect was reversed after positive feedback at position lag-
2 (-6.4%) whereas it was normal after negative feedback (2.0%). 
For analyses with lag-1 valence no significant results were found (all F’s < 4.1, p’s > .05) (see 
table 26). 
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Table 23: Random feedback - Reaction times (in milliseconds) for ABA and CBA sequences and their 
difference (BI = backward inhibition effect) for all combinations of the two valences at the two 
positions, respectively. 
 
Variable      
Position lag-2 Position lag-1 ABA CBA BI (SD) 
      
 positive 504 511 -7 (102)   positive 
 negative 500 513 -13 (80) 
 positive 525 533 -8 (97)   negative 
 negative 503 498 5 (89) 
      
Total  508 514 -6 (47) 
 
 
Table 24: Real feedback - Reaction times (in milliseconds) for ABA and CBA sequences and their 
difference (BI = backward inhibition effect) for each valence separated for positions lag-2 and lag-1. 
 
Variable Position lag-2  Position lag-1  
 ABA CBA BI (SD) ABA CBA BI (SD) 
         
 positive 461 533 -73 (89) 513 514 -2 (45) 
 negative 526 510 17 (84) 510 515 -5 (93) 
         
Total 494 522 -28 (62) 515 511 -3 (58) 
 
 
Table 25: Random feedback - Error rates (in percent) for ABA and CBA sequences and their 
difference (BI = backward inhibition effect) for all combinations of the two valences at the two 
positions, respectively. 
 
Variable      
Position lag-2 Position lag-1 ABA CBA BI (SD) 
      
 positive 20.3 25.2 -5.0 (19.6)   positive 
 negative 18.4 24.6 -6.3 (16.5) 
 positive 21.1 23.2 -2.1 (12.7)   negative 
 negative 22.2 21.4 0.8 (14.3) 
      
Total  20.5 23.6 -3.1 (7.8) 
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Table 26: Real feedback - Error rates (in percent) for ABA and CBA sequences and their difference (BI 
= backward inhibition effect) for each valence separated for positions lag-2 and lag-1. 
 
Variable Position lag-2  Position lag-1  
 ABA CBA BI (SD) ABA CBA BI (SD) 
         
 positive 16.6 23.1 -6.4 (11.3) 21.0 23.5 -2.5 (11.1) 
 negative 22.5 20.5 2.0 (10.6) 20.9 17.6 3.3 (8.9) 
         
Total 19.5 21.8 -2.2 (7.2) 21.0 20.6 0.4 (6.7) 
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Figure 19: Random and real feedback - Backward inhibition effects for reaction times (in milliseconds) 
with positive and negative feedback at positions lag-2 and lag-1, respectively. Error bars refer to 
standard errors. 
 
 
 
Random feedback                                Real feedback 
3. Method 88 
    
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
lag-2 lag-1 lag-2 lag-1
Ba
ck
w
ar
d 
in
hi
bi
tio
n
 
in
 
%
 
(A
BA
-
CB
A)
positive negative
 
 
Figure 20: Random and real feedback - Backward inhibition effects for error rates (in percent) with 
positive and negative feedback at positions lag-2 and lag-1, respectively. Error bars refer to standard 
errors. 
 
 
Results for switch costs 
The switch cost group with 29 participants showed an average error rate of 18.1% (SD = 
10.9%). Erroneous responses and reaction times faster than 180ms or more than three 
interquartile ranges (263ms) above the 75th percentile (609ms) were excluded from analyses 
(upper limit = 1398ms; 5.8% of all trials) (Tukey, 1977). 
Analyses were separated for real and random feedback. Means of all combinations of 
variables are presented in table 27 (random feedback) and table 28 (real feedback) for reaction 
times and in table 29 (random feedback) and 30 (real feedback) for error rates. 
Reaction times Random feedback Significant switch costs were found, F(1,28) = 35.33, p < 
.01, with task repetitions 75ms faster than task switches (see table 27). The interaction of 
switch costs with valence and the main effect of valence did not reach significance (all F’s < 
1) (see figure 21, left side). 
Real feedback Also significant switch costs were found, F(1,28) = 26.02, p < .01 (see table 
28). Switch trials were 73ms slower than non-switch trials. An interaction of switch costs with 
valence was not found (F < 1) (see figure 21, right side), but the factor valence reached 
Random feedback                              Real feedback 
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significance, F(1,28) = 16.58, p < .01. Reaction times were slower after negative feedback 
(494ms) compared to after positive feedback (466ms).  
Error rates Random feedback Significant switch costs of 8.6% were found, F(1,28) = 33.97, p 
< .01 (see table 29). Also the valence factor was significant, F(1,28) = 5.36, p < .03, with 
more errors after negative feedback (18.0%) compared to positive feedback (14.8%). The 
interaction of switch costs with valence was not significant (F < 1.1, p > .32) (see table 29). 
Real feedback Also for real feedback significant switch costs were found, F(1,28) = 38.01, p 
< .01. 9.0% more errors were made after switch trials compared to non-switch trials (see table 
30). No further significant results were observed (all F’s < 2.9, p’s > .10). 
 
 
Table 27: Random feedback - Reaction times (in milliseconds) for task switches (AB) and task 
repetitions (AA) and their difference (SC = switch costs) for the two valences, respectively. 
 
Variable     
Position lag-1 AB AA SC (SD) 
     
 positive 516 439 77 (70) 
 negative 514 440 74 (76) 
     
Total 515 440 75 (68) 
 
 
Table 28: Real feedback - Reaction times (in milliseconds) for task switches (AB) and task repetitions 
(AA) and their difference (SC = switch costs) for the two valences, respectively. 
 
Variable     
Position lag-1 AB AA SC (SD) 
     
 positive 502 430 72 (89) 
 negative 532 457 75 (83) 
     
Total 517 443 73 (78) 
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Table 29: Random feedback - Error rates (in percent) for task switches (AB) and task repetitions (AA) 
and their difference (SC = switch costs) for the two valences, respectively. 
 
Variable     
Position lag-1 AB AA SC (SD) 
     
 positive 19.5 10.0 9.5 (10.7) 
 negative 21.8 14.2 7.6 (7.8) 
     
Total 20.7 12.1 8.6 (7.9) 
 
 
Table 30: Real feedback - Error rates (in percent) for task switches (AB) and task repetitions (AA) and 
their difference (SC = switch costs) for the two valences, respectively. 
 
Variable     
Position lag-1 AB AA SC (SD) 
     
 positive 21.1 12.1 9.0 (11.7) 
 negative 18.8 9.9 8.8 (11.1) 
     
Total 19.9 11.0 8.9 (7.8) 
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Figure 21: Random and real feedback - Reaction times (in milliseconds) for non-switch and switch 
trials after positive or negative feedback at position lag-1, respectively. Error bars refer to standard 
errors. 
 
 
Discussion 
For a real affective modulation of backward inhibition effects an interaction should have been 
found for random feedback but no significant results were observed. Backward inhibition 
effects for lag-2 and lag-1 valence were very small (see figure 19, left side). These hardly 
existent differences did also not allow comparing the found pattern to predictions from the 
PSI and the dopaminergic theory. However, some of the effects found in experiment 4 were 
rediscovered in the current experiment with real feedback. In experiment 4 a significant 
interaction of backward inhibition effects with the contrast positive-neutral at position lag-2 
was found. The total pattern in experiment 4 showed a reversed backward inhibition effect for 
positive feedback, a slightly normal one for neutral and a clearly normal one for negative 
feedback (see figure 15). In the current experiment the interaction of backward inhibition with 
valence at position lag-2 for real feedback reached significance. The corresponding pattern 
was even more extreme than in experiment 4. A huge reversed backward inhibition effect is 
observed after positive feedback and a clearly normal effect after negative feedback. This 
interaction might have a simple origin because it is found with real feedback. It could depend 
completely upon the performance because feedback is connected with the performance. The 
rationale is as follows: positive feedback also indicates that the participant produced a fast 
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reaction time. Participants did a good job on the trial, their performance was correct and fast. 
Therefore the task in that trial, the corresponding task set, and everything else connected with 
that task can be stored as an episode with the label “well done”. The task is rounded off more 
completely as other tasks. Is the task repeated indirectly like in ABA sequences it can be 
executed faster because accessibility is improved. If the first trial in an ABA sequence 
produced a slow reaction time feedback is negative. The episode cannot get rounded off as 
nicely and completely as with positive feedback because the performance was bad. Thus, 
when it is repeated indirectly its execution is slowed down. Reaction times for ABA-positive 
and ABA-negative sequences at position lag-2 show exactly the described pattern with 461ms 
and 526ms, respectively. However, performance also had an impact on CBA sequences. 
CBA-positive sequences had an average reaction time of 533ms and CBA-negative sequences 
of 510ms. If the same task as in the beginning does not have to be executed again in the end 
of a triplet performance of the first task leads to different implications. In case of a CBA 
sequence (which does not include an indirect task repetition) and positive feedback at position 
lag-2 a disadvantage or a disturbance is produced that leads to higher reaction times. On the 
contrary when the lag-2 task ends with negative feedback and there is no need to repeat the 
recently executed task at position lag-0 this seems to be a kind of relief and reduces reaction 
times for those CBA sequences.  
With this total result pattern it can be suspected that for backward inhibition effects only real 
feedback at position lag-2 has an impact. This was confirmed with a further analysis that 
included the factors backward inhibition effect, lag-2 real and random feedback. The three-
way interaction reached significance, F(1,26) = 6.67, p < .02. 
Considering error rate analyses for random feedback the significant reversed backward 
inhibition effect is a striking result. Already reaction time analyses showed on a descriptive 
level that all backward inhibition effects for random feedback were reversed (see figure 19, 
left side). And the reversed backward inhibition effects were more pronounced with positive 
feedback for both positions (lag-2 and lag-1). This applied for error rates and for reaction 
times (see figures 19 and 18, left side, respectively). It seems as if positive random feedback 
at least helps to avoid errors (and also to respond more quickly) in difficult sequences (like 
ABA) compared to negative feedback. Besides that, like for latencies also for error rates the 
effects of experiment 4 could not be replicated with random feedback but with real feedback. 
The significant interaction of the backward inhibition effect and the contrast negative-neutral 
at position lag-2 in experiment 4 was partly rediscovered in experiment 5. The pattern in 
experiment 4 showed a reversed backward inhibition effect after positive and neutral feedback 
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compared to a normal effect after negative feedback (see figure 16, left side). In experiment 5 
a clearly reversed backward inhibition effect after real positive feedback is contradicted with a 
normal one after real negative feedback (see figure 20, right side). This effect corresponds to 
the effect with latencies and therefore a speed-accuracy trade-off regarding this effect is 
unlikely. The explanation given for the effect with latencies of course also applies for error 
rates. 
 
Analyses for switch costs did not show any interesting results, neither for reaction times nor 
for error rates. Switch costs for real and random feedback regarding latencies were very 
similar (see tables 27 and 28). Also the effect from experiment 4 (significant smaller error 
rates after neutral compared to positive feedback) regarding error rates could not be 
replicated. Nonetheless, it can be noted that the error rates for real and for random feedback 
showed a small trend: smaller switch costs after negative compared to positive feedback (see 
tables 29 and 30).  
 
To sum up experiments 4 and 5, the found effects in experiment 4 are mainly caused by 
performance-related factors. The non existent interactions of valence with the measures of 
executive functions in random feedback analyses allow concluding that valence, at least in a 
direct way does not have any influence at all on backward inhibition effects and switch costs. 
However, results with real feedback revealed some interactions. With the presented 
explanation the question is, whether the presentation of feedback is necessary to produce the 
described effect. Affect is said to energize goal directed behaviour, and it can, as feedback 
provide a basis to inform about the status of a goal (Emmons & Kaiser, 1996). It is possible 
that the effect is mainly caused by the performance but that feedback about that performance 
is necessary to produce an impact. Maybe participants need the affirmation in terms of 
external feedback to really store the episode in a complete way. If feedback is not necessary 
the interaction should also emerge when there is no feedback given but reaction times are split 
into fast and slow ones and on this way an artificial “valence” factor is created with slow 
reaction times imitating the negative affect and fast reaction times imitating the positive 
affect. To test that assumption the next experiment was without any valent stimuli. 
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3.2.7 Experiment 5.1: No valence 
 
Method 
Participants 43 students of the Friedrich-Schiller-University in Jena (between 19 and 26 years 
old) participated in the single-session experiment that lasted about 20 minutes. They received 
2.50 Euros.  
Task and stimuli Task and stimuli were like in the preceding experiments. The three basic 
tasks form (circle or square), line (thick or thin), and colour (green or blue) were used again 
but no feedback or valent primes like in previous experiments. 
Trial Procedure The trial procedure had to be changed slightly because no feedback or prime 
was used. It started with the letter cue for 400ms in the middle of the screen. Then the target 
followed at the same position and stayed on the screen until a response was given. A blank 
screen was shown for 800ms before the next cue was presented. 
Procedure The procedure was the same as in all preceding experiments apart from the fact 
that only the version without direct task repetitions to analyse backward inhibition effects was 
carried out. The experiment started with instructions and two practice blocks with twelve 
trials each. They were followed by eight test blocks with 56 trials, respectively. Average error 
rate and reaction time were presented at the end of each block. 
 
Results for backward inhibition effects 
The tested group showed an average error rate of 5.1% (SD =3.5%). Two participants had to 
be excluded from further analyses due to error rates higher than 12.2% (mean error rate plus 
two standard deviations). The remaining 41 participants showed an error rate of 4.7%. Those 
trials and reaction times below 200ms or more than three interquartile ranges (528ms) above 
the 75th percentile (1035ms) were excluded from analyses (upper limit = 2619ms; 3.0% of all 
trials) (Tukey, 1977).  
The sample with 41 participants was split into two halves. The first half contained the 20 
participants with the fastest average reaction times and the second half the remaining 
participants. This was done to allow a fairer fragmentation of reaction times into three 
artificial valences depending on general response speed. The reaction time distribution of the 
two halves was broken into thirds, respectively. The fastest 33 % were the “positive” ones, the 
slowest 33% the “negative” ones. The third in between were the “neutral” reaction times. For 
the fast group limits were 519ms and 704ms, for the slow group 908ms and 1085ms. 
An analysis was carried out with the factors backward inhibition (ABA versus CBA), and 
artificial valence (positive, neutral, or negative at position lag-2) which was split into the two 
3. Method 95 
contrasts positive-neutral and negative-neutral. Means from all combinations of variables for 
reaction times and error rates are presented in tables 31 and 32, respectively.  
Reaction times A significant backward inhibition effect of 28ms was discovered, F(1,40) = 
15.33, p < .01 (see table 31). The interaction of backward inhibition and the contrast negative-
neutral was also significant, F(1,40) = 5.45, p < .03. The backward inhibition effect was 
larger after a negative, meaning a slow performance (66ms) compared to after a neutral, 
meaning a fast performance (19ms) (see table 31 and figure 22). The other interaction was not 
significant (F < 1.1, p > .31). 
Not surprisingly the contrasts positive-neutral, F(1,40) = 22.46, p < .01, and negative-neutral, 
F(1,40) = 10.14, p < .01, reached significance. Positive (751ms) was faster than neutral 
(821ms) and neutral was faster than negative (866ms). 
Error rates No significant backward inhibition effect was found (F < 3.1, p > .08). Also none 
of the interactions or the two contrasts reached significance (all F’s < 1.2, p’s > .30) (see table 
32). 
 
 
Table 31: Reaction times (in milliseconds) for ABA and CBA sequences and their difference (BI = 
backward inhibition effect) for the three artificial valences at position lag-2, respectively. 
 
Variable     
Position lag-2 ABA CBA BI (SD) 
     
  positive 750 752 -2 (66) 
  neutral 830 811 19 (103) 
  negative 899 833 66 (84) 
     
Total 826 799 28 (45) 
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Table 32: Error rates (in percent) for ABA and CBA sequences and their difference (BI = backward 
inhibition effect) for the three artificial valences at position lag-2, respectively. 
 
Variable     
Position lag-2 ABA CBA BI (SD) 
     
  positive 4.8 4.9 -0.1 (3.0) 
  neutral 5.1 4.5 0.6 (4.7) 
  negative 5.6 4.1 1.4 (3.4) 
     
Total 5.2 4.5 0.6 (2.3) 
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Figure 22: Backward inhibition effects for reaction times (in milliseconds) with artificial valences 
positive, neutral, and negative at position lag-2, respectively. Error bars refer to standard errors. 
 
 
Discussion 
In this experiment a backward inhibition effect was discovered. With regard to experiments 2, 
3, 4, and 5 that did not reveal a general backward inhibition effect, this can be seen as a 
confirmation that the paradigm works especially because in the current experiment the tasks 
line, colour and form were used for the first time without any additional valent stimuli, a pure 
paradigm concerning backward inhibition was carried out. 
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An interaction of backward inhibition and the contrast negative-neutral was found which 
supports the idea of feedback not being necessary to allow participants to benefit from a good 
task performance at position lag-2. Participants do not need an external affirmation about their 
performance to round up a recently executed task. The complete pattern of backward 
inhibition effects under the three “valences” positive, neutral, and negative in the current 
experiment are comparable to effects in experiment 5 for real feedback (see figure 19, right 
side). After a good performance at position lag-2 ABA sequences are faster than CBA 
sequences leading to a (in experiment 5.1 only slightly) reversed backward inhibition effect. 
With a bad performance at position lag-2 meaning reaction times were slow a normal 
backward inhibition effect can be observed. With the results of the current experiment there 
are no more doubts about the fact that the interaction between backward inhibition effects and 
valence is an artefact because it only emerges with real feedback. 
Error rate analyses did not allow the assumption of a speed-accuracy trade-off.  
 
In the next two experiments the paradigm was changed in a more radical way in order to 
detect affective influences on executive functions. The paradigm was attuned to the ideas 
Kuhl and Kazén’s (1999) experiments are based on. Sequences of four tasks were presented, 
each with a cue displayed beforehand that told participants the succession of the next four 
tasks in a trial at once. This made internal cuing of tasks necessary which increases working 
memory load. This procedure also allows to prepare tasks in advance and then inhibit them 
until they have to be executed which makes the paradigm more similar to the one used by 
Kuhl and Kazén (1999; see also Kazén & Kuhl, 2005). Intention memory should definitely be 
loaded with this new paradigm. Dreher and colleagues (2001) showed that significant 
backward inhibition effects could also be found with triplets that were presented separatly 
from each other by inter triplet intervals of five to nine seconds Again feedback was used as 
valent element in the paradigm. 
In the following two experiments data to calculate backward inhibition effects and switch 
costs were collected in two separate experiments. It was not possible anymore to collect data 
regarding switch costs that also included the possibility to analyse backward inhibition 
effects. Using all 27 possible combinations of three tasks in sequences of always four tasks 
with the same probability for all tasks to appear, direct task repetitions would have been 
extremely seldom. Also the demand of only analysing error free triplets and pairs made it 
necessary to separate the two data collections to minimize data loss in several conditions. 
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3.2.8 Experiment 6.1: Prearranged quadruples, backward inhibition effects 
 
Method 
Participants 63 students of the Friedrich-Schiller-University in Jena (aged between 18 and 38 
years) participated in the single-session experiment that lasted at least 30 minutes. Experiment 
duration could be as long as 60 minutes because inaccurate sequences had to be repeated after 
each block. The repetition of inaccurate sequences was carried out to reduce data loss. 
Participants received at least 3 Euros plus 25 Cents of extra money for every block with a 
positive end result. With eight test blocks participants received 5 Euros at most. 
An abortion criterion was used additionally in this experiment. If the error rate of the first two 
test blocks was higher than 40% the experiment was abandoned. In this way two participants 
dropped out and received 1.50 Euros for participating. Further two participants were excluded 
from analyses because they showed merely correctness by chance8. 
Task and stimuli Task and stimuli were the same as in the preceding experiments. Only this 
time all eight possible target stimuli were used, meaning all combinations of the two features 
of every task: form (square – circle), line (thick – thin), and colour (blue – green). It did not 
seem necessary anymore to hold back certain stimuli because task sequence information was 
given completely in advance always for the next four tasks with a general cue. Feedback 
design was like in experiments 4 and 5 but the upper and the lower reaction time limits were 
again changed and adjusted induced by participants complaining about the difficulty to earn  
any of the possible extra money. Again real positive and negative feedback was shown as well 
as positive and negative random feedback. The limit to show real negative feedback was the 
mean of the slowest and the second slowest reaction time (comprising reaction times of the 
six preceding tasks which were responded to correctly). The limit for positive feedback 
represented the mean of the second and third fastest reaction time. Reaction times in between 
those limits were given positive or negative feedback by chance. 
Trial Procedure The trial procedure was changed. Four tasks were presented in prearranged 
sequences, respectively. Information about the task sequence in a trial was given in advance 
with a general cue, before presenting the first task. The cue contained for example the words 
“Farbe - Linie - Gestalt - Linie” (colour - line - form - line) one below the other and 
announced the next four tasks that had to be completed. A four task sequence started with 
such a cue. It was presented until the participant pressed the space key. This key press was 
                                                 
8
 To compute average error rates all trials were used those from the regular blocks and those from the repeated 
sequences. Error rates only based on the trials from the regular blocks did not change the number or the identity 
of participants to be excluded from further analyses due to increased error rates. 
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followed by a blank screen for 500ms. The first target followed until a response button was 
pressed. Immediately, response feedback was presented for 1000ms and followed by another 
blank screen for 300ms. Then the second target was shown, again until a response button was 
pressed, followed by feedback for 1000ms and then a blank screen for 300ms. A third and a 
fourth target with feedback and blank screen were presented exactly in the same manner. 
Then the cue for the next trial with four tasks was shown. This was the procedure for the test 
blocks, for practice blocks it was altered slightly: no feedback was presented and the blank 
screen after the fourth target’s feedback was extended to 2000ms. 
All combinations of task sequences without direct task repetitions were used. That resulted in 
24 possible combinations (ABAB, ABAC, ABCA, ABCB, ACAB, ACAC, ACBA, ACBC; 
resulting in 24 options with every task starting each of the eight sequences). 
Procedure The experiment started with written instructions on the screen. To get used to tasks 
and trial procedure participants had to complete two practice blocks with four trials each 
(meaning a total of sixteen tasks) in the above described trial procedure. After that 
participants were introduced to the rules concerning feedback and earning the extra money. 
Then eight test blocks were presented with twelve trials each (meaning a total of 48 tasks). 
That made it possible to present each of the 24 sequences exactly four times during the 
experiment. Trials that contained a wrong response were repeated at the end of a block after 
general block feedback with information about accuracy, speed and block score. For those 
additional trials no points could be collected and therefore no additional money could be 
earned, although feedback was given after every trial. 
 
Results for backward inhibition effects 
The group with 59 participants showed a mean error rate of 12.1% (SD = 8.1%) and three 
participants had to be excluded due to a higher error rate than 28.4% (mean error rate plus two 
standard deviations). Then the average error rate was 10.7% (of all trials). Those trials and 
reaction times below 180ms or more than three interquartile ranges (251ms) above the 75th 
percentile (604ms) were excluded from analyses (upper limit = 1357ms; 3.7% of all trials) 
(Tukey, 1977).  
Separate analyses had to be carried out for real and random feedback and for lag-1 and lag-2 
valence, respectively. Missing data in certain conditions when both positions were analysed 
together made that necessary. 
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Reaction time means for all combinations of variables are presented in table 33 (random 
feedback) and table 34 (real feedback). Average error rates are displayed in tables 35 (random 
feedback) and 36 (real feedback).  
Reaction times Random feedback For analyses with lag-2 position a significant backward 
inhibition effect of 14ms was found, F(1,55) = 8.57, p < .01 (see table 33). The interaction 
with valence (positive-negative) and the valence factor did not reach significance (all F’s < 1) 
(see figure 23, left side). 
For analyses with lag-1 affect position no significant results were found (all F’s < 2.4, p’s > 
.13) (see figure 23, left side). 
Real feedback For lag-2 analyses no significant backward inhibition effect and no significant 
interactions with valence were found (all F’s < 1.8, p’s > .19) (see table 34 and figure 23, 
right side). The difference between reaction times after positive and negative feedback at 
position lag-2 was significant, F(1,55) = 9.42, p < .01. Reaction times were faster after 
positive feedback (479ms) compared to negative feedback (500ms). 
For lag-1 analyses a significant backward inhibition effect of 16ms was found, F(1,55) = 5.72, 
p < .03 (see table 34). An interaction with valence did not emerge (F < 1.9, p > .18). Reaction 
times after positive feedback (471ms) compared to negative feedback (511ms) differed 
significantly, F(1,55) = 19.72, p < .01. 
Error rates Random feedback For lag-2 analyses no significant backward inhibition effect and 
no interaction with valence were found (all F’s < 1) (see table 35), but the factor valence was 
significant, F(1,55) = 5.48, p < .03. More errors were made after negative feedback (12.1%) 
compared to positive feedback (10.2%). 
For analyses with lag-1 valence no significant results were found (all F’s < 1.9, p’s > .17) (see 
table 35). 
Real feedback Lag-2 analyses did not show any significant results (all F’s < 1.9, p’s > .17) 
(see table 36). 
For lag-1 valence analyses the backward inhibition effect and the interaction with valence 
were not significant (all F’s < 3.7, p’s > .06) (see table 36), but significantly more errors were 
made after negative feedback (13.1%) compared to positive feedback (10.8%), F(1,55) = 
7.30, p < .01. 
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Table 33: Random feedback - Reaction times (in milliseconds) for ABA and CBA sequences and their 
difference (BI = backward inhibition effect) for each valence separated for positions lag-2 and lag-1. 
 
Variable Position lag-2  Position lag-1  
 ABA CBA BI (SD) ABA CBA BI (SD) 
         
 positive 495 477 18 (50) 495 480 14 (62) 
 negative 496 486 10 (58) 498 494 5 (58) 
         
Total 496 481 14 (36) 496 487 9 (47) 
 
 
Table 34: Real feedback - Reaction times (in milliseconds) for ABA and CBA sequences and their 
difference (BI = backward inhibition effect) for each valence separated for positions lag-2 and lag-1. 
 
Variable Position lag-2  Position lag-1  
 ABA CBA BI (SD) ABA CBA BI (SD) 
         
 positive 476 481 -5 (48) 475 468 7 (39) 
 negative 505 495 10 (80) 523 499 25 (90) 
         
Total 491 488 3 (49) 499 483 16 (50) 
 
 
Table 35: Random feedback – Error rates (in percent) for ABA and CBA sequences and their 
difference (BI = backward inhibition effect) for each valence separated for positions lag-2 and lag-1. 
 
Variable Position lag-2  Position lag-1  
 ABA CBA BI (SD) ABA CBA BI (SD) 
         
 positive 10.4 10.0 0.4 (6.8) 10.9 10.6 0.3 (8.6) 
 negative 12.1 12.1 -0.1 (9.2) 11.9 11.6 0.4 (9.0) 
         
Total 11.2 11.1 0.2 (6.2) 11.4 11.1 0.3 (5.7) 
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Table 36: Real feedback – Error rates (in percent) for ABA and CBA sequences and their difference 
(BI = backward inhibition effect) for each valence separated for positions lag-2 and lag-1. 
 
Variable Position lag-2  Position lag-1  
 ABA CBA BI (SD) ABA CBA BI (SD) 
         
 positive 11.3 11.3 0 (8.8) 11.7 9.9 1.8 (7.1) 
 negative 12.7 12.6 0.2 (12.1) 14.1 12.0 2.1 (13.5) 
         
Total 12.0 11.9 0.1 (7.3) 12.9 10.9 2.0 (7.8) 
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Figure 23: Random and real feedback - Backward inhibition effects for reaction times (in milliseconds) 
with positive and negative feedback at positions lag-2 and lag-1, respectively. Error bars refer to 
standard errors. 
 
 
Discussion 
Also with this method of prearranged quadruples an interaction of backward inhibition and 
affective stimulation with random feedback was not observed. Although the method to present 
the tasks must have loaded the intention memory, positive affect could not develop the impact 
that is predicted by PSI theory. In general effects in this experiment are quite small compared 
to experiments 4 and 5 for example. A comparison between predicted patterns from the PSI 
Random feedback                              Real feedback 
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and the dopaminergic theory with the backward inhibition effects pattern of the current 
experiment is not indicated because firstly no significant interactions were obtained and 
secondly, the two theories only made predictions about positive and neutral affect but the 
current experiment used negative and positive affect. However, it might be noted that for real 
feedback at position lag-2 the pattern looked exactly as in experiments 5 and 5.1 (see figure 
19, right side and figure 22, respectively). As already stated earlier (see discussion of 
experiment 5) this simply means that showing a good performance at position lag-2 especially 
helps in ABA sequences when the first task is repeated indirectly. Therefore reaction times for 
ABA sequences are faster than for CBA sequences. With a bad performance and negative 
feedback at position lag-2 there is no benefit anymore and reaction times for ABA sequences 
are slower than for CBA sequences. 
For error rates no notable results were found. 
 
 
3.2.9 Experiment 6.2: Prearranged quadruples, switch costs 
 
Method 
Participants 62 students of the Friedrich-Schiller-University in Jena, aged between 18 and 29 
years participated. Again, inaccurate sequences had to be repeated after each block. Therefore 
the experiment lasted 30 up to 60 minutes. Participants received at least 3 Euros plus 25 Cents 
of extra money for every block with a positive end result (maximum payment: 5 Euros). The 
same abortion criterion was used as in experiment 6.1. Thus, two subjects dropped out early 
and received 1.50 Euros for participating. 
Task and stimuli For the current experiment only two different tasks were needed and only 
the tasks colour (blue and green) and form (square and circle) were used. All four possible 
stimuli were used (green circle, green square, blue circle, blue square). Feedback design was 
like in the preceding feedback experiments. The upper and the lower reaction time limits were 
changed yet another time. Reaction times slower than the second slowest time resulted in 
negative feedback, times faster than the second fastest in positive feedback. Reaction times in 
between were given positive or negative feedback by chance. 
Trial Procedure The trial procedures used in practice and test blocks were identical to those 
in experiment 6.1. 16 possible sequences of four tasks each exist: AAAA, AAAB, AABA, 
AABB, ABAA, ABAB, ABBA, ABBB (also every sequence starting with B). Sequences 
AAAA and BBBB were not used, which left 14 sequences. 
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Procedure The procedure was also the same as in experiment 6.1 apart from one difference. 
In each of the eight test blocks fourteen trials with four tasks each, meaning 56 tasks were 
presented. That allowed showing each of the fourteen possible task combinations (trials) 
exactly once in a block.  
 
Results for switch costs 
The 60 participants of the tested group showed a mean error rate of 10.8% (SD = 8.1%). 
Three participants had to be excluded from further analyses due to higher error rates than 
27.0% (mean plus two standard deviations)9. Erroneous responses (9.5% of all trials) and 
reaction times below 180ms or more than three interquartile ranges (190ms) above the 75th 
percentile (514ms) were excluded from analyses (upper limit = 1084ms; 4.9% of all trials) 
(Tukey, 1977).  
Again different analyses were carried out for real and random feedback. Reaction time means 
for all combinations of variables are presented in table 37 (random feedback) and table 38 
(real feedback). Average error rates for all variables are displayed in tables 39 (random 
feedback) and 40 (real feedback).  
Reaction times Random feedback Significant switch costs were found, F(1,55) = 94.85, p < 
.01 (see table 37). Switch trials were 46ms slower than non-switch trials. The interaction of 
switch costs with valence and the factor valence did not reach significance (all F’s < 2.2, p’s 
> .14) (see figure 24, left side). 
Real feedback Also for real feedback switch costs of 48ms were found, F(1,55) = 93.00, p < 
.01 (see table 38). The interaction with affect did not reach significance (F < 1.1, p > .30) (see 
figure 22, right side). Reaction times after negative feedback (438ms) differed significantly 
from those after positive feedback (400ms), F(1,55) = 76.54, p < .01. 
Error rates Random feedback Significant switch costs of 1.9% were found, F(1,55) = 19.52, p 
< .01 (see table 39). A significant interaction with valence or a significant main effect of 
valence did not emerge (all F’s < 1). 
Real Feedback Significant switch costs were found, F(1,55) = 5.30, p < .03 (see table 40). 
1.6% more errors were made after switch trials compared to non-switch trials (9.2%). No 
other significant results were found (all F’s < 1.4, p’s > .24). 
 
 
                                                 
9
 To compute average error rates all trials were used those from the regular blocks and those from the repeated 
sequences. Error rates only based on the trials from the regular blocks did not change the number or the identity 
of participants to be excluded from further analyses due to increased error rates. 
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Table 37: Random feedback - Reaction times (in milliseconds) for task switches (AB) and task 
repetitions (AA) and their difference (SC = switch costs) for the two valences, respectively. 
 
Variable     
Position lag-1 AB AA SC (SD) 
     
 positive 434 388 46 (42) 
 negative 437 391 46 (36) 
     
Total 435 390 46 (35) 
 
 
Table 38: Real feedback - Reaction times (in milliseconds) for task switches (AB) and task repetitions 
(AA) and their difference (SC = switch costs) for the two valences, respectively. 
 
Variable     
Position lag-1 AB AA SC (SD) 
     
 positive 422 378 43 (43) 
 negative 464 412 52 (54) 
     
Total 443 395 48 (37) 
 
 
Table 39: Random feedback - Error rates (in percent) for task switches (AB) and task repetitions (AA) 
and their difference (SC = switch costs) for the two valences, respectively. 
 
Variable     
Position lag-1 AB AA SC (SD) 
     
 positive 10.1 8.6 1.6 (4.0) 
 negative 10.9 8.7 2.2 (4.8) 
     
Total 10.5 8.6 1.9 (3.2) 
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Table 40: Real feedback - Error rates (in percent) for task switches (AB) and task repetitions (AA) and 
their difference (SC = switch costs) for the two valences, respectively. 
 
Variable     
Position lag-1 AB AA SC (SD) 
     
 positive 10.0 8.3 1.7 (6.5) 
 negative 10.6 9.2 1.4 (8.7) 
     
Total 10.3 8.8 1.6 (5.1) 
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Figure 24: Random and real feedback - Reaction times (in milliseconds) for non-switch and switch 
trials after positive or negative feedback at position lag-1, respectively. Error bars refer to standard 
errors. 
 
 
Discussion 
Significant switch costs were still found with the method of prearranged quadruples, although 
they were quite small in general and compared to the other experiments. 
The results of this last experiment considering random feedback confirmed again what has 
also been shown in all previous experiments. Switch costs are not influenced by affective 
stimulation. In the current experiment switch costs under the two valences were identical for 
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random feedback (see table 37). Switch costs are not even influenced by performance-related 
feedback as this is the case for backward inhibition effects. Also for costs with real feedback 
the differences between positive and neutral feedback was small (see table 38). 
Error rates did not reveal any interesting results. 
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4. General Discussion 
 
The aim of this study was to detect modulating effects of valence in terms of short affective 
stimuli on measures of executive control. The measures switch costs and backward inhibition 
effects were calculated with data that was collected with the established task switching 
paradigm. The affective element was inserted into the paradigm with two different methods: a 
prime or a cue in terms of pictures from the IAPS (Lang et al., 2005) before a task or as 
feedback after a task. Affective pictures or feedback were positive, negative, or neutral. When 
possible the positive and the negative affective states were compared to the neutral baseline in 
two different contrasts, positive-neutral and negative-neutral. 
In the following section results of the study’s nine experiments are discussed considering the 
two presented models, the PSI theory (Kuhl, 1996, 2000, 2001) and the dopaminergic theory 
(Ashby et al., 1999; Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004), previous literature, and findings. 
Before discussing interactions of backward inhibition effects and switch costs with affect 
which were of special interest regarding the hypotheses main effects of the backward 
inhibition effect, switch costs, and valence are recapitulated. In the end technical and 
theoretical considerations are discussed that offer some explanations for the found result 
patterns. 
 
 
4.1 Main Effects  
 
4.1.1 Backward inhibition effects 
 
Significant backward inhibition effects were not found in all of the nine experiments. 
However, a significant effect was observed in nearly 50% of all analyses based on reaction 
times (in experiments 1, 3.1, 5, 5.1, and 6.1). Strikingly, the largest and most clear backward 
inhibition effects were found when only positive and neutral valence were included in the 
paradigm (experiment 3.1, 55ms) and with no valence at all (experiment 5.1, 28ms). For error 
rates normal backward inhibition effects were generally very small (between 0.07% and 
1.98%) with the largest effects measured in experiment 5 as reversed effects (-3.1% and -
2.2%). However, those effects and the only significant main effect with error rates 
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(experiment 5, random feedback: 3.1%) correspond to reaction time effects which means that 
a general speed-accuracy trade-off cannot be assumed. 
On the one hand this total pattern of significant overall backward inhibition effects could be 
interpreted as supporting the assumption that the backward inhibition effect is not a very 
reliable and robust effect especially when compared with switch costs (see further below). 
This can be used to question the backward inhibition effect as a measure of executive 
functions (see paragraph 1.1.4 Backward inhibition effect). The other option is to focus more 
on the fact that for reaction times only without negative affect or with a simplified paradigm a 
significant backward inhibition effect was observed. This could be interpreted as evidence 
that affect is influencing backward inhibition effects at least in some way. Maybe negative 
affect is only an unsystematic disturbance or maybe it is systematic but was just not 
measurable in the presented experiments. 
 
 
4.1.2 Switch costs 
 
In line with the literature about task switching (see Allport et al, 1994; Goschke, 2000; Jersild, 
1927; Meiran, 1996; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Spector & Biederman, 1976; Wong & Leboe, 
2009) and in contrast to backward inhibition effects, switch costs proved to be a very robust 
and reliable effect. That applied for reaction time and error rate analyses. In all six 
experiments that allowed switch cost analyses highly significant costs were found (for 
reaction times p always < .01; for error rates p always < .03). What is striking is the 
fluctuation of the costs from 46ms up to 335ms for reaction times and from 1.6% to 8.9% for 
error rates. A speed-accuracy trade-off cannot be assumed for any of the experiments. 
However, the largest switch costs for reaction times were found in the most difficult paradigm 
(experiment 3: three valent cues per task and an additional task). Increased task difficulty 
increased general reaction times, variance, and switch costs whereas at the same time the 
smallest but still significant switch costs were found with error rates. A corresponding pattern 
was found in experiments 4 and 5. In those two feedback experiments the importance of 
response speed was emphasised. Not surprisingly general reaction times dropped and error 
rates increased. Furthermore, also switch costs for reaction times were quite small (between 
64ms and 75ms) and for error rates the largest switch costs regarding all experiments were 
observed (between 7.5% and 8.9%). This pattern of higher error rates for the benefit of 
accelerated reaction times was attenuated in experiment 6.2. The prearranged and in advance 
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announced quadruples allowed the smallest switch costs for reaction times and error rates 
regarding all experiments. The opportunity to prepare tasks and task sequences is used to 
complete especially the most difficult tasks with the highest speed and accuracy. However, it 
has to be noted that experiment 6.2 was also the easiest one with only two different tasks. 
That might also have added to the finding of small switch costs for latencies and for error 
rates. In the end, even under all these different conditions switch costs always turned out to be 
highly significant. 
 
 
4.1.3 Valence 
 
For analyses that included both contrasts positive-neutral and negative-neutral (experiments 1 
to 4) a general trend can be described considering influences of affect on reaction times. Five 
of the seven significant contrasts show that reaction times after positive primes, cues or 
feedback are accelerated compared to neutral affect. If the results of experiment 4 are 
excluded because they included confounding variables four of five significant findings show 
this trend. It is further striking that all of these four results are achieved with lag-0 valence. 
This means that positive valence presented directly before an executed task can accelerate 
general reaction times. For experiments 5 and 6 that only included negative and positive 
valences in terms of feedback this accelerating effect of positive affect is confirmed. Of the 
six significant contrasts in five cases the positive affect produced faster reaction times than 
the negative one. 
With error rates less significant results were found than with reaction times. However, the 
general trend that positive affect seems to speed up reaction times can also be transferred to 
error rates. In four of the five significant results that were found with positive affect less 
errors were made compared to neutral or negative affect. 
 
 
4.1.4 Summary 
 
Summing-up all the reported and briefly discussed main effects three conclusions can be 
drawn. Firstly, affect can have an influence. Positive affect accelerates general reaction times 
and reduces general error rates. Secondly, because significant backward inhibition effects 
seem to depend on how many different valences were used in an experiment it can be 
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assumed that backward inhibition might be influenced by affect in some way. Thirdly, switch 
costs are less vulnerable. Switch costs reached significance in all experiments even when the 
costs were small. 
 
 
4.2 Backward Inhibition Effects and Affect 
 
4.2.1 Significant interactions 
 
Experiments 1 - 3.1 
In general, a speed-accuracy trade-off cannot be assumed. All significant effects for reaction 
times were always roughly reflected within error rates. 
Significant results that showed an interaction of backward inhibition effects with valence 
were scarce. Considering reaction times a direct influence of valence on backward inhibition 
is not very likely. A significant interaction of backward inhibition with lag-1/lag-2 or lag-
0/lag-1 contrasts of valence was never found apart from when valence was also performance-
related (experiments 4 and 5). The only significant two-way interaction was found based on 
error rates in experiment 1 (apart from another one in experiment 4 but this experiment 
included confounding variables). A normal backward inhibition effect was observed after 
neutral primes and a reversed effect after negative primes at position lag-0. This was mainly 
due to increased error rates for ABA sequences with neutral affect (neutral: 8.0%; negative: 
5.8%). An explicit hypothesis concerning negative affect at position lag-0 and backward 
inhibition was not generated with any of the two models. Only smaller backward inhibition 
effects were predicted by PSI theory (due to reduced reaction times or error rates for ABA 
sequences) for positive compared to neutral affect. However, exactly this pattern was found 
with negative and neutral affect for error rates. A negative cue before the last trial in the 
triplet seemed to help to reduce errors in ABA sequences. This would mean that the negative 
affect helps to overcome inhibition which enables faster activation of the current task, 
disturbing influences can be minimised which results in fewer errors. However, a comparable 
effect was never replicated therefore the explanation has to be handled with care. The 
expected two-way interactions predicted with the help of the PSI and the dopaminergic theory 
were not found neither in analyses for latencies nor in analyses for error rates. 
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One three-way interaction was found in experiment 3 for reaction times (backward inhibition 
x contrast negative-neutral lag-1 x contrast positive-neutral lag-0) but it was also never 
replicated. A similar three-way interaction appeared with error rates in experiment 3.1 
(backward inhibition x contrast positive-neutral lag-1 x contrast positive-neutral lag-0) but the 
pattern of means differed completely. Whereas the interaction for reaction times in 
experiment 3 showed a clearly reversed backward inhibition effect for the affect combination 
neutral-positive (-65ms) and a large effect for the combination negative-positive (144ms) the 
interaction in experiment 3.1 for error rates was caused mainly by the difference between 
positive-positive (-1.3%) and positive-neutral (2.1%) affect combinations. Therefore, the error 
rate result of experiment 3.1 is neither a replication of the significant three-way interaction 
with latencies in experiment 3 nor of the two-way interaction with error rates in experiment 1 
also because it included only positive and neutral affect (experiments 3 and 1 included 
positive, neutral, and negative affect, respectively). 
Although the significant three-way interaction in experiment 3 for reaction times was never 
replicated an attempt to explain it roughly will be made. In terms of forming and overcoming 
of inhibition it can be assumed that negative affect at position lag-1 seems to produce a lot of 
inhibition and the positive affect at position lag-0 functions as an additional handicap to 
overcome that inhibition which results in a huge backward inhibition effect. A neutral affect 
at position lag-1 seems not to produce that much inhibition. Hence, because there is no or 
only few inhibition the positive affect at position lag-0 seems to be able to facilitate executing 
the last trial in the triplet instead of increasing difficulties during overcoming of inhibition. 
This explanation makes clear that positive affect can have a facilitating or an obstructive 
effect depending on conditions and circumstances. This fits with ideas about influences of 
positive affect that assume that it is not simply improving or impairing every performance. 
For example different memory systems are influenced differently by positive mood (Oaksford 
et al., 1996), influences of positive mood differ among different tasks although they seem to 
represent the same constructs like for example flexibility (Phillips, Bull et al., 2002), and 
factors like whether a task is experienced as boring or not determine whether positive affect 
facilitates or impairs the performance of a task (Isen, 1999). 
 
Experiments 4 - 6.1 
The use of affective stimuli in terms of primes or cues before a task seemed not to have a 
modulating influence on backward inhibition effects. As a consequence of those first four 
experiments (experiments 1, 2, 3, and 3.1), it was assumed that the affective stimulation might 
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not have been enough to elicit an affective reaction that is strong enough to influence 
backward inhibition effects. Therefore, valent feedback was used next. Feedback has a clear 
relevance because the amount of additional money that could be earned during an experiment 
depended on it. However, what feedback experiment 5 showed was that the pure valence 
without being confounded with performance did not influence backward inhibition effects at 
all. Only with performance-related feedback an interaction with backward inhibition effects 
was observed. And this is clearly an artefact as experiment 5.1 showed. In this experiment no 
feedback was included and only performance of preceding tasks caused the differences in 
backward inhibition effects. The lack of interactions between valence and backward inhibition 
effects for random feedback in experiment 5 confirmed the assumption that backward 
inhibition effects are not modulated by affect.  
Based on the predictions made by PSI theory it was then tried to intensify the elements that 
are assumed to be involved in task switching like intention memory. The required internal 
cuing of tasks in experiment 6.1 allows planning of task sequences in advance which is 
supposed to load intention memory. This, on the one hand strengthens processes that are 
supposed to partake in switching tasks but on the other hand in advance announced task 
sequences also allow preparation. This means that a lot or all executive control processes 
could have been executed before reaction time measurement began. This opportunity of 
preparing tasks in advance was further supported by the trial procedure. Feedback 
presentation times of 1000ms after every task could have been and were probably used to 
prepare the upcoming task. The found backward inhibition effects for the different valences 
which were very small and also very similar in experiment 6.1 seem to confirm this 
assumption. Also this change of certain features of the paradigm could not reveal significant 
interactions of backward inhibition effects and valence. 
 
 
4.2.2 Descriptive patterns 
 
Although significant results concerning direct influences of valence on backward inhibition 
effects were not obtained the PSI and the dopaminergic theory made exact predictions about 
what causes reduced or increased backward inhibition effects in certain valence conditions. 
These predicted patterns can be compared to the found patterns in the reported experiments. 
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Predictions from the dopaminergic theory (valence at position lag-1/lag-2) 
For the valence at the position after the first trial in a triplet the dopaminergic theory predicted 
smaller backward inhibition effects because of faster reaction times for ABA sequences with 
positive compared to neutral affect. The reduction of reaction times for ABA sequences is 
caused either by increased distractibility which makes the use of inhibition less possible or by 
weak maintenance capability and the increased ability to overcome dominant responses which 
makes inhibition unnecessary. The predicted pattern was only met in the first and the second 
experiment with smaller backward inhibition effects for positive affect. This effect was due to 
a reduction of reaction times in ABA sequences at least in experiment 2. In experiment 1, 
reaction time reductions for ABA and increases for CBA sequences were responsible in equal 
parts for the pattern. In both experiments with valent cues (experiment 3 and 3.1) backward 
inhibition effects were larger for positive compared to neutral affect. However, differences 
between effects for neutral and positive affect in both experiments were extremely small and a 
comparison with the predicted pattern seems not appropriate. 
In feedback experiments that also differentiated between random and real feedback 
(experiments 5 and 6.1) only positive and negative affect were included. It is striking that in 
the relevant condition with random feedback hardly any differences existed between 
backward inhibition effects after positive and negative feedback. In general a comparison of 
these results with the predictions is difficult because predictions concern the contrast between 
positive and neutral affect. The lack of a baseline in terms of neutral affect might have 
prevented that significant interactions of backward inhibition effects with valence were found 
in the feedback experiments. 
Taken together, the predicted pattern for positive and neutral valence at position lag-1 cannot 
be confirmed.  This conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that when the pattern was 
found (smaller backward inhibition effects with positive compared to neutral valence) it was 
by no means due to reduced reaction times for ABA sequences with positive affect at position 
lag-1/lag-2 as predicted. 
 
Predictions from PSI theory (valence at position lag-0/lag-1) 
The prediction for lag-0 valence (or lag-1 valence for feedback experiments) based on PSI 
theory was that positive affect reduces backward inhibition effects compared to neutral affect. 
Positive affect is supposed to help overcoming once formed inhibition. Hence, ABA 
sequences are supposed to be executed faster with positive affect compared to neutral affect. 
Even more frequently than for the valence at position lag-1 differences in backward inhibition 
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effects between positive and neutral affect at position lag-0 were hardly recognisable. That 
applies for experiments 2, 4, 5, and 6.1. In experiments 1 and 3 even the reversed pattern was 
obtained, larger effects after positive compared to neutral affect. In experiment 1, this was due 
to increased reaction times for CBA sequences. For experiment 3, a suitable explanation of 
the pattern is not possible because the reaction time levels in the three different valence 
conditions differed too much. In experiment 3.1 predictions were met for the one and only 
time and the difference was caused by a reduction of reaction times for ABA sequences with 
positive affect. 
It can be concluded that apart from missing significant interactions with lag-0 valence also the 
descriptive patterns found in the experiments do not correspond to the predicted patterns.  
 
 
4.3 Switch Costs and Affect 
 
4.3.1 Significant interactions 
 
Significant results for influences of affect on switch costs hardly existed. For reaction times 
only one significant interaction with valence was found in experiment 2. This result was 
reflected in error rates therefore a speed-accuracy trade-off cannot be assumed. However, this 
reaction time result and even the descriptive pattern were never replicated. In experiment 2 
switch cost after a neutral prime were smaller compared to after a negative prime. Descriptive 
patterns in all other experiments with three valences presented before the tasks were either in 
the reversed direction (experiments 1 and 4) or a difference between switch costs with neutral 
and negative affect did not exist (experiment 3). In experiments that included real and random 
feedback and therefore only positive and negative affect (experiments 5 and 6.2) differences 
were hardly existent. This was most surprising for experiment 6.2. Considering PSI theory, 
intention memory must have been loaded with the prearranged and in advance announced 
quadruples in this experiment. Therefore the best conditions were established for the 
facilitating effect of positive affect (hypothesis 1a) and the blocking effect of negative affect 
(hypothesis 1c) regarding switch costs. However, results showed that switch costs for positive 
and negative affect especially for random feedback were nearly identical. 
In reaction time analyses hardly any differences between switch costs with different affects 
were observed, costs were very similar in most experiments. The significant interaction in 
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experiment 2 was mainly due to increased reaction times for switch trials (neutral: 960ms; 
negative: 991ms). Reaction times for non-switch trials were nearly identical (neutral: 817ms; 
negative: 809ms). Especially a negative prime seems to increase difficulties during the 
execution of switch trials. The comparison with the latency for positive affect (951ms) shows 
that at least in this case positive and negative affect do not have an impact into the same 
direction. The positive affect seems to reduce difficulties during switching. Increased switch 
costs for negative compared to neutral affect due to increased reaction times for switch trials 
were predicted by PSI theory. According to the deductions from that theory negative affect 
prevents intentions stored in the intention memory to be brought into action. Negative affect 
blocks access to executing systems, the connection between intention memory and intuitive 
behaviour control is disturbed and disrupted. However, the validity of this explanation has to 
be questioned considering all other experiments. As already mentioned not even the 
descriptive pattern was replicated. 
There was one further significant interaction based on error rates. In experiment 4 larger 
switch costs were found after a positive (11.6%) compared to after neutral feedback (6.9%). 
This was caused by increased error rates after positive feedback in switch trials. However, this 
result can be considered of minor importance because experiment 4 included confounded 
variables. A replication of this effect especially with random feedback would have been 
important, but the result was never replicated neither in experiment 5 nor in experiment 6.2. 
 
Possible explanation for the lack of significant interactions 
The dopaminergic theory offers an explanation why influences of affect on switch costs were 
not found in the current experiments. It might be that effects of enhanced flexibility and 
increased distractibility both supposed to be caused by positive affect neutralise each other. 
Switch trials benefit from enhanced flexibility, reaction times can be accelerated but at the 
same time switch trials also suffer when distractibility is increased so that as a result neither a 
benefit nor a loss can be measured. A further element in task switching that can be influenced 
by affect according to the dopaminergic theory is the maintenance capability. However, this 
element is not represented with specific switch costs. If maintenance capability is influenced 
by affect, that cannot be measured with specific switch costs. All that is left in specific switch 
costs is the pure switching between two tasks, the required maintenance is the same for switch 
and for non-switch trials because during blocks with both kinds of trials both tasks always 
have to be kept in mind. A better measure might be general switch costs because this measure 
also represents maintenance demands. In mixed blocks maintenance demands are much 
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higher compared to single blocks. Considering Dreisbach’s (2006) results the prediction 
would be that after positive affect when maintenance capability is impaired reaction times in 
mixed blocks compared to neutral affect should be higher resulting in larger global switch 
costs. The increased global costs can emerge because single trials are totally unaffected by 
affective influences because they do not require any complex maintenance capabilities. 
 
 
4.3.2 Descriptive patterns 
 
The predicted patterns by PSI theory and the dopaminergic theory concerning switch costs 
were as follows: Both theories predicted smaller switch costs for positive affect compared to 
neutral affect because reaction times in switch trials are reduced. PSI theory assumes 
facilitated access of once formed intentions (in the intention memory) to executing systems 
(in the intuitive behaviour control) with positive affect. That helps especially in case of a 
switch because their major difficulty makes the use of the intention memory necessary. The 
dopaminergic theory predicts effects in the same direction but explains them differently. 
Enhanced flexibility and reduced perseveration with positive affect are supposed to facilitate 
switching whereas task repetitions are not affected. It has to be noted that the task switching 
paradigm that was used in the presented experiments did not offer the opportunity to 
distinguish between the two theories and their respective explanations in case of a significant 
result in the predicted direction. The predicted descriptive pattern was found in experiments 1 
and 3 although the differences in experiment 1 were very small. In both experiments reduced 
reaction times for switch trials after positive affect were the cause for the reduced switch costs 
which is in line with the predictions. However, experiments 2 and 4 showed a reversed pattern 
for positive and neutral affect. In both cases this pattern is due to reduced reaction times for 
non-switch trials with positive affect. Experiments 5 and 6.2 did not include a neutral affect 
condition. Therefore comparisons with predicted patterns are not possible. Furthermore, 
switch costs for positive and negative affect in those experiments were very similar. 
Additionally and much more speculative PSI theory allowed deducing a hypothesis 
concerning negative affect. Reaction times for switch trials after negative affect are supposed 
to be increased which results in larger switch costs compared to neutral affect. The blocking 
of the connection between intention memory and the intuitive behaviour control is assumed to 
be responsible for this effect. This pattern was only met in experiment 2 and it was also 
significant. In experiments 1 and 4 the predicted pattern was reversed mainly because of 
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increased reaction times for non-switch trials (although in experiment 1 reduced latencies for 
switch trials also added to the effect). As already mentioned, in experiments 5 and 6.2 
differences were hardly existent. 
For influences of affect on switch costs it can be concluded that they do not seem to exist. 
Patterns according to the predictions were found as often as patterns that contradicted those 
predictions. It was assumed that maybe general switch costs would be influenced by affect 
because they also represent maintenance capability (see also paragraph 1.1.2 Task switching 
paradigm), an element that is also supposed to be influenced by affect (Dreisbach, 2006). 
 
 
4.4 Possible Causes for the Observed Result Patterns  
 
In the following paragraph assumed causes for the null findings in the present study are 
discussed. There are technical problems and restrictions related to the affective stimulation 
and the paradigm that might have prevented that affect influences executive functions. 
Furthermore, there are two general theoretical considerations that will be discussed further. 
Firstly, backward inhibition effects and switch costs might not measure executive functions at 
all and secondly, it can also be concluded that executive functions are simply not influenced 
by affect. Each of these possibilities will now be discussed in turn. 
 
 
4.4.1 Technical restrictions 
 
Questioning the choice of tasks used in an experiment is always an option to look for 
explanations when expected effects were not obtained. Especially considering backward 
inhibition effects the tasks in the current study were completely different and much easier 
than the tasks in Mayr and Keele’s original study (2000). However, backward inhibition 
effects have been demonstrated with a lot of different and also much easier tasks (see for 
example Arbuthnott, 2005; Arbuthnott & Frank, 2000; Gade & Koch, 2005; Phillip & Koch, 
2006). Also significant backward inhibition effects were found in nearly 50% of all carried 
out analyses. Regarding switch costs different researchers have discussed influences of tasks 
on switch costs and the general performance (Allport et al. 1994; Monsell, Yeung, & Azuma, 
2000) but a harmful influence of that kind in the presented experiments is very unlikely 
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because switch costs were a very stable measure and reached significance in all experiments. 
Therefore influences caused by the chosen tasks cannot be assumed. 
Two further and more plausible technical causes for the reported experiments’ result patterns 
are going to be discussed now in more detail: the chosen affective manipulation and general 
restrictions of the paradigm. 
 
Affective manipulation 
In the domain of valence as a modulating variable for executive functions a lot of changes are 
imaginable. Maybe affective words or sounds are the better primes in a task switching 
paradigm to detect an affective modulation of executive control functions. Although there is 
no real evidence for such an assumption it might still be worth trying in future experiments. 
The lack of significant interactions between affect and switch costs or backward inhibition 
effects in the current study might also have their origin in limited resources like for example 
attention. According to Baddeley (2007) with a demanding central task, attention has to be 
focused resulting in less attentional capacity for distracting stimuli. That would mean that the 
task switching tasks need that much attention that the distracting stimuli, in this case the 
valent stimuli cannot be processed anymore with the appropriate attention. Of course the 
difficulty of the central task is debatable because the tasks were quite easy compared for 
example with Mayr and Keele’s tasks (2000). However, for switch costs already the third task 
that was included in the paradigm to make backward inhibition analyses possible might have 
increased the difficulty in a sense that make Baddeley’s argument more plausible at least for 
switch costs. 
It can further be assumed that the affective stimulation was not strong enough. The trial by 
trial changes of affect might have weakened its impact. Bradley and colleagues (1999) 
suggest that a stronger affective manipulation would be to present contiguous blocks of 
pleasant or unpleasant stimuli, to create a more tonic, sustained mood state. This was for 
example realised in the experiments by Dreisbach (2006) and Dreisbach and Goschke (2004) 
who found affective influences on executive functions. They achieved their results with a 
between-subjects variation of valence. Still, valent elements were shown in every trial but 
they were of only one valence within a single participant’s testing. The trial by trial switches 
of valence in the current experiments might have been too fast and frequent to allow an 
affective stimulation to unfold a sufficient impact. Maybe a more continuous presentation of 
affect for example in a blocked form would rather make it possible for affective influences on 
executive control measures to take place. However, it has to be noted that PSI theory 
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considers affect switches to be necessary to allow the four systems to work together 
efficiently what would contradict the earlier suggested, more consistent mode of affect 
presentation. 
 
Restrictions of the paradigm 
The choice of task cues might be of some importance for backward inhibition effects. Already 
Arbuthnott (2005; see also Hübner et al., 2003) demonstrated that the cue type can influence 
backward inhibition. Also the overlapping of cue and target seems to play a role. Unaware of 
Druey and Hübner’s (2007) paper during data collection their findings might offer an 
explanation ex post why in the current study’s experiments general backward inhibition 
effects were not found consistently. Those authors could only find backward inhibition effects 
when cue and target were presented temporarily overlapping. A previously applied task set 
was not inhibited when target stimuli and cues were presented separately. The crucial position 
for this effect is n-2. The offered explanation is that with no overlap at position n-2 both 
irrelevant task sets are inhibited at position n-1. Therefore ABA and CBA sequences with no 
overlap should show nearly the same reaction times as ABA sequences with an overlap - what 
they did. In the current study’s experiments 2, 4, and 5 (at least for random feedback) no 
significant backward inhibition effects were found, differences between ABA and CBA 
sequences were often very small. Also, in all these experiments cue and target were presented 
separately. In experiment 3.1 and partly in experiment 6.1 significant backward inhibition 
effects were found and in those two experiments cue and target were presented in an 
overlapping mode inasmuch as the intrinsic cuing in experiment 6.1 can be regarded as a cue 
target overlap. So far the results are in line with Druey and Hübner’s (2007) findings. 
However, some findings do not fit within this explanation. In experiments 1 and 5.1 a 
significant backward inhibition effect was found without a cue target overlap. And in 
experiment 3 (cue = valent prime) with a total cue target overlap a significant backward 
inhibition could have been expected, but it was not observed. Nevertheless, Druey and 
Hübner’s (2007) assumptions should be considered for future experiments. 
Regarding the fact that switch costs represent exogenous and endogenous processes (see 
paragraphs 1.1.2 Task switching paradigm and 1.1.3 Assumed processes underlying switch 
costs) the length of the cue target interval used in the current experiments might be of some 
importance. Preparation intervals of 600ms allowed the maximal reduction of switch costs 
(Rogers & Monsell, 1995). This means all endogenous processes can be executed within this 
time span. The remaining switch costs are only representing the exogenous processes that can 
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only be executed with target onset. The CTI in the current experiments was always 500ms 
(except experiments 6.1 and 6.2). All influences of affect on executive functions could have 
happened within that time span resulting in remaining switch costs that are uninfluenced by 
affect because exogenous processes are not influenced by affect. As a consequence, variations 
in preparation time caused by affect are not represented in the measured switch costs 
anymore. Therefore it could only be stated that with the paradigm that was used in the 
reported experiments an influence of affect on exogenous processes included in switch costs 
can be negated. Whether endogenous processes are influenced by affect cannot be clarified 
with the results at hand following this rationale. Therefore, future experiments should test the 
influence of affect on conventional switch costs with shorter CTIs. With such a modification 
it can be expected that executive processes have also to be executed after target onset and 
therefore also within the measured reaction time. However, please note that in experiment 6.2 
something similar was already tested. With the intrinsic cueing of tasks a cue target interval 
does not exist anymore and preparation as usual is not possible anymore. Influences of affect 
should have been visible within the different switch costs but positive and negative switch 
costs were more similar than ever. Of course the long presentation time of feedback after 
every trial (1000ms) might have been used for preparation (see also paragraph 4.2.1. 
Significant interactions) Therefore, experiments with shorter CTIs are absolutely necessary. 
Both assumptions presented at the end of this paragraph as restrictions of the paradigm allow 
questioning whether the paradigm that was used was able to measure backward inhibition 
effects and switch costs adequately. In general it can be stated that backward inhibition effects 
were found in a sufficient amount of analyses and that switch costs reached significance in all 
experiments. Of course whether the measured switch costs still represent exogenous processes 
or not can still be questioned.  
 
Summing-up this paragraph some technical corrections and adjustments are offered in order 
to increase the possibility of affect to influence executive functions. However, in general it 
can be assumed that affective stimulation worked and executive functions were measured 
with switch costs and backward inhibition effects because main effects of valence, switch 
costs and the backward inhibition effect were found (see further above paragraph 4.1 Main 
Effects of the Backward Inhibition Effect, Switch Costs, and Valence). With that general 
assumption two more conclusions can be drawn from the current study based on theoretical 
considerations. Firstly, backward inhibition effects and switch costs are no measures of 
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executive control and secondly, affect does not influence executive functions. These two 
issues will now be discussed further. 
 
 
4.4.2 Theoretical considerations 
 
Backward inhibition effects and switch costs do not measure executive functions 
It can be hypothesised that the measures that were used in the current experiments, switch 
costs and backward inhibition effects do not measure what they are supposed to. For example 
it is possible to question whether switch costs are an appropriate measure for executive 
control functions at all. This would challenge a very influential and well established line of 
research that started nearly a hundred years ago in 1927 with Jersild’s description of “shift 
loss”. It has already been presented and discussed earlier (see paragraph 1.1.3 Assumed 
processes underlying switch costs) that switch costs include a lot more processes besides the 
processes of interest, the endogenous processes. Therefore the idea of switch costs not 
measuring executive functions is not too farfetched. Already other researchers have 
commented on that topic like Meiran and colleagues (2000) who wrote that switch costs 
“certainly cannot be taken as a measure of executive functioning” (p. 250). According to these 
authors this perspective is supported especially by the fact that dissipating seems to have a 
main share in switch costs. Also the same authors assumed that there are paradigm specific 
effects in task switching. Already little changes in the paradigm can produce great differences. 
Important elements seem to be the tasks themselves, the difficulty of the tasks, the nature of 
the cues if cues are used, and task sequencing. 
Concerning switch costs it has already been mentioned that maybe other measures would be 
better indicators for executive functions. Mayr and Kliegl (2003) demonstrated that switch 
costs can be split into cue switch and task switch costs. The cue switch costs were assumed to 
be a better indicator of executive functions. In experiment 3 three different cues per task were 
used which allowed to analyse cue switch costs and task switch costs. The rationale is to 
differentiate the non-switch trials that are used to calculate ordinary switch costs into trials 
with and without a cue switch. Normally, non-switch trials do not include a cue switch. This 
difference is normally also assumed to add to the size of switch costs because switch trials 
always need a cue switch. However, it has to be noted that in experiment 3 the frequency of 
those three different task pairs differed greatly (non-switch trials without cue switch p = .09; 
non-switch trials with cue switch p = .23; switch trials p = .68). Nonetheless, an analysis was 
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carried out to collect more information that might be useful for future experiments. Instead of 
switch costs cue switch and task switch costs were calculated. Cue switch costs are the 
difference between non-switch trials without a cue switch and non-switch trials with a cue 
switch. Task switch costs are the difference between switch trials that always require a cue 
switch and the non-switch trials with a cue switch. The analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
included the variables switch (non-switch trials without a cue switch, non-switch trials with a 
cue switch, or switch trials) and valence (positive, neutral, or negative). The valence factor 
was again split into the two contrasts positive-neutral and negative-neutral. Results showed 
significant cue switch costs of 303ms (F(1,21) = 97.39, p < .01) and significant task switch 
costs of 238ms (F(1,21) = 76.36, p < .01). Of major interest were the interactions with the two 
contrasts. Whereas the cue switch costs interacted significantly with both contrasts (positive-
neutral: F(1,21) = 5.73, p < .03; negative-neutral: F(1,21) = 5.15, p < .04) task switch costs 
did not interact (both F’s < 1). Task switch costs hardly differed (positive: 230ms; neutral: 
230ms; negative: 255ms) but cue switch costs of 380ms after a neutral cue were large 
compared to after a positive (253ms) and a negative cue (277ms). Assuming that cue switch 
costs represent endogenous processes and executive functions these results show that they are 
influenced and modulated by affect. Considering the results for task switch costs it can even 
be stated that endogenous processes are the only parts of switch costs that are modulated. 
These results give reason to believe that switch costs might be too flawed and include too 
many other processes apart from endogenous ones to be a good measure for executive 
functions. However, it has to be noted that all other experiments with only on cue per trial 
also had cue switch costs included in the measured ordinary switch costs. If cue switch costs 
are influenced by affect in such a dominating way this should have been visible in ordinary 
switch costs although the impact might have been less pronounced because also uninfluenced 
task switch costs are included in those switch costs. 
Concerning backward inhibition effects it has already been questioned whether they are an 
executive function at all (see paragraph 1.1.4 Backward inhibition effect). Therefore also 
backward inhibition effects might not have been the best measure to represent executive 
functions. Hence, an affective influence on executive functions with that measure would be 
difficult to detect in case an interaction between affect and executive control functions really 
exists. 
A confirmation of the idea that backward inhibition effects and switch costs are not measuring 
executive functions can be found in a study by Moritz and colleagues (2004). Patients with 
obsessive-compulsive disorder worked through a task switching experiment. Switch costs and 
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backward inhibition effects were calculated. Two further groups were tested, a healthy control 
group and a mixed anxiety group. Prefrontal areas are supposed to be involved in the clinical 
picture of obsessive-compulsive disorder. Different results were expected for the obsessive-
compulsive disorder group compared to the two other groups because executive functions are 
located in the prefrontal cortex. It was predicted that patients with an obsessive-compulsive 
disorder will have problems to disengage from rumination and therefore larger switch costs 
were expected. This clinical dysfunction is also supposed to be a disorder of disinhibition 
therefore smaller backward inhibition effects were expected. However, none of the 
expectations was met. The obsessive-compulsive disorder patients did not show differences 
concerning switch costs and backward inhibition effects although they showed slowed down 
general reaction times. 
 
Affect does not influence executive functions 
The definite conclusion that is also possible is that affect does not influence executive 
functions at all. This would imply that affective stimulation worked and that backward 
inhibition effects and switch costs were measured and are appropriate measures of executive 
control functions. Influences of valence on the two measures of executive functions were 
extremely weak and inconsistent therefore a modulating influence of affect on those basic 
human functions measured with the task switching paradigm must be denied. This hypothesis 
is supported by some studies that also failed to observe an influence of affective stimulation 
on executive functions. For example Finkelmeyer, Kellermann, Mathiak, and Reske (2009) 
tested if odour can influence cognitive control measured with the Stroop task. Aversive and 
neutral odours could not influence Stroop costs in a significant and consistent way. Brain 
activities recorded with fMRT were also not modulated by the valent odours. Also the results 
of Dreisbach’s study (2006) seem to support the conclusion partly. The difficulties to find the 
predicted effects in that study show that affective influences on executive control functions or 
parts of it are not easy to measure. The reduction of maintenance capability under mild 
positive affect was only achieved after distractors were included in task sequences in the 
second experiment.  
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4.5 Synopsis and Outlook 
 
The nine presented experiments in the current study show that backward inhibition effects are 
hardly influenced by affective stimulation. The same applies for switch costs. They seem to 
be even more robust against affective influences. 
The theoretical conclusion could be that executive functions are not influenced by affect. That 
would put an end to this line of research. However, it can also be concluded that the lack of 
significant interactions results from the two measures backward inhibition effects and switch 
costs. Other measures might be better indicators of executive functions and therefore also able 
to represent affective influences on those functions.  
Besides these two more radical conclusions it was also discussed that maybe slight changes 
and adjustments of the methods that were used might increase the probability to detect 
affective influences on executive control functions. For example using shorter CTIs seems to 
be promising enough because this maximises the amount of endogenous processes being 
measured with switch costs after target onset. For backward inhibition analyses it might be 
helpful to make sure that cue and target are presented in an overlapping manner to increase 
the probability to measure those effects at all. The results of Dreisbach (2006) further suggest 
using global instead of specific switch costs as a measure because the maintenance capability 
that might be influenced by affect is only represented in global switch costs. It is also possible 
to adjust the presentation or the modality of the affective stimuli. Maybe a blockwise 
presentation of different affects or using valence only as a between-subjects factor is a better 
method to present affect. Furthermore, affective sounds or words could provide a better 
stimulation. 
Summing up the current study with the presented experiments and referring to the title of this 
study it can be stated that affective stimulation in terms of primes, cues, and feedback was not 
able to modulate executive functions measured with specific switch costs and the backward 
inhibition effect. 
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6. Summary 
 
In everyday life it is a common observation that people are influenced in their behaviour, their 
actions and performances by affect, emotions, and mood. Emotional influences on one’s life 
are also a personal experience. Everybody can report on situations when emotional and 
affective conditions had an impact on relationships, the job, everyday actions, routines, 
thoughts etc. However, the question is whether that general human experience can be 
measured and represented within a psychological experiment. The aim of the current study 
was to investigate influences of affective stimulation on executive control functions. 
The term executive functions subsumes a number of important human abilities and processes 
that allow action control, action selection, goal pursuit and the regulation and organisation of 
behaviour (Baddeley, 1986, 2007, Kuhl, 1984, 2000; Norman & Shallice, 1986). With the 
task switching paradigm (Jersild, 1927; Rogers & Monsell, 1995) and switch costs as the 
resulting measure parts of these executive functions can be represented. Switching between 
two different tasks (e.g. A and B) requires flexible and stable processing at the same time. 
Attention has to be shifted, tasks sets and response sets switched, and the execution has to be 
shielded against disturbing influences. A further component that might be important for task 
switching is the inhibition of the abandoned task set in order to execute a current task without 
interference. This kind of inhibition is called backward inhibition (Mayr & Keele, 2000) and 
can also be measured with a slightly changed task switching paradigm. Whereas switch costs 
are calculated as the difference between switch (e.g. AB) and non-switch trials (e.g. AA) 
backward inhibition effects require three-task-sequences. The reaction time of the last trial in 
ABA sequences is compared to the reaction time of the last trial in CBA sequences. A switch 
is executed in both cases but in an ABA sequence a recently executed task has to be 
reactivated. Inhibition of this task set (task A), formed to facilitate the execution of the second 
task in the triplet (task B) has to be overcome first when the last task (again task A) has to be 
executed again. Slowed down reaction times for ABA sequences compared to CBA sequences 
are the result. With those two measures, switch costs and backward inhibition effects 
executive functions can be represented adequately. 
The affective stimulation in the current study was realised with affective pictures (from the 
IAPS, Lang et al., 2005) and feedback within the task switching paradigm. A vast amount of 
research dealing with influences of mood on different cognitive performances exists (see Isen, 
1999, 2000; Levine & Pizarro, 2004 for reviews). However, the examined cognitive functions 
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are normally quite complex (e.g. creativity or making judgments) and mood as affective 
stimulation differs considerably from the short affective stimulation that was intended in the 
current study. Moods are long lasting, object-free, and of low intensity floating in the 
background whereas affect is short, of higher intensity and sometimes an action tendency is 
included. Therefore all explanatory models based on mood research are not useable to 
generate hypotheses for the current study. Also classical models of executive functions (see 
Baddeley, 1986, 2007; Norman & Shallice, 1986) do hardly include emotional or affective 
elements that allow deducing useful hypotheses. Therefore two quite different models were 
used, the first one rather being a personality model and a second model of neuropsychological 
and -physiological origin. The PSI theory (Kuhl, 1996, 2000, 2001) and the dopaminergic 
theory (Ashby et al., 1999; Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004) allowed deducing hypotheses about 
affective influences on switch costs and backward inhibition effects. Both theories predict 
smaller switch costs with positive affect compared to neutral affect due to a reduction of 
reaction times for switch trials. For positive affect PSI theory assumes facilitation for the 
difficult switch trials and the dopaminergic theory predicts enhanced flexibility that supports 
executing switch trials. A further but also more speculative prediction by PSI theory is larger 
switch costs with negative compared to neutral affect due to increased reaction times for 
switch trials because negative affect disturbs the connection between planning and executing 
systems. Concerning backward inhibition effects both theories predict smaller effects with 
positive compared to neutral affect. That is due to reduced reaction times for ABA sequences 
with positive affect. PSI theory assumes that positive affect helps to overcome once formed 
inhibition. The dopaminergic theory offers two explanations. Firstly, latencies can be reduced 
with positive affect because increased distractibility weakens inhibition or secondly, the 
positive affect weakens maintenance capability which also disturbs the forming of inhibition 
in the first place. Less inhibition used after the first trial in a triplet accelerates reaction times 
for the last trial because less inhibition has to be overcome before being able to execute the 
current task. 
These hypotheses were tested in nine experiments. In the first four experiments affect was 
realised in terms of affective pictures from the IAPS (Lang et al., 2005) as primes that were 
irrelevant for task execution and presented before the tasks or as cues for the tasks. These 
experiments could not reveal a significant interaction as predicted by PSI theory and the 
dopaminergic theory although it was tried throughout the four experiments to intensify the 
focus on the valence information. In the end with the pictures as cues for the tasks the 
relevance was maximised. Afterwards feedback was used as the valent element. After every 
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task feedback was shown depending on accuracy and response speed. However, also with this 
manipulation a significant interaction as predicted could not be observed, at least not with 
random feedback when valence and performance were not confounded.  
According to these results it could be concluded that affective stimulation does not influence 
executive control functions or that backward inhibition effects and switch costs do not 
measure executive functions at all. However, before such definite conclusions can be drawn 
some further possibilities were discussed that can explain at least parts of the null findings or 
give reasons why no affective modulation was detected. For example technical problems 
concerning the paradigm might be sorted out first. Or maybe the affective stimulation should 
be adjusted. These possible changes are recommended to be considered for future 
experiments. 
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7. Zusammenfassung 
 
Aus dem täglichen Leben kennt jeder die Erfahrung, dass einen Emotionen und Stimmungen 
beeinflussen. Das emotionale Erleben beeinflusst zwischenmenschliche Beziehungen, die 
Arbeit, alltägliche Routinehandlungen, das Denken und die kognitive Leistungsfähigkeit. Das 
Ziel dieser Studie war es nun diese menschlichen Erfahrungswerte in ein psychologisches 
Experiment zu übertragen und sie dadurch messbar zu machen. Es wurde der Einfluss 
affektiver Stimulation auf exekutive Funktionen untersucht.  
Unter dem Begriff exekutive Funktionen werden häufig viele verschiedene wichtige 
Funktionen und  menschliche Fähigkeiten zusammengefasst. Diese Fähigkeiten ermöglichen 
Verhaltensregulation und -organisation, sowie Handlungskontrolle und Handlungsauswahl 
auszuüben (Baddeley, 1986, 2007; Kuhl, 1984, 2000; Norman & Shallice, 1986). Das so 
genannte Task-switching-Paradigma und die damit berechenbaren Wechselkosten (Jersild, 
1927; Rogers & Monsell, 1995) erlauben es, Teile dieser exekutiven Funktionen abzubilden. 
Um zwischen zwei unterschiedlichen Aufgaben (z.B. A und B) zu wechseln wird eine flexible 
aber gleichzeitig auch stabile Verarbeitung benötigt. Aufmerksamkeit muss neu ausgerichtet 
werden, Aufgaben- und Antwortsets müssen gewechselt werden und die Bearbeitung der 
Aufgabe muss gegen störende Einflüsse abgeschirmt werden. Eine weitere Komponente die 
für das Wechseln zwischen Aufgaben wichtig ist, ist die Inhibition des Aufgabensets das 
gerade eben noch bearbeitet wurde. Mayr und Keele (2000) nannten diese Art der Inhibition 
„Backward Inhibition“. Durch kleinere Veränderungen am gewöhnlich verwendeten Task-
swicthing-Paradigma können auch Daten zur Berechnung von Backward Inhibition Effekten 
erhoben werden. Wechselkosten werden aus der Differenz zwischen Aufgabenwechseln (z.B. 
AB) und Aufgabenwiederholungen (z.B. AA) gewonnen. Für die Berechnung von Backward 
Inhibition Effekten werden Reihen von jeweils drei Aufgaben benötigt. Die Reaktionszeit der 
letzten Aufgabe in einer ABA-Reihe wird mit der Reaktionszeit der letzten Aufgabe in einer 
CBA-Reihe verglichen. In beiden Fällen wird am Ende ein Aufgabenwechsel absolviert, 
jedoch muss in der ABA-Reihe eine erst kürzlich (nämlich am Anfang der Reihe) bearbeitete 
Aufgabe wieder reaktiviert und erneut bearbeitet werden. Das Aufgabenset von Aufgabe A 
wird bei der Bearbeitung von Aufgabe B inhibiert um deren Ausführung zu erleichtern. Diese 
Inhibition muss dann zuerst überwunden werden bevor Aufgabe A erneut am Ende der ABA-
Reihe absolviert werden kann. Das verlangsamt die Reaktionszeiten von ABA-Reihen im 
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Vergleich zu CBA-Reihen. Die Abbildung von exekutiven Funktionen ist durch die beiden 
Maße Backward Inhibition Effekt und Wechselkosten gewährleistet. 
Die affektive Stimulation wurde in der vorliegenden Studie durch affektive Bilder aus dem 
IAPS (Lang et al., 2005) und valentem Feedback verwirklicht. Es existiert eine Vielzahl von 
Forschungsergebnissen zu Einflüssen von Stimmung auf das Denken (siehe Übersichtsartikel 
von Isen, 1999, 2000; Levine & Pizarro, 2004). Jedoch wurden in diesem Forschungsgebiet 
meist recht komplexe Fähigkeiten wie Kreativität oder Urteilsfindung untersucht. Des 
Weiteren unterscheidet sich Stimmung als affektive Manipulation stark von den kurzen 
affektiven Stimulationen die in der vorliegenden Studie verwendet werden sollten. 
Stimmungen sind lang andauernd, objektfrei und haben lediglich eine schwache Intensität. Sie 
bilden eher einen längere Zeit gleich bleibenden Gefühlshintergrund für das menschliche 
Handeln und Fühlen. Affekt hingegen wirkt kürzer, ist von stärkerer Intensität und beinhaltet 
manchmal sogar Handlungstendenzen und -motivationen. Diese Unterschiede machen es 
unmöglich die Erklärungsmodelle der Stimmungsforschung auf Einflüsse kurzer affektiver 
Stimulation auf exekutive Funktionen zu übertragen. Auch aus den klassischen Modellen für 
exekutive Funktionen (siehe Baddeley, 1986, 2007; Norman & Shallice, 1986) lassen sich 
keine brauchbaren Hypothesen für die vorliegende Studie ableiten. Deshalb wurden zwei 
recht unterschiedliche Modelle zur Hypothesenbildung herangezogen. Die PSI Theorie (Kuhl, 
1996, 2000, 2001) bietet ein Modell, das eher dem Bereich der Persönlichkeitspsychologie zu 
zuordnen ist. Die dopaminerge Theorie (Ashby et al., 1999; Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004) 
hingegen kommt aus der neuropsychologischen und -physiologischen Forschung. Beide 
Theorien sagen niedrigere Wechselkosten bei positivem Affekt im Vergleich zu neutralem 
Affekt voraus. Dieser Effekt soll vor allem durch eine Verringerung der Reaktionszeiten für 
Aufgabenwechsel zustande kommen. Die PSI Theorie führt das auf Bahnungseffekte durch 
positiven Affekt zurück, die dopaminerge Theorie auf erhöhte Flexibilität was in beiden 
Fällen die Bearbeitung der schwierigen Aufgabenwechseldurchgänge erleichtert und 
beschleunigt. Eine weitere, eher spekulative Vorhersage der PSI Theorie zu negativem Affekt 
besagt, dass sich die Wechselkosten im Vergleich zu neutralem Affekt erhöhen. Die Ursache 
dafür wird in der Störung der Bahnung zwischen planenden und ausführenden Systemteilen 
des Modells gesehen. Bezüglich Backward Inhibition Effekten sagen beide Theorien 
niedrigere Effekte mit positivem im Vergleich zu neutralem Affekt vorher aufgrund 
verringerter Reaktionszeiten für ABA-Reihen. Laut PSI Theorie kommt es zu diesen 
schnelleren Reaktionszeiten weil der positive Affekt hilft die aufgebaute Inhibition schneller 
zu überwinden. Die dopaminerge Theorie bietet zwei Erklärungen. Höhere Ablenkbarkeit 
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verursacht durch positiven Affekt verringert die Menge an eingesetzter Inhibition oder der 
positive Affekt schwächt die Fähigkeit Aufgabenelemente aufrecht zu erhalten was auch die 
Notwendigkeit des Einsatzes von Inhibition verringert. In beiden Fällen wird am Anfang einer 
Aufgabensequenz weniger Inhibition gebildet, somit wird die Ausführung von ABA-Reihe 
erleichtert, da am Ende weniger Inhibition überwunden werden muss. 
Diese Hypothesen wurden in neun Experimenten getestet. In den ersten vier Experimenten 
wurde Affekt in Form von affektiven Bildern vor einer Aufgabe eingesetzt, entweder als 
irrelevanter Prime oder als konkreter Hinweisreiz für die Aufgaben. Die von den beiden 
Theorien vorhergesagten Interaktionen konnten nicht gefunden werden obwohl nach dem 
ersten Experiment versucht wurde die affektive Stimulation immer mehr zu verstärken bis hin 
zu Experiment 3 indem die affektiven Bilder selbst die Hinweisreize für die Aufgaben waren. 
Danach wurde Feedback als valentes Element eingesetzt. Nach jeder Aufgabe wurde ein 
leistungsbezogenes Feedback gezeigt. Jedoch konnte auch mit dieser Veränderung keine 
signifikante Interaktion erzielt werden, vor allem nicht mit zufälligem Feedback bei dem 
keine Konfundierung mehr zwischen Valenz und Leistung vorlag. 
Diese Ergebnisse legen den Schluss nahe, dass kurze affektive Reize exekutive 
Kontrollfunktionen nicht beeinflussen können beziehungsweise, dass Backward Inhibition 
Effekte und Wechselkosten kein exekutive Funktionen messen. Jedoch sollten solch 
endgültige Schlüsse erst gezogen werden, wenn alle anderen Erklärungsmöglichkeiten, die 
zum Teil auch diskutiert wurden ausgeschöpft sind. Es wurde zum Beispiel diskutiert, dass 
eventuell Veränderung am Paradigma und die Beseitigung von technischen Problemen die 
Bedingungen um affektive Einflüsse auf exekutive Funktionen festzustellen, verbessern 
könnten. Diese Veränderungen sollten für zukünftige Experimente unbedingt in Betracht 
gezogen werden. 
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